In its Rutaganda Decision on Leave to Appeal, the Appeals Chamber also considered the submissions of the Registrar and the Applicant relating to the Applicant’s ability to access to his file whilst in detention at the United Nationa Detention Facility in Arusha (“UNDF”), and held:

pp. 2-3: RECALLING that on 22 January 2009, the Appeals Chamber ordered the Registrar, pursuant to Rule 33(B) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”), to make a written submission to the Appeals Chamber explaining whether, at present and until his transfer to a third State, the Applicant continues to have access to the appropriate facilities and the files and documentation required to prepare his appeal against the Decision of 3 April 2008;[1]

CONSIDERING the correspondence from the Applicant to the Commander of the UNDF dated 23 January 2009, wherein the Applicant explains that, in anticipation of his imminent transfer, he packed his documents and therefore, whilst he still has possession of these materials, his access to them is more difficult;[2]

CONSIDERING that on 28 January 2009, the Registrar submitted that the Applicant continues to have access to the appropriate facilities, files, and documentation required to prepare his appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 3 April 2008;[3]

CONSIDERING therefore that since the Applicant has had continued access to his files, he has failed to demonstrate that for the filing of his appeal he needs additional time until after his transfer to the State in which his sentence is to be served[.]

6. […] Niyitegeka is not seeking clarification of any of the Appeals Chamber’s previous rulings or decisions, but is instead requesting legal advice concerning potential jurisdictions that could determine anew the validity of his conviction and rule on the alleged violations of his right to a fair trial. The Appeals Chamber considers that it is not within its remit to do so; the Appeals Chamber does not have advisory power,[1] in particular concerning other jurisdictions.

In reaching this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber stressed that “the charges against Niyitegeka have already been determined and that his conviction has been confirmed on appeal; he is not an accused before the Tribunal but a convicted person whose case has reached finality”. Hence, it found Niyitegeka’s references to Article 19(1), 20(2) and 20(4)(d) of the Statute of the Tribunal inapplicable to his current situation. (para. 5).

10. […] in order to carry out their duties in full, counsel recognized, assigned, or appointed by the Registrar as acting for an accused or convicted person must, in principle, automatically have access to the complete record of the proceedings to which their client is entitled.[1] […]

8.          […] neither the Statute nor the Rules of the Mechanism […] expressly provides for an appeal as of right against a decision issued by a Single Judge on a matter concerning financial assistance to a convicted person released pending his relocation. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter before it relates to the Mechanism’s duty to ensure the welfare of released persons pending their relocation.[1] Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that it has considered appeals of decisions rendered by a Single Judge in matters that dispose of discrete litigation after the close of trial and appeal proceedings.[2] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the present matter raises issues over which the Appeals Chamber may exercise jurisdiction and will consider the Appeal.

[…]

15.       […] there is nothing in the Mechanism’s legal framework. including in the Appeals Chamber’s binding jurisprudence on the matter, or in the provisions in the Mali Enforcement Agreement that requires the Mechanism to provide financial assistance to a convicted person who has completed serving his or her sentence and has been released on the territory of the enforcement State.