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Notion(s) Filing Case
Jurisdiction Decision - 09.01.2007 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-AR72.2)

The Appeals Chamber dismissed Boškoski’s Appeal on Jurisdiction on procedural grounds, giving the following reasoning:

3. The Appeals Chamber does not consider that Boškoski’s Appeal is admissible as there is no basis upon which he could have properly filed his jurisdictional challenge before the Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Rule 72(A)(i) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal (“Rules”) requires that challenges to jurisdiction must be “brought not later than thirty days after disclosure by the Prosecutor to the defence of all material and statements referred to in Rule 66(A)(i)”. Since disclosure for this case was completed in 2005, this Rule did not apply in this instance. Similarly, Rule 50(C) of the rules, which accords the accused “a further period of thirty days in which to file preliminary motions pursuant to Rule 72 in respect of new charges” did not apply since the amended indictment did not add new charges. Accordingly, Boškoski cannot be considered as now having the right to file an appeal under Rule 72(B)(i) of the Rules. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber questions the Trial chamber’s decision to recognize this motion under Rule 54 of the Rules, which effectually allowed for the circumvention of the clear provisions of Rule 72 and the time limits therein. Seeing, however, that the Impugned Decision was considered on the basis of Rule 54, only Rule 73 of the rules would have been applicable, necessitating certification.[1]

In his Partially Dissenting Opinion, Judge Pocar was of the view that it was within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to allow Boškoski’s motion under Rule 54. He continues:

In my opinion, as a challenge to jurisdiction under rule 72(B) gives rise to an appeal as of right, when such a challenge arises under any other rule from a Trial Chamber, it should also be treated as allowing a right of appeal. Any other interpretation would create the possibility of an accused standing trial on charges that are not properly brought before this Tribunal. As was stated by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadić, in its decision on jurisdiction, “[s]uch a fundamental matter as the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal should not be kept for decision at the end of a potentially lengthy, emotional and expensive trial”.[2] While that statement was made in relation to whether the International Tribunal had any jurisdiction at all, it is equally applicable to whether the Tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(3) extends to all types of criminal activity of subordinates.[3]  […] I do not consider that the accused’s challenge to the issue as constituting a defect in the form of the indictment should preclude his challenge of the same issue as on of jurisdiction.[4]

[1] Decision, para. 3

[2] Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 6

[3] Decision, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar, para. 2

[4] Ibid., para. 3

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ICTR Rule Rule 54;
Rule 72
ICTY Rule Rule 54;
Rule 72
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Supplementing Appeal Brief - 09.01.2007 BRALO Miroslav
(IT-95-17-A)

9. While it is true that, save for Rule 115(A) allowing parties to file supplemental briefs on the impact of the additional evidence admitted by the Appeals Chamber, no specific provision of the Rules explicitly regulates the possibility for the parties to supplement their briefs on appeal, it has been recognised in the jurisprudence that an appellant may supplement his or her brief, pursuant to Rule 127(A)(ii) and (B) of the Rules, by filing the said supplement with sufficient reasons constituting good cause for the Appeals Chamber to recognize it as validly filed.[1] In particular, the appellant must show that the proposed supplemental submissions are relevant to his grounds of appeal[2] and add substantial new information to the submissions which have already been made.[3]The new information at stake must be of sufficiently compelling importance to justify the admission of a supplemental brief at the stage where the briefing on appeal is completed.[4]

[1] Prosecutor v. Željko Mejakić et al., Case No. IT-02-65-AR1l bis.1, Decision on Second Joint Defense Supplement to Joint Appeal Brief in Support of Notice of Appeal, 16 November 2005 ("Mejakić Decision of 16 November 2005"), p. 4; Prosecutor v. Željko Mejakić et al., Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis.1, Decision on Joint Defense Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Appellant's Brief, 30 August 2005, p. 3; See also Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Confidential Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Extension of Time, 26 February 2004, p. 2; Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Decision on Hazim Delić's Motion for Leave to File Second Supplementary Brief, 1 February 2001 ("Delalić Decision of 1 February 200 1 "), para. 6. [2] Delalić Decision of I February 2001, para. 3.

[3] Ibid., para. 5.

[4] Ibid., para. 6.

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ICTR Rule Rule 116 ICTY Rule Rule 127
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Supplementing Appeal Brief - 09.01.2007 BRALO Miroslav
(IT-95-17-A)

10. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the concept of "good cause" applicable to amendments to a notice of appeal encompasses both good reason for including the new amended grounds of appeal sought and good reason showing why those grounds were not included (or were not correctly phrased) in the original notice of appeal.[1] Where an appellant seeks a substantive amendment broadening the scope of the appeal, "good cause" might also, under some circumstances, be established.[2] In such instances, each amendment is to be considered in light of the particular circumstances of the case. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that the same logic may be applied while examining applications to supplement an appellant's brief.

11. At the same time, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal establishes that the "good cause" requirement must be interpreted restrictively at late stages in appeal proceedings when amendments would necessitate a substantial slowdown in the progress of the appeal - for instance, when they would require briefs already filed to be revised and resubmitted.[3] To hold otherwise would leave appellants free to change their appeal strategy and essentially restart the appeal process at will (including after they have had the advantage of reviewing the arguments in a response brief), thus interfering with the expeditious administration of justice and prejudicing the other parties to the case.[4]

[1] Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Decision on Motion of Dragan Jokić for Leave to File Third Amended Notice of Appeal and Amended Appellate Brief, 26 June 2006 ("Blagojević Decision of 26 June 2006"), para. 7; See also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Decision on Motions Related to the Pleadings in Dragan Jokid's Appeal, 24 November 2005, para. 10 ("Blagojević Decision of 24 November 2005"); Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Decision on Defence Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File the Defence Notice of Appeal, 15 February 2005, pp. 2-3; Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v.The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza's Motions for Leave to Submit Additional Grounds of Appeal, to Amend the Notice of Appeal and to Correct his Appellant's Brief, 17 August 2006 ("Barayagwiza Decision of 17 August 2006"), para. 10. [2] Blagojević Decision of 26 June 2006, para. 7; Blagojević Decision of 24 November 2005, para. 7; Blagojević Decision of 20 July 2005,p.3; Barayagwiza Decision of 17 August 2006, para.10.

[3] Blagojević Decision of 26 June 2006, para. 8; Barayagwiza Decision of 17 August 2006, para. 11.

[4] Id.

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ICTR Rule Rule 108 ICTY Rule Rule 108
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Provisional Release - 14.12.2006 MILUTINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-AR65.2)

The Appeals Chamber considered whether there was discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the progress of the trial constituted changed circumstances that made flight risk more likely than it had been at the pre-trial stage (where the Defendants were granted release).  It held in paragraph 15:

The Trial Chamber is the body best positioned to assess whether circumstances at trial have materially affected the possibility that accused will not return from provisional release.  The Appeals Chamber finds it reasonable for the Trial Chamber to have concluded that the Defendants’ incentives to flee increased over the course of a trial as they heard first-hand the evidence against them.[1]  This is not to say this is the only reasonable conclusion.  In some cases, the incentives to flee might decrease over time;[2] in other cases, these incentives might stay the same; and in still other cases these incentives might not shift enough to affect materially the approach taken in earlier provisional release decisions regarding the same accused.   These are matters that are best assessed by the Trial Chamber that is hearing the case, and the Appeals Chamber will not reverse the Trial Chamber’s considered judgement or decision absent a discernible error.  Here, while the Trial Chamber could have done a more complete job in explaining how the proceedings thus far have increased the Defendants’ incentives to flee, it provided enough reasoning to justify its conclusion.

[1] Cf. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir Limaj’s Request for Provisional Release, 31 October 2003, para. 30 (noting that the severity of a sentence faced can impact the extent of the incentive to flee).

[2] The Defendants suggest that their incentives to flee have indeed decreased since the trial began.  Interlocutory Appeal Reply, para. 16.  They point to an excerpt of a discussion between the Presiding Judge and the Prosecutor on 31 August 2006.  Ibid. (quoting T. 2674-2675).  In that exchange, the Prosecution notes that at the pre-trial stage the Trial Chamber had rejected the Prosecution’s proposal to allow a large number of Rule 92bis witnesses.  The Presiding Judge responds by saying that “one thing that’s absolutely clear from the way in which this case has been conducted so far is that there could have been the grossest miscarriage of justice if these witnesses had not been available for cross-examination.”  Ibid.  This exchange, however, does not provide enough of a basis for the Appeals Chamber to second-guess the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the incentives for flight have increased rather than decreased for the Defendants in this case.  Read most favorably to the Defendants, the Presiding Judge’s statement at best suggests that there have been some successful cross-examinations.  It does not show that, on balance, the Prosecution’s case is weaker objectively than it was before the summer recess.  Moreover, several months of trial have passed since this exchange.

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ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Provisional Release - 14.12.2006 MILUTINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-AR65.2)

The Appeals Chamber considered whether there was discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the progress of the trial constituted changed circumstances that made flight risk more likely than it had been at the pre-trial stage (where the Defendants were granted release).  It held in paragraph 15:

The Trial Chamber is the body best positioned to assess whether circumstances at trial have materially affected the possibility that accused will not return from provisional release.  The Appeals Chamber finds it reasonable for the Trial Chamber to have concluded that the Defendants’ incentives to flee increased over the course of a trial as they heard first-hand the evidence against them.[1]  This is not to say this is the only reasonable conclusion.  In some cases, the incentives to flee might decrease over time;[2] in other cases, these incentives might stay the same; and in still other cases these incentives might not shift enough to affect materially the approach taken in earlier provisional release decisions regarding the same accused.   These are matters that are best assessed by the Trial Chamber that is hearing the case, and the Appeals Chamber will not reverse the Trial Chamber’s considered judgement or decision absent a discernible error.  Here, while the Trial Chamber could have done a more complete job in explaining how the proceedings thus far have increased the Defendants’ incentives to flee, it provided enough reasoning to justify its conclusion.

[1] Cf. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir Limaj’s Request for Provisional Release, 31 October 2003, para. 30 (noting that the severity of a sentence faced can impact the extent of the incentive to flee).

[2] The Defendants suggest that their incentives to flee have indeed decreased since the trial began.  Interlocutory Appeal Reply, para. 16.  They point to an excerpt of a discussion between the Presiding Judge and the Prosecutor on 31 August 2006.  Ibid. (quoting T. 2674-2675).  In that exchange, the Prosecution notes that at the pre-trial stage the Trial Chamber had rejected the Prosecution’s proposal to allow a large number of Rule 92bis witnesses.  The Presiding Judge responds by saying that “one thing that’s absolutely clear from the way in which this case has been conducted so far is that there could have been the grossest miscarriage of justice if these witnesses had not been available for cross-examination.”  Ibid.  This exchange, however, does not provide enough of a basis for the Appeals Chamber to second-guess the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the incentives for flight have increased rather than decreased for the Defendants in this case.  Read most favorably to the Defendants, the Presiding Judge’s statement at best suggests that there have been some successful cross-examinations.  It does not show that, on balance, the Prosecution’s case is weaker objectively than it was before the summer recess.  Moreover, several months of trial have passed since this exchange.

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ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Provisional Release - 14.12.2006 MILUTINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-AR65.2)

The Appeals Chamber discussed for the first time whether Rule 65 applies to provisional release requests made during the course of a trial or instead only to pre-trial and pre-appeal provisional release requests.  In paragraphs 9-10, it rejected the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Rule 65 applied only to pre-trial (and pre-appeal) proceedings:

Moreover, the Appeals Chamber disagrees with the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the language “will appear for trial” in Rule 65(B) “ma[kes] it clear that the application of the Rule is confined to the provisional release of an accused whose trial has not yet begun”.[1]  First, the language of the Rule does not read “will appear for the beginning of trial” but rather reads “will appear for trial” – language which could refer to any stage of the trial.  Second, the purpose behind Rule 65(B) is best fulfilled if its language is read broadly.  Its goal of permitting provisional release only if the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the accused will return and will do no harm is not logically limited to the pre-trial stage.  Rather, this goal is equally important at other stages of the proceedings, as Rule 65(I) demonstrates in identifying the same criteria for the pre-appeal stage.  Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes that the practice of Trial Chambers in the past supports the view that Rule 65(B) is best read as applying to all provisional release applications before the Trial Chamber.[2]

Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber holds that Rule 65 applies to provisional release issues arising during the course of trial, just as it applies during pre-trial and pre-appeal proceedings.

[1] [Impugned Decision], para. 4.  The Appeals Chamber assumes for the purposes of this discussion that the Trial Chamber meant to speak of the application of Rule 65(B) in particular rather than of Rule 65 generally.  If the Trial Chamber meant the latter, however, then the presence of Rule 65(I) obviously refutes its claim. 

[2] See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Defence Motions for Provisional Release of Radivoje Miletić and Milan Gvero, 7 December 2006 (“Popović Decision”), p. 4 (relying on Rule 65(B) in granting provisional release request for two accused for part of the winter recess); Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Confidential Decision on Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Prlić, made public on 17 August 2006 (dated 26 June 2006), pp. 3-4 (granting a provisional release request for the summer recess during the course of trial pursuant to Rule 65); Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Joint Motion for Temporary Provisional Release During Summer Recess, 1 June 2006, paras 3-4 (applying Rule 65(B) in granting provisional release for the summer recess after one week of trial); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Provisional Release, 23 February 2006, paras 9-10 (treating Rule 65(B) as the standard for reviewing a provisional release request made during trial); Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Confidential Decision on Renewed Motion for Provisional Release, 22 July 2005, p. 4 (applying Rule 65(B) in granting provisional release prior to the entry of judgement); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Confidential Decision on Motion for Provisional Release of Enver Hadžihasanović, 20 August 2004 (dated 23 July 2004), pp. 2-3 (granting a motion for provisional release during trial pursuant to Rule 65); Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release, 21 April 2005, p. 2 (treating Rule 65(B) as the standard when considering a provisional release request made for a break of several weeks in trial proceedings).

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ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Provisional Release - 14.12.2006 MILUTINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-AR65.2)

The Appeals Chamber found that the presumption of innocence does not play a determinative role in provisional release decisions.  In paragraph 12, it held:

The Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning.  The Trial Chamber was correct in concluding that the presumption of innocence is not “determinative”, since otherwise, as the Trial Chamber observed, “no accused would ever be detained, as all are presumed innocent.”[1]  Contrary to the suggestion of the Defendants, this Tribunal’s consistent jurisprudence does not treat the presumption of innocence as determinative in assessing whether provisional release should be granted.  Rather, to the extent that this Tribunal has identified determinative factors, it has pointed to those specified in Rule 65(B).[2]

[1] Impugned Decision, para. 8.

[2] See, e.g., Stanišić Decision, para. 7; Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-AR65.2, Decision on Lahi Brahimaj’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision Denying His Provisional Release, 9 March 2006, para. 6.

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ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Rebuttal Material - 13.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

7. Rule 115(A) of the Rules provides that rebuttal material may be presented by any party affected by a motion to present additional evidence before the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber recalls that rebuttal material is admissible if it directly affects the substance of the additional evidence admitted by the Appeals Chamber[1] and, as such, has a different test of admissibility from additional evidence under Rule 115 of the Rules.[2] […]

[1] [Confidential Decision on Motions Relating to the Appellant Hassan Ngeze’s and the Prosecution’s Requests for Leave to Present Additional Evidence of Witnesses ABC1 and EB, 27 November 2006], para. 42 [see Public Redacted Version filed on 1 December 2006]; Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-AR65.2, Decision on Lahi Brahimaj’s Request to Present Additional Evidence Under Rule 115, 3 March 2006 (“Haradinaj Decision”), para. 44; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Adduce Rebuttal Material, 12 March 2004 (“Kvočka Decision”), p. 3; The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Decision on Evidence, 31 October 2003, p. 5.

[2] Decision of 27 November 2006, para. 42; Haradinaj Decision, para. 44; Kvočka Decision, p. 3.

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Rebuttal Material - 13.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

7. […] The Appeals Chamber also recalls that a hearing under Rule 115 of the Rules “is intended to be a sharply delimited proceeding for entering discrete, specific evidence into the record” and “is not intended to be a trial within a trial that opens the door to the exploration of every issue that might be raised during the hearing”.[1]

[1] Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Oral Decision (Rule 115 and Contempt of False Testimony), 19 May 2005 (Cf. T. 19 May 2002 (Appeals Hearing), p. 49, lines 34-36). 

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Rebuttal Material - 13.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

14. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that Rule 66(B) applies to appellate proceedings and that, consequently, the Prosecution, on request of the Defence, “has to permit the inspection of any material which is capable of being admitted on appeal or which may lead to the discovery of material which is capable of being admitted on appeal”.[1] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “purely inculpatory material is not necessarily immaterial for the preparation of the Defence”[2] and that the Prosecution shall provide the Defence with access to any documents that are material to the preparation of the Defence, with the exception of Rule 70 material and, if necessary, request from the Appeals Chamber permission to withhold any information provided by these sources under Rule 66(C) of the Rules.[3] […]

[1] Decision of 27 November 2006, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Confidential Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion to Be Relieved of Obligation to Disclose Sensitive Information Pursuant to Rule 66(C), 27 March 2003, p. 4.

[2] Id.

[3] Decision of 27 November 2006, para. 16.

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ICTR Rule Rule 66 ICTY Rule Rule 66
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Rebuttal Material - 13.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

14. […] The Appeals Chamber considers that the statements attached to the Investigation Report fall within the scope of Rule 66(B) and are not protected by Rule 70[1] and therefore, should have been communicated to the Appellant upon his request for them. The report also mentions two interviews with Witness EB conducted by the Prosecution’s Investigators in March 2006;[2] however, no information in this respect was communicated to the Appellant prior to the present Motion.[3]

15. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Prosecution acted in violation of its obligations under Rule 66(B) in this case. […]

16. […] the Appeals Chamber has already considered that these documents are irrelevant to the preparation for the appeals hearing on 16 January 2007[4] and therefore finds that the question as to whether the Prosecution acted in violation of Rule 66(B) with respect to these documents needs not be considered.

[1] See Decision of 27 November 2006, para. 14.

[2] Motion, Annex 6, p. 3 of the Rapport d’enquête and annex 2 thereto (e-mail from Mr. Aaron Musonda to Mr. James Stewart on the results of the interview with Witness EB on 7 March 2006).

[3] The Appeals Chamber notes the “Prosecutor’s Disclosure of Relevant Pages of the Gacaca Records Book Pertinent to Prosecution Witness EB’s Testimony before the Gacaca, [REDACTED]” filed confidentially on 20 June 2006. However, this document only mentions the fact that it was obtained by the Prosecution’s Investigators “from the Gacaca President of Dukore, on 5 May 2006” and does not refer to any contact with Witness EB in March 2006, as described in the Investigation Report, p. 3 [REDACTED].

[4] See supra, para. 12.

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ICTR Rule Rule 66 ICTY Rule Rule 66;
Rule 68 bis
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Rebuttal Material - 13.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

Where, at the appellate stage, a party moves for translation of a trial exhibit (in parts or in its entirety), it must show that it was impossible to obtain the said translations at trial despite the exercise of due diligence and that absence of such translation would entail a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the above criteria had been met.

13. […] S’agissant de la demande aux fins de traduction d’enregistrements et de passages d’émissions non traduits lors du procès en première instance, la Chambre d’appel n’y donnera suite que si l’Appelant démontre qu’il n’a pu obtenir leur traduction en dépit de la diligence exercée ou que le défaut de traduction de ces documents entraînerait un déni de justice[1].

26. S’agissant d’éléments de preuve versés au dossier bien avant la clôture du procès en première instance (contrairement à la pièce C7), la Chambre d’appel considère qu’il appartenait à l’Appelant de faire une demande de traduction avant la fin du procès en première instance. En l’espèce, la Chambre d’appel observe que l’Appelant a formulé cette demande plus de deux ans après le prononcé du Jugement et qui plus est, après le dépôt de son Mémoire d’appel. Par conséquent, la Chambre d’appel n’est pas satisfaite que l’Appelant ait fait preuve de la diligence exigée.

27. De ce fait, la Chambre n’accordera une telle demande que si elle considère, au vu des traductions proposées par l’Appelant, que l’exclusion de ces documents conduirait à un déni de justice.[2] De manière générale, la Chambre d’appel constate que l’Appelant se contente de soumettre des passages dont la traduction est prétendument absente des documents composant la pièce à conviction C7 sans se référer aux conclusions de la Chambre de première instance auxquelles ils se rapporteraient.[3] Par ailleurs, il appartient à l’Appelant de démontrer, dans le cadre de son appel au fond, si certains extraits de la pièce à conviction C7 démontrent que la Chambre de première instance a commis une erreur de fait[4]. Il n’y a pas lieu à ce stade d’ordonner la traduction sollicitée car l’Appelant, maîtrisant les langues kinyarwandaise et française, dispose de tous les éléments nécessaires à la préparation de sa défense ; il est notamment en mesure de proposer sa version des traductions en articulant ses arguments en appel. Si, en se prononçant sur ces arguments, la Chambre d’appel conclut à l’existence d’une erreur ayant entraîné un déni de justice,[5] elle ordonnera, proprio motu, le cas échéant, la traduction des passages pertinents.

[1] Voir, par ailleurs, la Conférence de mise en état du 9 mars 2005 où Mme le Juge de mise en état en appel a fait remarquer à l’Appelant, en réponse à l’une de ses questions concernant la traduction des mémoires de première instance, que « lorsque vous déposez le mémoire de l'Appelant, nous ne pouvons plus revenir à une demande de traduction de documents relevant de la première instance » (CRA du 9 mars 2005, p. 11).

[2] Voir supra, au par. 13.

[3] Requête, par. 18-27 sous le titre commun « Emissions non traduites démontrant le souci du rédacteur en chef de la RTLM et de ses journalistes d’éviter toute confrontation ethnique ».

[4] La Chambre d’appel relève que ces arguments sont déjà inclus dans les écritures de l’Appelant relatives au fond de son appel – voir notamment, Mémoire en réplique, par. 64-70 et Annexe 8 « Langue des transcrits des émissions de la radio RTLM jusqu’au 6 avril 1994 (Chambers exh. C7) ».

[5] Voir l’article 24(1)b) du Statut.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Rebuttal Material - 13.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

15. […] Considering that the Appellant has not suffered any apparent prejudice as a result of this violation, since these documents were communicated to him more than a month before the appeals hearing, the Appeals Chamber will not impose sanctions on the Prosecution for this violation. However, the Appeals Chamber warns the Prosecution of the possibility of sanctions should it again be found in violation of its disclosure obligations in the present case. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 66 ICTY Rule Rule 66; 68bis
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Assignment of Counsel No 2 - 08.12.2006 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-AR73.4)

The Appeals Chamber determined that due to extraordinary circumstances and the grave condition of Šešelj’s health, it would depart from the requirements of the Practice Decision and consider Šešelj’s Appeal on the merits.

13. […] The Appeals Chamber does not find that there is any reason why Šešelj should not be permitted to file the Appeal despite the fact that it does not conform with the Practice Direction on filing of appeals before the Appeals Chamber.[1]  In this instance, Šešelj has sought to appeal by filing a letter before the Appeals Chamber requesting that it take into account all arguments he has made in prior submissions filed before the Appeals Chamber, the President and the Bureau with respect to his right to self-representation and his opposition to standby counsel and counsel as forming the grounds of his appeal.[2]

14.  […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recognises that there are extraordinary circumstances justifying its departure from the requirements of its own Practice Direction.  Šešelj has persisted in his refusal to take food or medicine since 11 November 2006.  He has also since that time refused to be medically assessed by doctors assigned to his care.  The only doctors that have been able to make any assessment of Šešelj’s condition could only make a rudimentary assessment.  However, it is abundantly clear to the Appeals Chamber that the action taken by Šešelj is seriously damaging his health and could have grave consequences.  Šešelj has made a choice to undertake this action, and he has purportedly done so because of his opposition to the decision of the Trial Chamber to impose standby counsel following the Appeal Decision.  That opposition of Šešelj caused the Trial Chamber to take the further step of assigning counsel, but Šešelj’s opposition leading to that decision of the Trial Chamber was based in the first instance on his strong belief that the Appeal Decision, which reinstated his right to self-representation, left no room for the imposition of standby counsel by the Trial Chamber as an immediate response to the Appeal Decision, without establishing any obstructionist behaviour on his part. Upon that basis, and in light of the fact that the Trial Chamber certified its decision to assign counsel for appeal, the Appeals Chamber will consider the Appeal on the merits.

[1] In accordance with Paragraph 9 of the on Procedure for the Filing of Written Submissions in Appeal Proceedings Before the International Tribunal, IT/155/Rev.3, 16 September 2005 (“Practice Direction”) a certified appeal should be filed within seven days of the decision of certification so the time for the filing of an appeal by independent counsel will expire on 12 December 2006. […]

[2] The Appeals Chamber sought clarification from the Commanding Officer of the UNDU as to the scope of Šešelj’s appeal.  It was advised upon instruction from Šešelj that he wished the Appeals Chamber to consider the arguments he made in various filings with respect to the assignment of counsel and standby counsel. […]

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Other instruments Practice Direction on Procedure for the Filing of Written Submissions in Appeal Proceedings Before the International Tribunal (ICTY).
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Assignment of Counsel No 2 - 08.12.2006 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-AR73.4)

The Appeals Chamber noted that although the decision of the Trial Chamber to assign standby counsel was not specifically at issue in the given appeal, the decision was “inextricably linked” to the Impugned Decision.  The Appeals Chamber determined that it must consider whether the Trial Chamber erred in interpreting its decision restoring Šešelj’s right to self-representation.

20.     […] While the decision of the Trial Chamber to assign standby counsel was not certified for appeal by the Trial Chamber, the two decisions are inextricably linked.[1]  It was because of the decision of the Trial Chamber to immediately impose standby counsel and Šešelj’s inability to find an avenue to legally challenge that decision before the Trial Chamber that he was placed on a collision course with the Trial Chamber leading to the Trial Chamber’s issuing of the Impugned Decision.  In this respect, while the Tribunal’s jurisprudence limits the Appeals Chamber to examining whether the Trial Chamber erred in issuing the Impugned Decision, such a review in this appeal would not resolve the real issue of dispute between Šešelj and the Trial Chamber. 

24.     While the Appeals Chamber has acknowledged that the Decision to Assign Standby Counsel is not the Impugned Decision before it, it must also acknowledge that its decision restoring the right of Šešelj to self-representation was not clear as to whether the restoration of that right to self-representation allowed the Trial Chamber to restore the status quo by immediately reassigning standby counsel, following the Appeal Decision without establishing any obstructionist conduct on the part of Šešelj. 

25.     If the Appeals Chamber was to ignore the background to the Impugned Decision and apply the applicable law and the standard of review to the Impugned Decision, it would find no error on the part of the Trial Chamber in ordering the imposition of assigned counsel.  As the test makes clear, all that must be established is that the disruptive behaviour of the Accused “is substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial” and it does not matter whether that conduct is intentional or unintentional. […] In this particular case, what must and also can be considered by the Appeals Chamber is whether the Trial Chamber erred in the interpretation of its decision restoring Šešelj’s right to self-representation.  […]

[1] Cf. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (observing that “questions logically antecedent and essential to the order under review” fall within the jurisdiction of a court of appeals in reviewing an order certified for interlocutory appeal).   

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Assignment of Counsel No 2 - 08.12.2006 ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(IT-03-67-AR73.4)

The Appeals Chamber examined whether the Appeal Decision which re-instated Šešelj’s presumptive right to self-representation allowed the Trial Chamber to immediately assign standby counsel, in light of the fact that the Appeal Decision did not specifically note the extent of the Trial Chamber’s discretion in this matter.  The Appeals Chamber concluded that the imposition of standby counsel by the Trial Chamber had the practical effect of undermining the Appeal Decision.

19.     […] Article 21(4) of the Statute of the International Tribunal.  Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute grants the right of an accused “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing”  The jurisprudence of this Tribunal has interpreted this provision of Article 21 as providing an accused with “the presumptive right to self-representation”.[1]  However, a presumptive right to self-representation does not translate into an absolute right and there are circumstances in which this right may be curtailed.  Of relevance to this appeal, a Trial Chamber may place restrictions on the right of an accused to self-representation where “a defendant’s self-representation is substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial”.[2]

20.     The Appeals Chamber has already indicated […] what it considers to  be the real issue for it to determine […], whether the Appeal Decision, wherein Šešelj’s right to self-representation was re-instated, allowed the Trial Chamber to immediately order the assignment of standby counsel without establishing any persistent or obstructionist behaviour on his part.  Šešelj’s view is that it did not and it is in light of that view that Šešelj has undertaken action, which resulted in the Trial Chamber determining that it had the right to impose Counsel in the Impugned Decision.  […]

22.     […] [I]t would have been better if the Appeals Chamber in returning to Šešelj the right to self-representation would have made clearer what it considered that to mean with respect to the discretion on the part of the Trial Chamber to immediately impose standby counsel with a right to jump in and take over the proceedings in the circumstances identified by the Trial Chamber in its Decision to Assign Standby Counsel. This is particularly so given that the Appeals Chamber was made abundantly aware of Šešelj’s opposition to standby counsel during his pre-trial proceedings.

23.     […] Having just had its decision on the assignment of counsel overturned on appeal the Trial Chamber viewed [imposing standby counsel] as a necessary move to preserve Šešelj’s right to a fair and expeditious trial in light of the history of proceedings in his case pre-trial.

24.     […] The Appeals Chamber […] must […] acknowledge that its decision restoring the right of Šešelj to self-representation was not clear as to whether the restoration of that right to self-representation allowed the Trial Chamber to restore the status quo by immediately reassigning standby counsel, following the Appeal Decision without establishing any obstructionist conduct on the part of Šešelj.  The Appeals Chamber notes that standby counsel is not assigned counsel, and there are clear limits on the ability of standby counsel to participate in the proceedings, including that such participation did depend upon the conduct of Šešelj.  However, the fact that the Registry appointed former assigned counsel to act as standby counsel following the Appeal Decision, and then following the protest by Šešelj to that appointment, the Trial Chamber ordered the reassignment of standby counsel to act as assigned counsel in the Impugned Decision[3]  further entrenched Šešelj’s belief that the Trial Chamber had not respected the right restored to him by the Appeals Chamber.  He was not given a clean slate by the Trial Chamber following the Appeal Decision.

26.     While the Appeals Chamber did not explicitly state that the Trial Chamber was prohibited from imposing standby counsel, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber decision to do so, immediately upon the issuing of its decision and without establishing any additional obstruction by Šešelj, did have the practical effect of undermining the practical implementation of that decision. 

[1] Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, 1 November 2004 (“Milošević Decision on Defence Counsel”), para. 11.

[2] Ibid., paras. 12-13.

[3] Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 20 October 2006 (“Appeal Decision”) para. 45.

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ICTR Statute Article 20(4)(d) ICTY Statute Article 21(4)(d)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Further Investigations - 08.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

The Appeals Chamber reiterated that a party is always entitled to seek material from any source, including from another case before the Tribunal, to assist in the preparation of its case if the material sought has been identified or described by its general nature and if a legitimate forensic purpose for such access has been shown. The Appeals Chamber specified the criteria for granting such access and considered that it had jurisdiction under Rule 75(G)(ii) to grant to the Appellant access to a confidential guilty plea entered in another case after having consulted with the Judges of the Trial Chamber concerned and afforded the Prosecution the possibility to apply for redactions.[1]

12. La Chambre d’appel a affirmé de manière constante qu’une partie a toujours le droit de chercher à obtenir des documents provenant de n’importe quelle source afin de l’aider à préparer son dossier, à condition d’identifier les documents recherchés, ou de décrire leur nature générale, et de démontrer l’existence d’un but légitime juridiquement pertinent justifiant l’obtention de cet accès[2]. La pertinence des pièces demandées par une partie peut être établie du fait de l’existence d’un lien entre l’affaire de ladite partie et la ou les affaires dans le cadre desquelles ces pièces ont été présentées, par exemple, lorsque ces affaires découlent d’événements qui auraient eu lieu dans la même région et à la même époque ou s’il existe d’autres recoupements[3]. Il suffit que la partie requérante démontre que l’accès à ces pièces est susceptible de l'aider de manière substantielle à présenter sa cause ou, tout au moins, qu'il existe de bonnes chances pour qu'il en soit ainsi[4]. En se prononçant sur une telle demande, il appartient à la Chambre d’appel de trouver un juste équilibre entre le respect du droit d’une partie à avoir accès à des pièces nécessaires à la préparation de sa cause et l’obligation du Tribunal de garantir la protection et la préservation d’informations confidentielles[5].

13. La Chambre d’appel considère qu’elle est compétente, en vertu de l’article 75(G)(ii), pour statuer sur la demande relative à la convention de plaidoyer de Joseph Serugendo, puisque aucune Chambre n’est saisie de la première affaire[6], la procédure ayant été terminée par le prononcé du Jugement le 12 juin 2006 et le décès de Joseph Serugendo le 22 août 2006. Ainsi, la Chambre d’appel se voit habilitée à modifier le niveau de classification des documents protégés[7].

14. La Chambre d’appel est satisfaite que l’Appelant a, d’une part, décrit avec suffisamment de précision la pièce demandée comme il lui incombait de le faire et, d’autre part, démontré l’existence d’un but légitime juridiquement pertinent justifiant la consultation de ladite pièce. Conformément à l’article 75(H) du Règlement, la Chambre d’appel a obtenu toutes les informations nécessaires des Juges composant la Chambre de première instance I qui a prononcé le Jugement dans l’affaire Serugendo et décide d’accorder à l’Appelant l’accès à la convention de plaidoyer de Joseph Serugendo.

15. La Chambre d’appel accorde au Procureur quatorze (14) jours à compter de la date de la présente décision pour déposer une requête aux fins d’expurgation, s’il peut établir l’existence de motifs suffisants justifiant l’expurgation de certaines informations contenues dans ledit document. Les mesures de protection que la Chambre de première instance a adoptées s’agissant de cette pièce restent en vigueur.

[1] See also para. 29 of the present Decision for specific conditions of granting the access to the confidential document in question.

[2] Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Case No It-95-9-A, Decision on Defence Motion by Franko Simatovic for Access to Transcripts, Exhibits, Documentary Evidence and Motion Filed by the Parties in the Simic et al. Case, 13 avril 2005  (« Décision Simić du 13 avril 2005 »), p. 3 ; Momir Nikolic c/ Le Procureur, affaire n° IT-02-60/1-A, Décision relative à la Requête urgente aux fins d’obtenir l’accès à des documents confidentiels, 4 février 2005, p. 6 ; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškic, Case No IT-95-14-A, Decision on Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez’s Request for Access to Tihomir Blaškic’s Fourth Rule 115 Motion and Associated Documents, 28 janvier 2004, p. 4; Le Procureur c/ Mladen Naletilić, alias “Tuta”, & Vinko Martinović, alias“Stela”, Affaire n° IT-98-34-A, Décision relative à la Requête conjointe déposée par la Défense de Enver Hadžihasanovic et Amir Kubura aux fins d’accès à tous les documents, écritures, comptes rendus d’audience et pièces à conviction confidentiels de l’affaire Naletilić et Martinović, 7 novembre 2003, p. 3-4.

[3] Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No IT-95-14-R, Decision on “Defence Motion on Behalf of Rasim Delić Seeking Access to all Confidential Material in the Blaškić Case”, 1 juin 2006 (« Décision Blaškić du 1 juin 2006 »), p. 9 ; Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Decision on Momčilo Perišić’s Motion Seeking Access to Confidential Material in the Galić Case, 16 février 2006 ((« Décision Galić du 16 février 2006 »), par. 3 ; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No IT-02-60-A, Decision on Momčilo Perišić Motion Seeking Access to Confidential Material in the Blagojević and Jokić Case”, 18 janvier 2006 (« Décision Blagojević du 18 janvier 2006 »), par. 4 ; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No IT-02-60-A, Decision on Motions for Access to Confidential Materials, 16 novembre 2005, par. 8 ; Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Decision on Motion by Hadžihasanović, Alagić and Kubura for Access to Confidential Supporting Material, Transcripts and Exhibits in the Kordić and Čerkez Case, 23 janvier 2003, pp. 4-5 ; Le Procureur c/ Tihomir Blaškić, affaire n° IT-95-14-A, Décision relative à la Requête des Appelants Dario Kordić et Mario Čerkez aux fins de consultation de Mémoires d’appel, d’écritures et de comptes rendus d’audience confidentiels postérieurs à l’appel déposés dans l’affaire Le Procureur c/ Blaškić, 16 mai 2002 (« Décision Blaškić du 16 mai 2002 »), par. 15.

[4] The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-A, Decision on Ojdanić’s application for access to exhibit P92, 3 novembre 2006, par. 6; Décision Blaškić du 1 juin 2006, p. 9 ; Décision Galić du 16 février 2006, par. 3 ; Décision Blagojević du 18 janvier 2006, par. 4 ; Décision Blagojević du 16 novembre 2005, par. 8 ; Décision Simić du 13 avril 2005, p. 3 ; Le Procureur c/ Miroslav Kvočka et al., affaire n° IT-98-30/1-A, Décision relative à la requête des Momćilo Gruban aux fins d’accéder à des pieces, 13 janvier 2003 (« Décision du 13 janvier 2003 »), par. 5 ; Le Procureur c/ Milan Milutinović et consorts, affaire n° IT-99-37-I, Décision relative à la Requête de Dragoljub Ojdanić aux fins de communication de conclusions ex parte, 8 novembre 2002, par. 18 ; Décision Blaškić du 16 mai 2002, par. 14.

[5] Miroslav Bralo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Decision on Motion of Miroslav Bralo for Access to Certified Trial Record, 2 mai 2006, p. 4 ; Le Procureur c/ Vidoje Blagojević et Dragan Jokić, affaire n° IT-02-60-A, Décision [confidentielle] relative à la Requête de l’Accusation aux fins d’expurger les documents confidentiels communiqués à Momčilo Perišić, 9 mars 2006, p. 2 ; Décision Galić du 16 février 2006, par. 10 ; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, [Confidential] Decision on Prosecution request for Redactions, 17 janvier 2006, p. 1 ; Décision Blaškić du 16 mai 2002, par. 29.

[6] Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Case No IT-95-9-A, Order Proprio Motu Granting Access to Confidential Material, 3 février 2006, p. 1.

[7] La Chambre d’appel considère qu’il convient d’appliquer mutatis mutandis la même procédure que celle prévue pour la modification des mesures de protection accordées à des témoins en vertu de l’article 75 du Règlement dans le cas de documents protégés, tel l’accord sur le plaidoyer ; à ce sujet voir Le Procureur c/ Slobodan Milosević, affaire n°IT-02-54-T, Décision aux fins de lever la confidentialité de l’accord sur le plaidoyer conclu dans l’affaire Erdemović, 26 août 2003, p. 2. L’article 75 (G) du Règlement est rédigé en des termes similaires à celui du Règlement du TPIY : « (…) Une partie à la deuxième affaire, qui souhaite obtenir l’annulation, la modification ou le renforcement de mesures ordonnées dans la première affaire, doit soumettre sa demande : i) à toute Chambre encore saisie de la première affaire, quelle que soit sa composition, ou ii) à la Chambre saisie de la deuxième affaire, si aucune Chambre n’est plus saisie de la première affaire. ». 

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ICTR Rule Rule 75 ICTY Rule Rule 75
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Further Investigations - 08.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

The Appeals Chamber reiterated that Rule 66(B) applies to appellate proceedings and that, consequently, the Prosecution, on request of the Defence, has to permit the inspection of any material which is capable of being admitted on appeal or which may lead to the discovery of material which is capable of being admitted on appeal. It also noted that purely inculpatory material is not necessarily immaterial for the preparation of the Defence.

9. La Chambre d’appel rappelle que l’article 66(B) du Règlement s’applique en appel à la condition que les éléments de preuve visés par la demande d’examen de la Défense aient été indisponibles lors du procès[1]. L’applicabilité de l’article 66(B) à la procédure d’appel implique que le Procureur doive permettre à la Défense de prendre connaissance des éléments qui « soit sont nécessaires à la préparation de la défense de l’accusé, soit seront utilisés par le Procureur comme moyens de preuve au procès, soit ont été obtenus de l’accusé ou lui appartiennent »[2]. A cet égard, la Chambre d’appel rappelle que les pièces exclusivement à charge ne sont pas nécessairement inutiles à la préparation de la défense de l’accusé et que le Procureur devrait déterminer si « les questions auxquelles se rapportent les pièces en question sont […] l’objet d’un motif d’appel » ou si « les pièces en question peuvent raisonnablement permettre à la Défense de faire de nouvelles investigations et donner lieu à la découverte de moyens supplémentaires admissibles en vertu de l’article 115 du Règlement »[3]. Par conséquent, il appartient au Procureur de permettre à l’Appelant de prendre connaissance de « tout élément susceptible d’être admis en appel ou qui pourrait donner lieu à la découverte d’éléments de preuve susceptibles de l’être »[4].

[1] Georges Anderson Nderumbumwe Rutaganda c/ Le Procureur, affaire n°ICTR-96-3-A, Décision, sur “Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Clarification in Relation to the Applicability of Rule 66(B) to Appellate Proceedings and Request for Extension of the Page Limit Applicable to Motions”, 28 juin 2002, p. 3.

[2] Le Procureur c/ Radislav Krstić, affaire n°IT-98-33-A, Décision [confidentielle] relative à la Requête de l’Accusation aux fins d’être dispensée de son obligation de communiquer des informations sensibles en application de l’article 66(C) du Règlement, 27 mars 2003, p. 4.

[3] Ibid., p. 5, [Le Procureur c/ Radislav Krstić, affaire n°IT-98-33-A, Décision [confidentielle] relative à la Requête de l’Accusation aux fins d’être dispensée de son obligation de communiquer des informations sensibles en application de l’article 66(C) du Règlement, 27 mars 2003].

[4] Id., [Le Procureur c/ Radislav Krstić, affaire n°IT-98-33-A, Décision [confidentielle] relative à la Requête de l’Accusation aux fins d’être dispensée de son obligation de communiquer des informations sensibles en application de l’article 66(C) du Règlement, 27 mars 2003].

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ICTR Rule Rule 66 ICTY Rule Rule 66
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Further Investigations - 08.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

The Appeals Chamber found that, in the circumstances of the case, the Prosecution was not in breach of its Rule 66(B) disclosure obligation since the material at stake was available via EDS.

10. La Chambre d’appel prend note du fait que le Procureur a informé la Défense de la disponibilité des dossiers MINALOC et MRND et des déclarations de Joseph Serugendo après le dépôt de la Requête de l’Appelant alors qu’il aurait pu le faire plus tôt[1]. Cependant, l’Appelant n’a pas fait état, jusqu’à ce jour, de difficultés dans l’obtention des documents via EDS.[2] En conséquence, la Chambre d’appel considère que la demande de communication sur la base de l’article 66 du Règlement relative à ces documents est sans objet.

[1] [footnote omitted].

[2] En même temps et vu que le Procureur semble se référer aux articles 66 et 68 du Règlement en invoquant le fait que les documents en question sont disponibles sur EDS (Réponse à la Requête du 10 octobre 2006, par. 17-19), la Chambre d’appel tient à rappeler que le simple fait pour le Procureur d’introduire une pièce dans EDS ne revient pas nécessairement à s’acquitter de ses obligations au titre de l’article 68 du Règlement et à donner à un accusé la possibilité d’y « avoir aisément accès » (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding the Role of the Prosecutor’s Electronic Disclosure Suite in Discharging Disclosure Obligations, 30 juin 2006 (« Décision Karemera du 30 juin 2006 »), par. 15 ; Décision Bralo du 30 août 2006, par. 35).

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ICTR Rule Rule 66 ICTY Rule Rule 66
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Further Investigations - 08.12.2006 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

The Appeals Chamber further specified that the burden of proving an alleged breach of the disclosure obligations lies on the Defence who must identify specifically the materials sought, and prove the Prosecutor's custody or control of the materials requested. Finally, before ordering any remedy for a proven breach of such obligations, the Appeals Chamber will still examine whether the Defence has actually been prejudiced. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Prosecution correctly exercised its discretion and that the Appellant failed to show that the material at stake could fall under Rule 68 of the Rules.

7. […] Lorsque la Défense estime qu’une violation de l’article 68 du Règlement a été commise, il lui appartient de soumettre à la Chambre tout commencement de preuve de nature à rendre vraisemblable le caractère disculpatoire des éléments de preuve en question ainsi que leur détention par le Procureur[1]. Même si un appelant démontre que sa demande a été suffisamment précise et que le Procureur ne s’est pas acquitté de ses obligations, la Chambre d’appel n’envisagera d’émettre une ordonnance de communication que s’il est démontré que ces manquements ont porté préjudice à l’appelant[2].

8. […] La Chambre d’appel relève que le Procureur a déterminé que les documents demandés ne répondaient pas aux critères énoncés par l’article 68 du Règlement[3] et que l’Appelant n’a pas démontré en quoi le jugement du Procureur, selon lequel ces documents ne contiennent pas de moyens de preuve disculpatoires, est abusif en l’espèce. A cet égard, la Chambre d’appel relève notamment que l’Appelant se réfère lui-même à ces documents comme étant « pertinents » à son affaire et « nécessaires à la défense » et se contente d’affirmer qu’ils « contiennent des éléments à décharge » [4] sans expliquer davantage en quoi ils peuvent le « mettre hors de cause »[5] ou atténuer sa responsabilité individuelle.

[1] Décision Barayagwiza du 8 décembre 2006, par. 34 ; Décision Brđanin du 7 décembre 2004, p. 3 ;  Décision Bralo du 30 août 2006, par. 31; Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, 23 mai 2005 (« Arrêt Kajelijeli »), par. 262.

[2] Décision Barayagwiza du 8 décembre 2006, par. 34 ; Décision Bralo du 30 août 2006, para. 31; Arrêt Kajelijeli, para. 262; Arrêt Krstić, par. 153.

[3] Ibid., par. 11, [Réponse du Procureur à la « Requête aux fins de divulgation d’éléments en possession du Procureur et nécessaires à la Défense de l’Appelant », 20 juillet 2006].

[4] Requête du 10 juillet 2006, par. 18, [Requête aux fins de divulgation d’éléments en possession du Procureur et nécessaires à la Défense de l’Appelant, 10 juillet 2006].

[5] Requête du 10 juillet 2006, par. 14.

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ICTY Rule Rule 68 bis