Complexity of the case
|Appeal Judgement - 04.02.2013||
MUGENZI AND MUGIRANEZA (Government II)
32. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “because of the Tribunal’s mandate and of the inherent complexity of the cases before the Tribunal, it is not unreasonable to expect that the judicial process will not always be as expeditious as before domestic courts”. In the circumstances of this case, which is one of the largest ever heard by the Tribunal, the significant period of time which elapsed during these proceedings can be reasonably explained by its size and complexity. The pace of the trial was not dissimilar from that of other multi-accused trials, where no undue delay has been identified. As a result, the fact that some multi-accused cases may have proceeded at a more accelerated pace does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that the duration of proceedings in this case amounted to undue delay.
33. Although the size and complexity of the case resulted from the Prosecution’s decision to jointly charge four senior government officials, Mugiraneza fails to demonstrate that this decision improperly prolonged his trial. The Appeals Chamber also considers speculative Mugenzi’s contention that investigative failings resulted in the size and complexity of the case or that the Prosecution acted impermissibly simply because much of the Prosecution’s case at trial was deemed unproven. The Appeals Chamber likewise dismisses Mugiraneza’s unsubstantiated contention that the Prosecution’s disclosure violations resulted in undue delay.
 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1076.
 In the Bagosora et al. case, involving the trial of four senior military officers, the trial chamber heard 242 witnesses over the course of 408 trial days in proceedings which lasted 11 years. See Bagosora et al. Trial Judgement, paras. 76, 78, 84. See also Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 38 (dismissing Anatole Nsengiyumva’s challenge to undue delay in the proceedings). In the Nahimana et al. case, the Appeals Chamber held that a period of seven years and eight months between the arrest of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and the issuance of the trial chamber’s judgement did not constitute undue delay, with the exception of some initial delays which violated his fundamental rights. In particular, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that Barayagwiza’s case was particularly complex due to the multiplicity of counts, the number of accused, witnesses, and exhibits, as well as the complexity of the facts and law. See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1072-1077. This case is nearly twice the size of the Nahimana et al. case. Compare Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, paras. 50, 94 (93 witnesses over the course of 238 trial days) with Trial Judgement, para. 76 (171 witnesses over the course of 399 trial days).
|Appeal Judgement - 09.10.2012||
GATETE Jean Baptiste
29. Whether a case is sufficiently complex to justify lengthy pre-trial detention is, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In the present instance, the Trial Chamber correctly observed that the case against Gatete could not be compared to multi-accused trials, which run for years and involve hundreds of trial days, hundreds of witnesses, and over a thousand exhibits. However, despite this assessment, the Trial Chamber found that the case was complex in light of the number of counts, allegations, and nature of the crimes charged. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber erred in this regard. Although the Indictment alleges crimes pertaining to different modes of liability and several different incidents, the Prosecution was nonetheless able to present its case in 13 days. Moreover, the whole trial in this single-accused case ran for only 30 days, during which 49 witnesses were called and 146 exhibits were admitted. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that the allegations against Gatete justified a pre-trial delay of over seven years. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in finding the case particularly complex and in relying on this as one of the factors to support its finding that the pre-trial delay was not undue.
 Cf. Renzaho Appeal Judgement, paras. 238-240.
 Trial Judgement, para. 60.
 Trial Judgement, paras. 60, 64.
 Trial Judgement, Annex A, para. 14.
 See Trial Judgement, para. 60. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber recognises that all 22 witnesses called by the Prosecution were eye-witnesses who gave relatively short, uncomplicated testimony, and that no expert witnesses were called.
 The Appeals Chamber considers that, although the Trial Chamber erred in its evaluation of the complexity of the case, it took into account the correct factors, including the fact that the case had been selected for referral to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the Rules. See Trial Judgement, para. 64.
|ICTR Statute Article 20(4)(c) ICTY Statute Article 21(4)(c)|
|Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015||
NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
359. Turning to the merits of the submissions before it, the Appeals Chamber recalls that, as previously held, the length of an accused’s detention does not in itself constitute undue delay, and the fact that the co-Appellants had been detained for many years at the time of the issuance of the Trial Judgement is insufficient, in itself, to show that the Trial Chamber erred in its determination that there was no undue delay in the proceedings. Because of the Tribunal’s mandate and of the inherent complexity of the cases before it, it is not unreasonable to expect that the judicial process will not always be as expeditious as before domestic courts.
360. It is well established in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence that the complexity of a case is one of the factors to be taken into account when assessing whether undue delay has occurred. A number of factors are relevant to determining the level of complexity of a particular case, including the number of counts, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the quantity of evidence, and the complexity of the facts and of the law.
 See Ntabakuze Appeal Judgement, para. 20.
 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1076. See also Mugenzi and Mugiraneza Appeal Judgement, para. 32.
 Cf. Mugenzi and Mugiraneza Appeal Judgement, para. 30; Gatete Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1074.
 Cf. Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 238; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1074. See also Rwamakuba Appeal Decision, para. 13.
|Decision on Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal - 21.04.2016||
CONSIDERING that, pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism (“Rules”), parties seeking to appeal a trial judgement are to file a notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date on which the written judgement was filed;
RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 154 of the Rules, the time limits prescribed in the Rules may be enlarged on good cause being shown;
CONSIDERING the length of the Trial Judgment and the significant complexity of this case;
CONSIDERING FURTHER that is in the interests of justice to ensure that parties have sufficient time to prepare meaningful notices of appeal in full conformity with the applicable provisions;
CONSIDERING the need to weigh carefully the interests in safeguarding expeditious proceedings before the Mechanism and allowing sufficient time for the parties to prepare their respective cases;
CONSIDERING that the reasons justifying an extension to file Karadžić’s notice of appeal also apply to the Prosecution and that a synchronised schedule for filing any notices of appeal in this case will assist the effective case management and is, therefore, in the interests of justice;
 See Trial Judgement, para. 6 (“The prodigious amount of evidence in this case included the testimony of 434 witnesses who appeared before the Chamber, the evidence in writing of 152 other witnesses and a total of 11, 469 exhibits representing 191, 040 pages. A total of 48, 121 transcript pages recorded the daily proceedings and 94, 917 pages of filings were submitted to the Chamber. The scope of the Indictment and the high profile of the Accused conjointly contributed to the unprecedented nature of this case.”). In addition, the Trial Judgment is 2,607 pages long, including annexes.
|IRMCT Rule Rule 133; Rule 154|
|Decision on a Motion for an Extension of a Word Limit - 08.09.2016||
RECALLING that, pursuant to paragraphs 6(a) and 7 of the Practice Direction on Lengths of Briefs and Motions, an appellant’s and a respondent’s briefs in an appeal from a trial judgment should not exceed 30,000 words where the appeal is not restricted to sentencing issues;
RECALLING that, pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Practice Direction, a party must seek advance authorization to exceed the word limits set out in the Practice Direction, and must provide an explanation of the exceptional circumstances that necessitate the oversized filing;
RECALLING FURTHER that, pursuant to the same paragraph of the Practice Direction, a judge may dispose of a motion for an extension of a word limit without hearing the other party unless it is considered that there is a risk that the other party may be prejudiced;
EMPHASIZING that the quality and effectiveness of an appeal brief do not depend on its length, but on the clarity and cogency of the arguments presented and that, therefore, excessively long briefs do not necessarily facilitate the efficient administration of justice;
 Practice Direction on Lengths of Briefs and Motions, MICT/11, 6 August 2013 (“Practice Direction”).
 Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Decision on Stanišić’s Urgent Request for Extension of Word Limit, 31 October 2013 (“Stanišić and Simatović Decision of 31 October 2013”), p. 2; Georges A.N. Rutaganda v The Prosecutor, Case No. IT-96-03-R68, Decision on Motion for Leave to Exceed the Word Limit, 23 February 2010, p. 2.
|Other instruments Paragraphs 6(a), 7, and 17 of the Practice Direction on Lengths of Briefs and Motions|