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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

328. The Appeals Chamber holds that the Trial Chamber permissibly considered Blagojević’s participation in de-mining activities under the broad category of post-conflict conduct that goes to the character of the accused. In the Babić Sentencing Appeal, the Appeals Chamber observed that “[n]either the Statute nor the Rules exhaustively define the factors which may be taken into account by a Trial Chamber in mitigation or aggravation of a sentence.”[1] In that case, the Appeals Chamber provided a non-exhaustive list of twelve factors that have been taken into account in connection with mitigation. Notably, the Babić Appeals Chamber placed remorse within the broader context of the “character of the accused after the conflict”.[2] The Appeals Chamber did not specify how other post-conflict conduct – distinguishable from remorse – could evidence the character of the accused in mitigation of a sentence. Leaving such considerations to the Trial Chambers, the Appeals Chamber recognized that they are “endowed with a considerable degree of discretion in deciding on the factors which may be taken into account”.[3] In the present case, the Trial Chamber considered that Blagojević’s active engagement in planning, managing, and organizing a system of de-mining in the army of the Republika Srpska was a relevant mitigating circumstance, without placing it under the rubric of remorse.[4]

330. The Appeals Chamber […] considers that conduct of an accused that promotes reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia may be considered as a mitigating circumstance whether or not it is directly connected to the harm the accused caused. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Plavsić and Miodrag Jokić cases do not stand for a different proposition. In the Plavsić Sentencing Judgement, the Trial Chamber credited Biljana Plavsić for “ensuring that the Dayton Agreement was accepted and implemented in Republika Srpska.”[5] In the case of Miodrag Jokić, the Trial Chamber credited him for post-war “participat[ion] in political activities programmatically aimed at promoting a peaceful solution to the conflicts in the region.”[6] Similarly, the Trial Chamber here credited Blagojević for taking a leadership role in implementing one aspect of the Dayton Peace Accords, as previous Trial Chambers, cited by the Prosecution, have credited convicted persons for implementing that agreement.

[1] Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43.

[2] Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43, citing Miodrag Jokić Sentencing Judgement, paras. 90, 92 (finding that Miodrag Jokić’s “post-conflict conduct” “reflect[ed] his sincere remorse”).

[3] Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43, quoting Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 780.

[4] The Appeals Chamber notes that remorse is not mentioned in the operative paragraphs considering Blagojević’s de-mining activities. See Trial Judgement, paras. 858-860.

[5] Plavsić Sentencing Judgement, para. 94.

[6] Miodrag Jokić Sentencing Judgement, para. 91.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

344. […] Nor does the Prosecution demonstrate error in the weight accorded by the Trial Chamber to Jokić’s voluntary surrender. The Prosecution argues that an accused is under an obligation to surrender to the International Tribunal,[1] but this does not mean that doing so may not be considered in mitigation,[2] as the Trial Chamber did here. Although voluntary surrender is not cooperation with the Prosecution per se, it is cooperation with the International Tribunal, and the Trial Chamber could consider it a mitigating circumstance. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber dismisses this sub-ground of the appeal. […]

[1] Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 6.54 (stating that an accused is required to submit themselves to the Tribunal pursuant to an Indictment).

[2] See Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 701 fn. 1512, citing Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 868 (stating “That an accused may be said to be under an obligation to surrender to the International Tribunal does not mean that doing so should not be considered in mitigation”).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

Blagojević requested a new trial to rectify alleged violations of his right to counsel of his choice, right to competent counsel, and right to appear as a witness in his own trial.

21. […] The Appeals Chamber considers that an appellant cannot premise a request for a new trial on a claim of a total breakdown in communication in circumstances where the appellant unjustifiably refused to cooperate with his or her assigned counsel throughout the trial proceedings.

Also see infra on Judge Shahabuddeen’s Dissenting Opinion.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

142. [the Trial Chamber sentenced Blagojević to 18 years] The Appeals Chamber has reversed Blagojević’s conviction for complicity in genocide on the basis that his knowledge of the forcible transfer operation, the separations, and the mistreatment and murders in Bratunac town were insufficient, without knowledge of the mass killings, to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find genocidal intent beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Appeals Chamber has upheld Blagojević’s convictions for aiding and abetting murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war, and aiding and abetting murder, persecutions, and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity. The Appeals Chamber proceeds with the adjustment of Blagojević’s sentence in light of its findings, and in accordance with the requirements of the Statute and the Rules. In light of the circumstances of this case, as well as the gravity of the crimes for which Blagojević is responsible, the Appeals Chamber, taking into account the principle of proportionality, considers that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber should be reduced to fifteen years. […]

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

333. The Appeals Chamber has noted that the precedential effect of sentences rendered by the International Tribunal is very limited because: (1) comparisons between sentences can only be undertaken where the offences are the same and committed in substantially similar circumstances; and (2) each Trial Chamber has an overriding obligation to tailor a penalty to fit the individual circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime.[1] See paras 334-335 for the specific comparison criteria used in this case.

[1] See Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 32 (internal citations omitted); Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 717, 720, 821.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

339. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “the governing criterion in sentencing is that the sentence should reflect the totality of the offender's conduct (the ‘totality’ rinciple), and that it should reflect the gravity of the offences and the culpability of the offender so that it is both just and appropriate.”[1] […]

[1] Mucić et al. Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 21.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

9. When considering an alleged error of fact with respect to a particular ground where no additional evidence has been admitted on appeal, the Appeals Chamber will apply a standard of reasonableness in reviewing the finding.[1] […] In determining whether or not a Trial Chamber’s finding was reasonable, the Appeals Chamber does not lightly disturb findings of fact made by a Trial Chamber.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls, as a general principle, the approach adopted by the Appeals Chamber in the Kupreškić et al. case, wherein it was stated that […].

[1] See Brđanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 12-14.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

9. […] Where the Prosecution is appealing, the Appeals Chamber will reverse only if it finds that no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to make the particular finding of fact beyond reasonable doubt and the acquittal relied on the absence of this finding.[1] […]

[1] See Brđanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 12-14.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

226. The standard of proof at trial requires that a Trial Chamber may only find an accused guilty of a crime if the Prosecution has proved each element of that crime and of the mode of liability, and any fact which is indispensable for the conviction, beyond reasonable doubt.[1] This standard applies whether the evidence evaluated is direct or circumstantial.[2] The Appeals Chamber has previously endorsed an approach where, similar in parts to the present case, a Trial Chamber individually examined evidence with respect to a number of incidents and subsequently assessed the accused’s criminal responsibility for those incidents.[3]

[1] See, e.g., Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 219 (“A Trial Chamber may only find an accused guilty of a crime if the Prosecution has proved each element of that crime (as defined with respect to the relevant mode of liability) beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 174.

[2] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 219; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 303; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 834.

[3] Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 70 (citing with approval the approach of the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić to determine whether certain incidents occurred beyond reasonable doubt before determining Galić’s individual criminal responsibility for those incidents).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

280. As a threshold matter, the Appeals Chamber confirms that superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute encompasses all forms of criminal conduct by subordinates, not only the “committing” of crimes in the restricted sense of the term, but all other modes of participation under Article 7(1). The Appeals Chamber notes that the term “commit” is used throughout the Statute in a broad sense, encompassing all modes of responsibility covered by Article 7(1)[1] and that such a construction is clearly manifest in Article 29 (co-operation and judicial assistance) of the Statute, referring to States’ obligation to co-operate with the International Tribunal “in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.”

281. The Appeals Chamber has previously determined that criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) is based primarily on Article 86(2) of Protocol I.[2] Accordingly, the meaning of “commit”, as used in Article 7(3) of the Statute, necessarily tracks the term’s broader and more ordinary meaning, as employed in Protocol I.[3] The object and purpose of Protocol I, as reflected in its preamble, is to “reaffirm and develop the provisions protecting the victims of armed conflicts and to supplement measures intended to reinforce their application”. The preamble of Protocol I adds further that “the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments.” The purpose of superior responsibility, as evidenced in Articles 86(1) and 87 of Protocol I, is to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. Furthermore, one of the purposes of establishing the International Tribunal, as reflected in Security Council Resolution 808, is to “put an end to [widespread violations of international humanitarian law] and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them”. And, more particularly, the purpose of superior responsibility in Article 7(3) is to hold superiors “responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behaviour of [their] subordinates.”

282. In this context, the Appeals Chamber cannot accept that the drafters of Protocol I and the Statute intended to limit a superior’s obligation to prevent or punish violations of international humanitarian law to only those individuals physically committing the material elements of a crime and to somehow exclude subordinates who as accomplices substantially contributed to the completion of the crime. Accordingly, “commit” as used in Article 7(3) of the Statute must be understood as it is in Protocol I, in its ordinary and broad sense.

[1] See, e.g., Statute, Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 16, 29.

[2] Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility,.[Prosecutor v. Enver Had‘ihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003] para. 48 See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 237. Article 86(2) of Protocol I [Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts , 8 June 1977] provides: “The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.”

[3] Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.

[4] Protocol I, [Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts , 8 June 1977] Article 86(1) states: “The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.” Article 87(1) states: “The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.”

[5] S/RES/808 (1993), p. 2.

[6] Report of the Secretary-General,[Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704] para. 56.

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ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

302. The Appeals Chamber does not consider the conclusions regarding the scope of Blagojević’s authority irreconcilable with the finding that he exercised no effective control over Momir Nikolić. In the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber discussed the possibility that de jure authority alone may not lead to the imposition of command responsibility.[1] The relevant discussion indicated “possession of de jure power in itself may not suffice for the finding of command responsibility if it does not manifest in effective control.”[2] […]

[1] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 197.

[2] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 197 (quoting the Trial Judgement approvingly).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

287. The Appeals Chamber agrees that a superior need not necessarily know the exact identity of his or her subordinates who perpetrate crimes in order to incur liability under Article 7(3) of the Statute. […]

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ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

82. Accomplice testimony is not per se unreliable, and its use by a Trial Chamber, in and of itself, does not constitute error. Such evidence, however, must be carefully considered in light of the circumstances under which it was given. […] In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber treated this evidence with appropriate caution. […]

[1] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 203, 204.

[2] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 204.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

82. […] the Appeals Chamber observes that it is not unreasonable for a Trial Chamber to accept certain parts of a witness’s testimony and reject others.[1]

[1] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 333. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 214; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 248.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

14. The Appeals Chamber ultimately confirmed that as a participant in the International Tribunal’s legal aid program, Blagojević did not have the absolute right to choose his counsel;[1] that the Registrar had properly assigned competent counsel committed to representing Blagojević’s interests;[2] that good cause did not exist for removing his duly assigned defence team;[3] and that he was not justified in unilaterally refusing to cooperate with his lawyers.[4] […]

17. Blagojević submits that the Trial Chamber violated his right to counsel of his choice when it refused to replace his entire defence team after the breakdown in trust and communication between him and his assigned counsel. This submission consists of two principal arguments. First, Blagojević maintains that, even as a participant in the International Tribunal’s legal aid system, he has a right to counsel of his choice. This argument has no merit. An accused who lacks the means to remunerate counsel shall have the right to have counsel assigned to him by the Registrar from the list drawn up in accordance with Rule 45(B), provided that there is no impediment to the assignment of that counsel.[5] While there is the additional limitation placed on the right of an indigent accused to choose counsel in so far as the choice is limited to the list of counsel maintained in accordance with Rule 45, as previously explained in this case, the Registrar normally takes account of an accused’s preferences in assigning counsel, as was done in the present case, but it is also within the Registrar’s discretion to override that preference in the interests of justice.[6] Once counsel has been properly assigned, as was the case here, counsel has a professional obligation to continue representing the accused and may only be withdrawn or replaced, if sufficient cause exists.[7]

[1] Blagojević, Ex Parte and Confidential Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace His Defence Team [Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-AR73.4, Ex Parte and Confidential Reasons for Decisions on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace his Defence Team, 7 November 2003], paras. 22, 33, 54.

[2] Blagojević, Ex Parte and Confidential Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace His Defence Team, para. 54.

[3] Blagojević, Ex Parte and Confidential Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace His Defence Team, paras. 16-22, 24-33, 42-54.

[4] Blagojević, Ex Parte and Confidential Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace His Defence Team, paras. 31, 51, 54.

[5] Rules, Rule 45; Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, Articles 6 and 11(D)(i).

[6] Blagojević, Ex Parte and Confidential Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace His Defence Team, para. 22 fn. 54. See also Mejakić et al., Decision on Appeal by the Prosecution to Resolve Conflict of Interest Regarding Attorney Jovan Simić [Prosecutor v. Zeljko Mejakić et al., Case No. IT-02-65-AR73.1, Decision on Appeal by the Prosecution to Resolve Conflict of Interest Regarding Attorney Jovan Simić, 6 October 2004], para. 8; Nahimana et al., Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Contesting the Decision of the President Refusing to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar relating to the Withdrawal of Co-Counsel [Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Contesting the Decision of the President Refusing to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar Relating to the Withdrawal of Co-Counsel, 23 November 2006], para. 10; Akayesu Appeal Judgement, para. 61; Kambanda Appeal Judgement, para. 33.

[7] Blagojević, Ex Parte and Confidential Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace His Defence Team, paras. 52, 54.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

9. […] Where the convicted person is appealing, the Appeals Chamber will reverse only if it finds that no reasonable trier of fact could have made the particular finding of fact beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction relied on this finding. […]

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

145. The Appeals Chamber has previously noted that, although a Trial Chamber’s factual findings are governed by the legal rule that facts essential to establishing the guilt of an accused have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, this does not affect their nature as factual conclusions.[1] A party arguing that a Trial Chamber based its factual conclusions on insufficient evidence therefore submits that the Trial Chamber committed an error in fact, not an error in law.

[1] Blagojević and Jokić, Decision on Motion to Strike [Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Decision on Motion to Strike Ground One of Jokić Appeal Brief, 31 August 2006], para. 8.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Conflict of Interest (Markač) - 04.05.2007 GOTOVINA et al.
(IT-06-90-AR73.1)

14. In addition, the Appellant requests an oral hearing for the purpose of advancing arguments relating to this ground of appeal. In view of the extensive submissions made and filed by the parties before both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber and the substantial discussion in the First and Second Impugned Decisions of the issues now under appeal, the Appeals Chamber does not consider it necessary to hold an oral hearing on the Appeal.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Conflict of Interest (Markač) - 04.05.2007 GOTOVINA et al.
(IT-06-90-AR73.1)

17. […] After the question of whether the Appellant would in fact be a “necessary witness” was remitted to the Trial Chamber, pursuant to the Clarification Decision, the Trial Chamber found that it “reasonably foresees the likelihood that the Appellant will be called as a witness in this case because of his position as former Minister of Justice at the time of alleged crimes”.[1]

18. The Appeals Chamber finds no error in this conclusion. Article 26 of the Code of Professional Conduct only envisages that “Counsel shall not act as an advocate in a proceeding in which counsel is likely to be a necessary witness”.[2] The Appeals Chamber notes that because their trials have been joined, Gotovina, Cermak and Markač are in the same proceeding. Although the Prosecution did not envisage calling the Appellant as a witness, and Markač and Čermak appear to hold the view that their respective defence strategies will not involve calling the Appellant as a witness, Gotovina has not ruled out the possibility of calling him as a witness. Further, the Trial Chamber has not ruled out at this stage that it might choose to call him as a witness.[3]

19. In addition, should the Appellant be called to testify, the Trial Chamber is not precluded from using his evidence in support of or against Čermak or Markač.[4] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber found that the cases of the three accused are inherently connected because they took place in the same geographic area, in the same time period and in the course of the same military operation, and that they were allegedly committed pursuant to the same joint criminal enterprise of which all three accused are alleged to be members.[5] On the basis of this factual nexus some of the evidence, including that of the Appellant, may be the same.

[1] [Second] Impugned Decision [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-PT, Decision on Finding of Misconduct of Attorney Miroslav [eparović, 6 March 2007], p. 8 (emphasis added).

[2] Emphasis in original.

[3] First Impugned Decision [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-PT, Decision on Conflict of Interest of Attorney Miroslav Šeparović, 27 February 2007], p. 7.

[4] See Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir et al., Case No. IT-04-80-AR73.1, Decision on Radivoje Miletić’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Joinder of the Accused, 27 January 2006, paras 14 and 15.

[5] Appeals Chamber Decision on Joinder [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-01-45-AR73.1, Prosecutor v. Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač, Case Nos. IT-03-73-AR73.1 and IT-03-73-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision to Amend the Indictment and for Joinder, 25 October 2006], para. 20.

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Other instruments Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal.
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Conflict of Interest (Markač) - 04.05.2007 GOTOVINA et al.
(IT-06-90-AR73.1)

32. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the giving of consent by Markač could not cure the conflict of interest between Markač and the Appellant in relation to his position as Minister of Justice tempore criminis.[1] Consent given by a potentially affected client to remove a conflict of interest with counsel is not conclusive of there being no conflict of interest.[2] Although the Trial Chamber resolved the conflict of interest in the Simić case by consent, the Trial Chamber in the present case was not bound to follow the Simić case.[3] In any event, the present case is distinguishable from that of Simić. First, the Appeals Chamber notes that the applicable provisions are different. At the time the decision in the Simić case was rendered, the Trial Chamber applied Article 9(5) of the Code of Professional Conduct which read: […]

Article 9(5) of the Code of Professional Conduct has since been amended and currently provides, as Article 14 (E) of the Code of Professional Conduct: […]

33. The Appeals Chamber has already found that the Appellant’s further representation of Markač is likely to irreversibly prejudice the administration of justice.[4] In addition, whereas in the Simić case, all the co-accused stated that there was no conflict of interest between them and counsel, Gotovina, in the present case, has not waived his right to call the Appellant as a witness and has clearly indicated that there is, in his view, a conflict of interest.

[1] Impugned Decision [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-PT, Decision on Conflict of Interest of Attorney Miroslav Šeparović, 27 February 2007], p. 8.

[2] Stojić Decision, para. 27.

[3] Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2004, para. 114 (“The Appeals Chamber considers that decisions of Trial Chambers, which are bodies with coordinate jurisdiction, have no binding force on each other, although a Trial Chamber is free to follow the decision of another Trial Chamber if it finds that decision persuasive.”)

[4] See supra, para. 28.

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Other instruments Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal.