The ICTR Appeals Chamber held that the decision of the President of the Tribunal on early release are final and cannot be subject to appeal:

3. The Appeals Chamber cannot identify any legal basis for its consideration of this appeal. Article 27 of the Statute of the Tribunal places the ultimate decision on pardon and commutation of sentences in the exclusive discretion of the President of the Tribunal upon consultation with the Judges of the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not provide for appellate review of such a decision. Finally, Article 10 of the Tribunal’s Practice Direction concerning the appropriate procedure for determination of applications for pardon, commutation, or early release of persons convicted by the Tribunal makes clear that the President’s decision is final and not subject to appeal.[1]

In sentencing the Appellant to life imprisonment, the Trial Chamber stated:

The then competent court (Rule 104 of the Rules) shall review this sentence and if appropriate suspend the execution of the remainder of the punishment of imprisonment for life and grant early release, if necessary on probation, if: (1) 20 years have been served calculated in accordance with Rule 101(C) from the date of Dr. Stakić’s deprivation of liberty for the purposes of these proceedings, this being the “date of review”[;] (2) In reaching a decision to suspend the sentence, the following considerations, inter alia, shall be taken into account: the importance of the legal interest threatened in case of recidivism; the conduct of the convicted person while serving his sentence; the personality of the convicted person, his previous history and the circumstances of his acts; the living conditions of the convicted person and the effects which can be expected as a result of the suspension[.][1]

The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber acted “ultra vires”[2] in imposing a review obligation on the Host State whereas Article 28 of the Statute, Rule 123 of the Rules, the Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release,[3] and the Model Agreement for enforcing sentences[4] “each provide that eligibility of a convicted person for pardon, early release or commutation of sentence is determined by the law of the State in which the convicted person is serving his sentence”.[5] It also found that, by vesting the courts of the Host States with the power to suspend the sentence, the Trial Chamber removed the power of the President of the Tribunal[6] to make the final determination regarding the sentence.[7]