|Appeal Judgement - 20.10.2010||
86. The Appeals Chamber has explained that an “aider and abettor commit[s]] acts specifically aimed at assisting, encouraging, or lending moral support for the perpetration of a specific crime, and that this support ha[s] a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.” Whether a particular contribution qualifies as “substantial” is a “fact-based inquiry”; such assistance need not “serve as condition precedent for the commission of the crime.” With regard to the mens rea required for aiding and abetting, the Appeals Chamber has held that “[t]]he requisite mental element [...]] is knowledge that the acts performed assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal perpetrator.” Specific intent crimes such as genocide require that “the aider and abettor must know of the principal perpetrator’s specific intent.”
87. Kalimanzira’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he made a substantial contribution to the killings at Kabuye hill is not convincing. The Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that he substantially contributed to the massacre by encouraging Tutsis to seek refuge at Kabuye hill and by providing armed reinforcements to those trying to kill the Tutsis there. Kalimanzira’s assertion that he did not substantially aid the assault on Kabuye hill rests on his claim that no credible witnesses who were also principal perpetrators placed him there. However, this claim does not take into account the evidence provided by Tutsi survivors of the attacks. It was on the basis of their testimonies that the Trial Chamber placed him at Kabuye hill on 23 April 1994. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not necessary for a principal perpetrator to be aware of the aider and abettor’s contribution. It further recalls the Trial Chamber’s finding that the attacks at Kabuye hill involved a large number of individuals over a broad terrain and long period of time. In this context, it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to conclude that Kalimanzira provided substantial assistance to the massacre at Kabuye hill even if this assistance was not known to principal perpetrators who testified before it.
Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 44. See also Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, para. 79; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 127.
 Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 134.
 Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, para. 79.
 Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 127.
 See Kalimanzira Appeal Brief, paras. 196-201. See also Kalimanzira Reply Brief [Callixte Kalimanzira’s Brief in Reply, 13 April 2010] para. 24.
 See Trial Judgement, paras. 379-383, 393.
 See Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
 See Trial Judgement, paras. 386, 387.
 The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting a crime may occur before, during, or after the principal crime has been perpetrated, and that the location at which the actus reus takes place may be removed from the location of the principal crime.” Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 48. See also Blagoje Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 85.
|ICTR Statute Article 6(1) ICTY Statute Article 7(1)|
|Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012||
LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
437. The Trial Chamber found that Sredoje Lukić, through his armed presence at and/or around the Memić House, provided practical assistance to the commission of the crimes committed at the Memić House and therefore found him guilty of aiding and abetting the crimes of cruel treatment as a violation of the laws or customs of war and other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity. The Trial Chamber correctly observed that the practical assistance of an aider and abetter must have a “substantial effect” upon the commission of the crimes in order for the actus reus to be established. However, in finding that the actus reus of aiding and abetting was established, the Trial Chamber did not explicitly find that Sredoje Lukić’s practical assistance had a “substantial effect” on the commission of the crimes of cruel treatment as a violation of the laws or customs of war and other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity. The Appeals Chamber considers that an explicit finding of “substantial effect” should have been made and that the Trial Chamber’s failure to do so constitutes an error. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that this error invalidates the Trial Judgement.
438. […] the Appeals Chamber recalls that the question whether an act has a substantial effect on the commission of a crime necessitates a fact-based inquiry. […]
 Trial Judgement, para. 986.
 Trial Judgement, para. 901.
 See Trial Judgement, para. 984.
 Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 134.
|Appeal Judgement - 16.11.2012||
GOTOVINA & MARKAČ
149. With respect to aiding and abetting, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber did not explicitly find whether Markač made a “substantial contribution” to relevant crimes by the Special Police. While the Trial Chamber concluded that the evidence it considered proved that Markač’s Failure to Act constituted a significant contribution to the JCE, the Appeals Chamber has held that the threshold for finding a “significant contribution” to a JCE is lower than the “substantial contribution” required to enter a conviction for aiding and abetting. Thus the Trial Chamber’s finding of a significant contribution is not equivalent to the substantial contribution required to enter a conviction for aiding and abetting.
 See generally [Gotovina and Markač] Trial Judgement.
 See [Gotovina and Markač Appeal Judgement], para. 138.
 See Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 97; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 229. Judge Agius dissents in relation to this paragraph.