|Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005||
202. The parties have addressed the effects of these prior interlocutory appeals decisions by reference to the doctrine of res judicata. This doctrine refers to a situation when “a final judgement on the merits” issued by a competent court on a claim, demand or cause of action between parties constitutes an absolute bar to “a second lawsuit on the same claim” between the same parties. The doctrine of res judicata is not directly applicable to this case, because it applies not to the effects of prior interlocutory appeals decisions on further proceedings in the same case, but instead to the effects of final judgements in one case on proceedings in a subsequent and different case. However, a similar principle applies to cases like this one: the Appeals Chamber ordinarily treats its prior interlocutory decisions as binding in continued proceedings in the same case as to all issues definitively decided by those decisions. This principle prevents parties from endlessly relitigating the same issues, and is necessary to fulfil the very purpose of permitting interlocutory appeals: to allow certain issues to be finally resolved before proceedings continue on other issues.
203. There is an exception to this principle, however. In a Tribunal with only one tier of appellate review, it is important to allow a meaningful opportunity for the Appeals Chamber to correct any mistakes it has made. Thus, under the jurisprudence of this Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber may reconsider a previous interlocutory decision under its “inherent discretionary power” to do so “if a clear error of reasoning has been demonstrated or if it is necessary to do so to prevent an injustice.”
 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). A limited exception to the doctrine of res judicata barring review of final judgements is found under Article 25 of the Statute and Rules 120 and 121 of the Rules whereby a final judgement may be reviewed when a new fact is discovered that was not known at the time of the original proceedings either before the Trial or Appeals Chambers, could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and could have been a decisive factor in reaching the final decision.
 Under this Tribunal’s jurisprudence, interlocutory appeal decisions are not considered “final judgements” unless they terminate the proceedings between the parties, which is not the case here. See Barayagwiza, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), paras. 49, 51.
 Cf. Čelebići Case Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras. 48-60.
 Nahimana et al [Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A], Decision on Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Request for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber Decision of 19 January 2005, [4 February 2005], p. 2.
|Decision on Revocation of Referral - 04.10.2016||
29. The Appeals Chamber further finds that Uwinkindi fails to establish that the non-inclusion of the charge of complicity in genocide in his ICTR Indictment prohibited its inclusion in his indictment before the Rwandan High Court in view of the res judicata principle. Res judicata arises only when there is an identity of parties, identity of issues, and importantly a final determination of those issues in the previous decision by a court competent to decide them. Notably, the litigation before the ICTR concerning the inclusion of complicity in genocide in Uwinkindi’s indictment did not result in a final determination and the Rwandan Prosecution was not a party to it.
 See Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, Decision on a Motion for Redacted Versions of Decisions Issued under Rule 75(H) of the ICTY Rules, 18 July 2016, p. 4 and references cited therein; The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Decision on the Kingdom of Belgium’s Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief and on the Defence Application to Strike Out the Observations of the Kingdom of Belgium Concerning the Preliminary Response by the Defence, 12 February 2001, para. 11.
 Specifically, Trial Chamber III of the ICTR subsequently confirmed the initial indictment against Uwinkindi but ordered the Prosecution to amend it to clearly indicate what facts could support Uwinkindi’s involvement in the crime of complicity in genocide; the decision did not require the Prosecution to drop the charge. See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Confirmation of Indictment, 3 September 2001, paras. 7, 9.
|Decision on Redacted Versions of Decisions - 18.07.2016||
CONSIDERING that legal certainty presupposes respect for the principle of res judicata, which holds that no party is entitled to seek a review of a final and binding decision or judgment merely for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and a fresh determination of the same issue;
 See Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, 23 May 2005, para. 202 (“The doctrine [of res judicata] refers to a situation when ‘a final judgement on the merits’ issued by a competent court on a claim, demand or cause of action between parties constitutes an absolute bar to a ‘second lawsuit on the same claim’ between the same parties”). See also, e.g., Brumărescu v. Romania  ECHR 105 at para. 61, (“[o]ne of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires, inter alia, that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question”); Ryabykh v. Russia  ECHR 396 at para. 52 (“Legal certainty presupposes respect for the principle of res judicata, that is the principle of finality of judgments. This principle underlines that no party is entitled to seek a review of a final and binding judgment merely for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and a fresh determination of the case”).