The Appeals Chamber recalled the definition of the “same transaction” under Rule 2 of the Rules. It then set out the factors that a Trial Chamber may consider in deciding whether to join two or more accused in one case:

7. The Appeals Chamber considers that pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules, “persons accused of the same or different crimes committed in the course of the same transaction may be jointly charged and tried.” Thus, the fundamental question for the Trial Chamber under Rule 48 is whether the two or more persons at issue for possible joinder in one trial are charged with: (1) having committed crimes, regardless of whether those crimes are alleged to be the same crimes, (2) “in the course of the same transaction.” A transaction is defined under Rule 2 of the Rules as “[a] number of acts or omissions whether occurring as one event or a number of events, at the same or different locations and being part of a common scheme, strategy or plan.” Pursuant to Rule 2 therefore, a common scheme, strategy or plan includes one or a number of events at the same or different locations.[1] Furthermore, there is no requirement under Rules 2 and 48 that the events constituting the “same transaction” take place at the same time or be committed together.[2] The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that “[i]n deciding whether charges against more than one accused should be joined pursuant to Rule 48, the Chamber should base its determination upon the factual allegations contained in the indictments and related submissions.”[3]

8. Where a Trial Chamber finds that two or more persons have allegedly committed crimes in the course of the same transaction, it then considers various factors, which it weighs in the exercise of its discretion as to whether joinder should be granted. Rule 82 (A) provides that “[i]n joint trials, each accused shall be accorded the same rights as if such accused were being tried separately.” The rights of an accused at trial are explicitly listed under Article 21 of the Statute of the International Tribunal. Rule 82(B) further provides that a Trial Chamber “may order that persons accused jointly under Rule 48 be tried separately if it considers it necessary in order to avoid a conflict of interests that might cause serious prejudice to an accused, or to protect the interests of justice.” Therefore, in light of Rule 82, it is appropriate for a Trial Chamber deciding whether to join two or more accused into one case pursuant to Rule 48 to take into consideration and weigh the following: (1) protection of the rights of the accused pursuant to Article 21 of the Statute; (2) avoidance of any conflict of interests that might cause serious prejudice to an accused; and (3) protection of the interests of justice. A Trial Chamber may, of course, look to other factors in its discretion, which it deems important for considering whether joinder under Rule 48 would be appropriate. For example, in this case, in addition to weighing the first two factors mentioned previously, the Trial Chamber also considered that a single trial would better ensure the interests of justice by (1) avoiding the duplication of evidence; (2) promoting judicial economy; (3) minimising hardship to witnesses and increasing the likelihood that they will be available to give evidence; and (4) ensuring consistency of verdicts.[4]

See also Pandurević Decision on Joinder of Accused, paras 7-8.

The Appellant was arguing that his right to an expeditious trial pursuant to Article 21(4)(c) of the Statute would be infringed by a joinder of cases.  The Appeals Chamber most importantly held that “[i]t is well within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to take into consideration judicial economy when determining whether joinder would be appropriate” (para. 26). 

The Appellant was arguing that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that it could regulate the cross-examination of witnesses. In his view, this would violate both his right to cross-examine witnesses under Article 21(4)(e) of the Statute and Rule 82(A) of the Rules according to which in “joint trials, each accused shall be accorded the same rights as if such accused were being tried separately.”

The Appeals Chamber found the following:

29. […] The Trial Chamber was correct to note that in a joint trial, a Trial Chamber has discretion to regulate the examination of witnesses so as to avoid repetitive questioning during cross-examination. Rule 90(F) specifically provides that “[t]he Trial Chamber shall exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (i) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth; and (ii) avoid needless consumption of time.” Of course, this power is subject to Trial Chamber’s obligation to respect the rights of an accused, including the right to cross-examine witnesses under Article 21(4)(e) of the Statute.[1] The Appellant fails to show how the Trial Chamber’s regulation of the cross-examination of witnesses in this joint trial by, for example, avoiding repetitive questioning, would result in prejudice to him. Rather, the Trial Chamber’s regulation should mitigate any potential prejudice to him. At trial, the Appellant will have the opportunity to object where he feels that the Trial Chamber has erred in finding that another Accused’s cross-examination of a witness is sufficient to cover his defence such that he does not need to also engage in cross-examination of that same witness. The Trial Chamber will consider each objection carefully under its obligation to respect norms of due process and the rights of the Appellant. 

3. The Appeals Chamber does not accept that Counsel’s commitment to other cases at this Tribunal constitutes “good cause” pursuant to Rule 127.  Counsel assigned to represent accused at this Tribunal are expected to organise their work schedules in order to meet their obligations to respect the time limits for filings on appeals laid down in the Practice Direction.[1]  Counsel would have been able to calculate, upon the filing of the Appellant’s Appeal, the due date for the Prosecution Response and subsequently the Appellant’s Reply and is expected to have organised her work schedule to meet those due dates.  Accordingly, “good cause” has not been shown, and the Reply of the Appellant will not be considered in this Appeal.

P. 4: CONSIDERING that the Appeals Chamber has the statutory duty to ensure the fairness of the proceedings on appeal[1] and, thus, has jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tribunal’s Registrar and President;

P. 4: CONSIDERING, however, that the exercise of such jurisdiction should be closely related to the fairness of proceedings on appeal and should not be used as a substitute for a general power of review which has not been expressly provided by the Rules of Detention;[2]

P. 4: CONSIDERING that the Appellant has not identified any impact by the issues raised in his Motion on his right to fair proceedings;

P. 4: FINDING that the detention conditions raised by the Appellant are not related to the fairness of proceedings on appeal and that, therefore, the Appellant’s right to fair proceedings has not been infringed by the outcome of the President’s Decision;

P. 4: FINDING, therefore, that the Appellant has exhausted all available remedies and that the Appeals Chamber has no jurisdiction in this matter

P. 4: FINDING also that, had the procedure of the Detention Rules been followed, the Appeals Chamber would only have jurisdiction to review a Registrar’s or President’s decision if the issues in question were closely related to the fairness of the proceedings on appeal;[1]

P. 3: NOTING that, according to Rules 82 and 83 of the Detention Rules, where a detainee is not satisfied with the conditions of his or her detention, he or she is entitled to “make a complaint to the Commanding Officer or his representative at any time” and, in case of an unsatisfactory response, to “make a written complaint, without censorship, to the Registrar, who shall forward it to the President”;

P. 4: FINDING that the complaint procedure for the detention conditions has not been duly followed by the Appellant and that he has not yet exhausted the remedies made available to him by the Detention Rules;

Pp. 4-5: CONSIDERING that medical, psychological, and psychiatric examinations pursuant to Rule 74bis are typically ordered to establish the accused’s fitness to stay in custody, his ability to stand trial,[1] his mental state at the time of the acts charged, as well as sentencing considerations such as ability to be reintegrated in society;[2]

P. 5: FINDING that the Appellant has not demonstrated that any of these concerns are implicated, and specifically has not demonstrated any threat to the fairness of the proceedings on appeal;

P. 5: FINDING therefore, that the Appellant has not demonstrated the need for an independent psychological examination under Rule 74bis;

P. 5: FINDING that, in these circumstances and at this stage, the Appeals Chamber sees no reason to order a psychological or psychiatric examination of the Appellant pursuant to Rule 74bis of the Rules

21.  Rule 6(D) of the Rules provides that amendments to the Rules “shall not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused or of a convicted or acquitted person in any pending case”.  The Appeal Chamber considers that the same principle applies to changes in the procedural requirements set out by the Tribunal’s practice directions.  […]

When examining the Trial Chamber’s finding that it was satisfied that the Accused, if released, will not pose a danger to victims, witnesses or other persons, the Appeals Chamber held:

11. The Trial Chamber “consider[ed] that there is nothing to suggest that, if released, the Accused will pose” such a danger, and “that the Trial Chamber thereby previously [only] identified the [question of whether the Accused would appear for trial] as being in issue”.[1]  The Trial Chamber is not obliged to deal with all possible factors when deciding whether it is satisfied the requirements of Rule 65(B) are fulfilled, but at a minimum, the Trial Chamber must provide reasoning to support its findings regarding the substantive considerations relevant to its decision.[2]  Here, the Trial Chamber appears, in effect, to have switched the burden to the Prosecution to show that the Accused would pose a danger if released.  In the putative absence of such information, the Trial Chamber appears to have assumed the lack of a danger posed by the Accused’s release.  If the Trial Chamber found, as it must have done so here, that the Accused upon release will pose no danger to persons, then it must provide the reasons for reaching that finding.