Knowledge of the subordinates' intent

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 29.09.2014 KAREMERA & NGIRUMPATSE
(ICTR-98-44-A)

307.   […] In the case of specific intent crimes such as genocide, the Appeals Chamber has found that this requires proof that the superior was aware of the criminal intent of the subordinate.[1] In most cases, the superior’s knowledge or reason to know of his subordinate’s genocidal intent will be inferred from the circumstances of the case.[2]

[1] See Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 114, fn. 257 (finding that a commander must have reason to know of the facts in question that make the conduct criminal). This is the same approach that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has taken with holding a superior responsible for other crimes which require proof of specific intent or other attendant circumstances. See, e.g., Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 155 (finding that, to hold a superior responsible for torture, it must be established that the superior had information that a beating inflicted by a subordinate is for one of the prohibited purposes provided for in the prohibition against torture).

[2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 524.

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ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3)