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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Application to Strike Brief - 23.06.2005 MILOŠEVIĆ Slobodan
(IT-02-54-A-R77.4)

The Appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief after the deadline set by the Appeals Chamber and he did not submit a motion pursuant to Rule 127 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence requesting that it be considered as validly filed and showing good cause to justify the delay. The Appeals Chamber, nevertheless, held that the Appellant’s Brief was deemed to be validly filed:

5.       The Scheduling Order issued by the Appeals Chamber is unambiguous.  The Appellant’s Brief was to be filed on 17 June 2005.  If good cause justified Counsel filing the Appellant’s Brief after the time stipulated in that Order, then that good cause should be presented to the Appeals Chamber, and a request for an extension of time should have been made before the filing deadline or a request that the Appellant’s Brief be received as validly filed pursuant to Rule 127 of the Rules should have been made at the time of the filing of the Appellant’s Brief out of time, if not before.  The fact that Counsel for the Appellant has not sought to justify his late filing and has requested the Appeals Chamber to receive it as validly filed after the fact is sufficient grounds for the Appeals Chamber to strike the Appellant’s brief as not validly filed, as is requested by the Prosecution.  Indeed, when clear time limits are transgressed without justifiable explanation, the Appeals Chamber is hesitant to do other than reject the filing.  In this case, however, the Appeals Chamber has determined that the interests of justice warrant it receiving the brief as validly filed despite Counsel’s breach of its Order. 

6.       Contempt proceedings are ancillary to proceedings at the Tribunal and arise from the inherent power of the Judges of this Tribunal to protect the integrity of their own proceedings.  However, this particular contempt appeal also touches upon fundamental due process rights of an Accused, Mr Milošević, charged with  particularly serious offences in a way that other contempt proceedings heard at this Tribunal have not. 

7.       A central argument made by the Appellant in his grounds of appeal is that the Trial Chamber should not have allowed his cross-examination to continue in the absence of the Accused and that, as a result, he should never have been put in the position of refusing an order of the Tribunal and subsequently being charged with contempt of the Tribunal for such a refusal.  Prior to the commencement of the contempt proceedings against him, the Appellant requested the Trial Chamber to reconsider its ruling on this basis.  The Trial Chamber refused to do so on the basis that it was not its role to reconsider such a decision, one which it already had determined was warranted, in the context of a proceeding of contempt against the Appellant.

8.       In these circumstances, if the Appeals Chamber refuses due to a procedural irregularity to accept the Appellant’s Brief as validly filed, then the Appellant is placed in the unfortunate position of being charged with contempt but denied the opportunity to respond fully to that criminal charge. Upon this basis, the Appeals Chamber has determined that the possible implications of this contempt proceeding for the rights of the Accused Mr Milošević warrant some leniency to the Appellant despite his Counsel’s failure to abide by the Scheduling Order of the Appeals Chamber.

9.       On the basis of the foregoing, the Appellant’s Brief filed on 20 June 2005 is deemed to be validly filed. […]  

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ICTR Rule Rule 116 ICTY Rule Rule 127
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Time and Page Limits - 22.06.2005 BRĐANIN Radoslav
(IT-99-36-A)

5.       […] [O]rdinarily the filing of a Supplementary Notice of Appeal does not itself constitute good cause for an extension of time,[1] […]

[1] The Appellant appears to assume that having filed the supplemental Notice of Appeal would ordinarily entitle him to file an additional Appeal Brief in support of it, and suggests that an extension of time (and page length) is merited here so that he can instead file a consolidated brief addressing all grounds of appeal.  But consolidation is the normal required procedure.  The filing of a supplemental notice of appeal does not in and of itself entitle an appellant to an extension of time nor to an enlargement of length for the appeal brief, and it certainly does not entitle him to file two appeal briefs.  Instead, the appellant must file a single appeal brief, the deadline for which is calculated, pursuant to Rule 111, based on the date of filing the original notice of appeal, not on the date on which a variation of that notice was authorised pursuant to Rule 108.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

219. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Statute and Rules of the Tribunal are silent with regard to the manner and method in which an arrest of a suspect is to be effected by a cooperating State under Rule 40 of the Rules at the urgent request of the Prosecution. For example, no mention is made of ensuring the suspect’s right to be promptly informed of the reasons for his or her arrest or the right to be promptly brought before a Judge.[1] It is for the requested State to decide how to implement its obligations under international law.[2]

220. The Appeals Chamber finds that under Rule 40 of the Rules, the Prosecution and Benin had overlapping responsibilities during the first period of the Appellant’s arrest and detention in Benin. This flows from the rationale that the international division of labour in prosecuting crimes must not be to the detriment of the apprehended person. Under the prosecutorial duty of due diligence, the Prosecution is required to ensure that, once it initiates a case, “the case proceeds to trial in a way that respects the rights of the accused.”[3] With regard to the responsibility of the Benin authorities, the Appeals Chamber is mindful of the fact that a cooperating State, when effecting an urgent arrest and detention pursuant to the Prosecution’s request under Rule 40 of the Rules, must strike a balance between two different obligations under international law. First, the State is required under Security Council Resolution 955 and Article 28 of the Tribunal’s Statute to comply fully without undue delay with any requests for assistance from the Tribunal in fulfilling the weighty task of investigating and prosecuting persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. On the other hand, the cooperating State still remains under its obligation to respect the human rights of the suspect as protected in customary international law, in the international treaties to which it has acceded,[4] as well as in its own national legislation.

221. Therefore, a shared burden exists with regard to safeguarding the suspect’s fundamental rights in international cooperation on criminal matters. A Judge of the requested State is called upon to communicate to the detainee the request for surrender (or extradition) and make him or her familiar with any charge, to verify the suspect’s identity, to examine any obvious challenges to the case, to inquire into the medical condition of the suspect, and to notify a person enjoying the confidence of the detainee[5] and consular officers.[6] It is, however, not the task of that Judge to inquire into the merits of the case. He or she would not know the reasons for the detention in the absence of a provisional or final arrest warrant issued by the requesting State or the Tribunal. This responsibility is vested with the judiciary of the requesting State, or in this case, a Judge of the Tribunal, as they bear principal responsibility for the deprivation of liberty of the person they requested to be surrendered.

222. Accordingly, the Prosecution is under a two-pronged duty. The request to the authorities of the cooperating State has to include a notification to the judiciary, or at least, by way of the Tribunal’s primacy, a clause reminding the national authorities to promptly bring the suspect before a domestic Judge in order to ensure that the apprehended person’s rights are safeguarded by a Judge of the requested State as outlined above. In addition, the Prosecution must notify the Tribunal in order to enable a Judge to furnish the cooperating State with a provisional arrest warrant and transfer order.

223. In this context, the Appeals Chamber recalls the words of Judge Vohrah, which, although made in relation to the status of an accused, apply to suspects as well:

if an accused is arrested or detained by a state at the request or under the authority of the Tribunal even though the accused is not yet within the actual custody of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has a responsibility to provide whatever relief is available to it to attempt to reduce any violations as much as possible.[7]

 

[1] Rule 40(A)(i) of the Rules merely states that “[i]n case of urgency, the Prosecutor may request any State: (i) To arrest a suspect and place him in custody….”

[2] U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, para. 2, provides, in pertinent part that:

 

all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance … under Article 28 of the Statute…. (emphasis added).

[3] Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999 [Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, 3 November 1999], paras. 91, 92.

[4] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Republic of Benin acceded to the ICCPR on 12 March 1992 and to the ACHPR on 20 January 1986.

[5] Numerous international bodies have condemned incommunicado detention. See Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, art. 92; U.N. Human Rights Commission Resolutions 1998/38, para. 5, and 1997/38, para. 20; U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, para. 926(d); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission, 1982-1983; Mukong v. Cameroon, para. 9.4; El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, para. 5.4; Suárez Rosero Case, para. 91 (describing detainee’s being cut off from communication with his family as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment). See also Art. 104(4) of the German Constitution (the “Grundgesetz”): “A relative or a person enjoying the confidence of the person in custody shall be notified without delay of any judicial decision imposing or continuing a deprivation of freedom.” (Emphasis added). The rationale behind this constitutional norm is that it is an inalienable duty to inform relatives or good friends of a person as to any deprivation of liberty. This provision is based upon lessons learned in Germany from World War II whereby legal safeguards must exist such that never again should the judiciary be able to abuse its power by causing human beings to just disappear.

[6] See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36(b).

[7] Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, Declaration of Judge Lal Chand Vohrad, [Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, 31 May 2000], para. 6.

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ICTR Statute Article 28 ICTY Statute Article 29 ICTR Rule Rule 40 ICTY Rule Rule 40
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

226. […] Although the Appellant was lawfully apprehended pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules, the manner in which the arrest was carried out was not according to due process of law because the Appellant was not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest. As held by the Appeals Chamber in Semanza, a suspect arrested at the behest of the Tribunal has a right to be promptly informed of the reasons for his or her arrest, and this right comes into effect from the moment of arrest and detention.[1] Before providing the reasons for this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber first notes that in making an urgent Rule 40 request, the Prosecution is not required to provide the suspect with a copy of a warrant for the arrest.[2] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber finds that in this case, the Appellant’s right to freedom from an arrest contrary to due process of law was not violated due to the lack of an arrest warrant by the Prosecution or the Benin authorities, given the exigencies of the circumstances in which he was arrested. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber does not agree with the Trial Chamber that the Prosecution was not required to have evidence tending to show that the Appellant may have committed crimes within this Tribunal’s jurisdiction at the time it made its Rule 40 request to the Benin authorities. By making a Rule 40 request for the urgent arrest of a suspect, the Prosecution is, by definition under Rule 2 of the Rules, making the claim that it possesses “reliable information which tends to show that he may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.” Indeed, in this case, the Prosecution represented in its request letter of 6 June 1998 to the Benin authorities only that it had “compelling and consistent evidence of [the Appellant’s] participation in crimes committed in the Republic of Rwanda between 1st January and 31st December 1994.”[3]

251. On the basis of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber concludes that […] the Appellant’s right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest at the time of his arrest as required under Article 9(2) of the ICCPR was not properly ensured.

[1] Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, para. 78.

[2] See Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, n. 106 citing Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999.

[3] Appeal Hearing, T. 7 March 2005 p. 51.

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ICTR Rule Rule 40 ICTY Rule Rule 40 Other instruments International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 9(2)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

231. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber finds that [the Trial Chamber] erred in failing to find that his detention in Benin for a total of 85 days without charge and without being brought promptly before a Judge was clearly unlawful and was in violation of his rights under the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules as well as international human rights law. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Prosecution is responsible for these violations because it failed to make a request within a reasonable time under Rules 40 and 40bis for the Appellant’s provisional arrest and transfer to the Tribunal. Moreover, its request would have included the provisional charges, which would then have been served on the Appellant.[1] Although Rules 40 and 40bis do not explicitly state how long a suspect may permissibly remain in the provisional custody of a cooperating State pursuant to a Rule 40 request, the Appellant’s prolonged detention in Benin was unreasonable. The evidence on the record indicates that the Appellant was never informed by a Judge of the charges against him, even provisionally, until sometime between 29 August 1998 and 7 September 1998, when he was formally served with an arrest warrant and a copy of the redacted indictment against him from the Tribunal.[2] The Appeals Chamber does not accept that 85-days’ delay after a suspect’s arrest may be considered “prompt” or “immediate” within the meaning of this Tribunal’s Statute or Rules.[3] Additionally, although 90 days may be permissible for the finalizing of a formal indictment, 85 days of provisional detention without even an informal indication of the charges to be brought against the suspect is not reasonable under international human rights law, given that nothing less than an individual’s fundamental right to liberty is at issue. While it is true that the Appellant was served with the arrest warrant and redacted indictment within days of their issuance by a Judge of this Tribunal on 29 August 1998, at a minimum, the Appellant should have been informed as soon as possible after his arrest on 5 June 1998 of any reliable information possessed by the Prosecution with regard to why he was considered a suspect and as to any provisional charges against him.[4] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Prosecution was able to directly request the Benin authorities to do so on its behalf, given that it stated that when it sent its request letter of 6 June 1998 to the Benin authorities, it had compelling and consistent evidence of the Appellant’s participation in the commission of crimes in Rwanda.[5]

232. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber finds that as a result of the Prosecution’s failure to make a Rule 40bis transfer and provisional detention request within a reasonable period of time, the Appellant was not promptly brought before a Judge, either of this Tribunal or in Benin during the first period of his detention of 95 days. The Appeals Chamber notes that there are important purposes underlying the right to be promptly brought before a Judge in the requested State, inter alia: to allow for the suspect to be informed of the provisional charges against him or her; to ascertain the identity of the detained suspect;[6] to ensure that the suspect’s rights are being respected while in detention; and to give the suspect an opportunity to voice any complaints. The Appeals Chamber considers that this violation of the Appellant’s right is not solely attributable to the Prosecution. The Appeals Chamber notes in this context that the Benin Constitutional Court found, in response to a motion filed by the Appellant before it on 24 August 1998, that his detention from 5 June 1998 to 7 September 1998 by the Benin Director of Police and the Benin General Public Prosecutor Office, was in violation of the Constitution of Benin.[7] Nevertheless, although the violation is not solely attributable to the Tribunal, it has to be recalled that it was the Prosecution, thus an organ of the Tribunal, which was the requesting institution responsible for triggering the Appellant’s apprehension, arrest and detention in Benin.

233. The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that “it is important that Rule 40 and Rule 40bis be read together” and restrictively interpreted.[8] The purpose of Rule 40 and Rule 40bis is to place time limits on the provisional detention of a suspect prior to issuance of an indictment[9] and to ensure that certain rights of the suspect are respected during that time. The Appeals Chamber considers that it is not acceptable for the Prosecution, acting alone under Rule 40, to get around those time limits or the Tribunal’s responsibility to ensure the rights of the suspect in provisional detention upon transfer to the Tribunal’s custody under Rules 40 and 40bis, by using its power under Rule 40 to keep a suspect under detention in a cooperating State.[10] The Appeals Chamber notes the Prosecution’s submission, made at the Appeal Hearing, that the 95-days’ delay in the Appellant’s transfer to the custody of this Tribunal was due to the fact that the period in which the Appellant was arrested was an extremely busy one for the Prosecution with numerous ongoing investigations against dozens of suspects and numerous indictments being drafted simultaneously.[11] While the Appeals Chamber is sympathetic to the workload carried by the Prosecution at that time, in no way does this fact justify the Appellant’s arbitrary provisional detention in Benin without charge for 85 days, and detention in Benin without appearance before a Judge for a total of 95 days.

251. […] the Appeals Chamber concludes that […] the Appellant was arbitrarily detained in Benin for 85 days without an arrest warrant and a transfer order from the Tribunal being submitted to the Benin authorities by the Prosecution within a reasonable time and without being promptly informed of the charges against him in violation of Rule 40 of the Rules and Articles 9(2) and 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR. Finally, the Appellant was detained in Benin for a total of 95 days without being brought before a Judge or an official acting in a judicial capacity in clear violation of Article 9 of the ICCPR.

[1] Rule 40bis(A) and (E).

[2] The Appeals Chamber rejects the Prosecution’s argument that its duty to inform the suspect as soon as possible of the reasons why he or she is considered a suspect and of any provisional charges against him or her was fulfilled by its questioning of the Appellant on 12 June 1998. See Appeal Hearing, T. 7 March 2005 p. 51.

[3] Cf. Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, para. 87 (finding that 18 days’ delay between the time the Appellant was taken into custody and informed of the charges brought against him by the Prosecution constituted a violation of the Appellant’s right to be promptly informed of the nature of the charges against him).

[4] See Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, n. 104 (citing Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999).

[5] Appeal Hearing, T. 7 March 2005 p. 51.

[6] For example, Milan and Miroslav Vuckovic were transferred to the ICTY instead of Predrag and Nenad Banovic, see Sikirica et al. [Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica et al, Case No. IT-95-8-I], None [sic] Parties Milan and Miroslav Vuckovic’s Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery, 2 September 1999. See also Kolundzija [Prosecutor v. Dragan Kolundžija, Case No. IT-95-8-PT], Order on Non-Party Motion for Discovery, 29 September 1999. Similarly, Agim Murtezi was brought before the ICTY on the basis of an indictment in which the true identity of the perpetrator was uncertain, see [Prosecutor v.] Limaj et al., [Case No. IT-03-66-I], Order to Withdraw the Indictment against Agim Murtezi and Order for His Immediate Release, 28 February 2003.

[7] Decision DCC 00-064, The Constitutional Court, Republique du Benin, 24 October 2000. Article 18(4) of the Benin Constitution stipulates that “no one can be held for a period beyond 48 hours without a decision from a Magistrate to whom the person is presented, this timeframe can only be exceeded exceptionally as provided for by law and that cannot exceed a period of eight days.”

[8] Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, paras. 46, 53.

[9] Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, paras. 46, 53.

[10] Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, paras. 46, 53.

[11] Appeal Hearing, T. 7 March 2005 p. 52.

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ICTR Rule Rule 40;
Rule 40 bis
ICTY Rule Rule 40;
Rule 40 bis
Other instruments International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 9(2); Article 14(3)(a)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

245. […] Rule 44bis of the Rules clearly obliges the Registrar to provide a detainee with duty counsel, with no prejudice to the accused’s right to waive the right to counsel. It constitutes a violation of Rule 44bis of the Rules and provision 10bis of the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel not to assign duty counsel, in spite of ongoing efforts to assign counsel of choice in light of the outstanding initial appearance. Also, the wording of Rule 44bis(D) is sufficiently clear (“unrepresented at any time”) to find that such a duty exists from the very moment of transfer to the Tribunal and is not confined to purposes of the initial appearance only.

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ICTR Rule Rule 44 bis
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

248. The Appeals Chamber does not agree with the Trial Chamber in this regard. The difficulties in assigning the Appellant counsel in this case should not have been an obstacle for the Tribunal to ensure that the Appellant’s initial appearance was scheduled without delay. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that it is important and indeed ideal for an accused to have the assistance of counsel at the initial appearance to provide guidance, in particular, for entering a plea. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber considers that Rule 62(A)(i) states that at the initial hearing, the Trial Chamber or Judge shall “[s]atisfy itself or himself that the right of the accused to counsel is respected.” In addition, the Trial Chamber or Judge could ordered assignment of duty counsel to the Appellant for purposes of representation at the initial appearance and would have had the opportunity to facilitate the Registry’s further attempts to assign the Appellant counsel.

249. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that apart from the assignment of counsel issue and the Appellant’s role in creating delay, the Registry conceded that in this case, the initial appearance was also delayed in part due to the fact that the Appellant had been jointly indicted with several other accused. It was difficult at the time for the Tribunal’s Court Management Section to find a date acceptable to all, with all being duly represented by counsel.[1]

250. The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that Rule 62 is unequivocal that an initial appearance is to be scheduled without delay. There are other purposes for an initial appearance apart from entering a plea including: reading out the official charges against the accused, ascertaining the identity of the detainee,[2] allowing the Trial Chamber or Judge to ensure that the rights of the accused while in detention are being respected, giving an opportunity for the accused to voice any complaints, and scheduling a trial date or date for a sentencing hearing, in the case of a guilty plea, without delay.[3] The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that, under the plain meaning of Rule 62, the 211-day delay between the Appellant’s transfer to the Tribunal and the initial appearance before a Judge of this Tribunal constitutes extreme undue delay.

[1] Decision of 8 May 2000 [The Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-I, Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing, 8 May 2008], para. 28 referring to the written brief of 7 February 2000 filed by Mr. Antoine Mindua, a representative of the Registry.

[2] See supra n. 484 [Appeal Hearing, T. 7 March 2005 p. 51].

[3] See generally Rule 62.

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ICTR Rule Rule 62 ICTY Rule Rule 62
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

255. […] the Appeals Chamber reiterates that any violation of the accused’s rights entails the provision of an effective remedy pursuant to Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR. The Appeals Chamber considers that under the jurisprudence of this Tribunal, where the Appeals Chamber has found on interlocutory appeal that an accused’s rights have been violated, but not egregiously so, it will order the Trial Chamber to reduce the accused’s sentence if the accused is found guilty at trial.[1] With this in mind, the Appeals Chamber will take into consideration its findings here on violations of the Appellant’s rights when it turns to the task of determining the Appellant’s sentence in this Judgement in order to provide for an appropriate remedy.

320. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it concluded that the Appellant’s fundamental rights were violated during his arrest and detention prior to his initial appearance and consequently, that he is entitled to a remedy.[2] The Appeals Chamber therefore finds it appropriate to reduce the Appellant’s sentences as imposed by the Trial Chamber for his convictions at trial, which have been affirmed in this appeal.[3]

322. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber granted credit[4] to the Appellant pursuant to Rule 101(D) for time served pending surrender and trial as foreseen mandatorily under all circumstances and in each case. Therefore this credit was not a remedy for the suspect or accused’s rights having been violated during the period of his prolonged detention pending transfer and trial. Where a suspect or an accused’s rights have been violated during the period of his unlawful detention pending transfer and trial, Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR stipulates that “[a]ny person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

[1] See Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, para. 129; Barayagwiza, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration) [Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), 31 March 2000], para. 75.

[2] See supra paras. 251-255.

[3] See Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, para. 129; Barayagwiza, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), para. 75.

[4] Trial Judgement, paras. 966, 967, 970.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

42. […] The Appeals Chamber has recently confirmed that when a defendant pleads an alibi, he is denying that he was in a position to commit the crimes with which he is charged because he was elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that:

It is settled jurisprudence before the two ad hoc Tribunals that in putting forward an alibi, a defendant need only produce evidence likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case. The burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the facts charged remains squarely on the shoulders of the Prosecution. Indeed, it is incumbent on the Prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true.[2]

43. Nothing in the foregoing requires the Prosecution, however, specifically to disprove each alibi witness’s testimony beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, the Prosecution’s burden is to prove the accused’s guilt as to the alleged crimes beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the proffered alibi.

[1] See Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60 citing Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106.

[2] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60 (internal citations omitted). See also Čelebići Case Appeal Judgement, para. 581; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 113.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

81. The Appeals Chamber recalls that under Count 2, genocide, and Count 6, extermination as a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber found the Appellant responsible both individually, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute, and as a superior, pursuant to Article 6(3).[1] The Appeals Chamber notes that the convictions for individual and superior responsibility under each of these counts are based on the same facts.[2] The jurisprudence of the ICTY Appeals Chamber provides that concurrent conviction for individual and superior responsibility in relation to the same count based on the same facts constitutes legal error invalidating the Trial Judgement.[3] The Appeals Chamber endorses this position. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber vacates the Appellant’s convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity under Counts 2 and 6 in so far as they are based on a finding of superior responsibility under Article 6(3).

[1] Trial Judgement, paras. 842, 843, 905, 906.

[2] See Trial Judgement, paras. 842, 843, 905, 906.

[3] In Kordić and Čerkez, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated the following in that regard:

The provisions of Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) of the Statute connote distinct categories of criminal responsibility. However, the Appeals Chamber considers that, in relation to a particular count, it is not appropriate to convict under both Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) of the Statute. Where both Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) responsibility are alleged under the same count, and where the legal requirements pertaining to both of these heads of responsibility are met, a Trial Chamber should enter a conviction on the basis of Article 7(1) only, and consider the accused’s superior position as an aggravating factor in sentencing. … The Appeals Chamber therefore considers that the concurrent conviction pursuant to Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) of the Statute in relation to the same counts based on the same facts, as reflected in the Disposition of the Trial Judgement, constitutes a legal error invalidating the Trial Judgement in this regard.

Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 34, 35 (citations omitted). See also Blaškić Appeal Judgement, paras. 91, 92.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

202. The parties have addressed the effects of these prior interlocutory appeals decisions by reference to the doctrine of res judicata. This doctrine refers to a situation when “a final judgement on the merits” issued by a competent court on a claim, demand or cause of action between parties constitutes an absolute bar to “a second lawsuit on the same claim” between the same parties.[1] The doctrine of res judicata is not directly applicable to this case, because it applies not to the effects of prior interlocutory appeals decisions on further proceedings in the same case, but instead to the effects of final judgements in one case on proceedings in a subsequent and different case.[2] However, a similar principle applies to cases like this one: the Appeals Chamber ordinarily treats its prior interlocutory decisions as binding in continued proceedings in the same case as to all issues definitively decided by those decisions. This principle prevents parties from endlessly relitigating the same issues, and is necessary to fulfil the very purpose of permitting interlocutory appeals: to allow certain issues to be finally resolved before proceedings continue on other issues.

203. There is an exception to this principle, however. In a Tribunal with only one tier of appellate review, it is important to allow a meaningful opportunity for the Appeals Chamber to correct any mistakes it has made.[3] Thus, under the jurisprudence of this Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber may reconsider a previous interlocutory decision under its “inherent discretionary power” to do so “if a clear error of reasoning has been demonstrated or if it is necessary to do so to prevent an injustice.”[4]

[1] Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). A limited exception to the doctrine of res judicata barring review of final judgements is found under Article 25 of the Statute and Rules 120 and 121 of the Rules whereby a final judgement may be reviewed when a new fact is discovered that was not known at the time of the original proceedings either before the Trial or Appeals Chambers, could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and could have been a decisive factor in reaching the final decision.

[2] Under this Tribunal’s jurisprudence, interlocutory appeal decisions are not considered “final judgements” unless they terminate the proceedings between the parties, which is not the case here. See Barayagwiza, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), paras. 49, 51.

[3] Cf. Čelebići Case Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras. 48-60.

[4] Nahimana et al [Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A], Decision on Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Request for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber Decision of 19 January 2005, [4 February 2005], p. 2. 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005 KAJELIJELI Juvénal
(ICTR-98-44A-A)

262. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has affirmed that the Prosecution has the obligation to determine whether evidence is exculpatory under Rule 68.[1] This Appeals Chamber follows that position and considers that in order to allege a breach of Rule 68, the Defence must first establish that the evidence was in the possession of the Prosecution, and then must present a prima facie case which would make probable the exculpatory nature of the materials sought.[2] If the Defence satisfies the Tribunal that the Prosecution has failed to comply with its Rule 68 obligations, then the Tribunal must examine whether the Defence has been prejudiced by that failure before considering whether a remedy is appropriate.[3]

263. The Appeals Chamber finds that in the present case, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the Prosecution was not in possession of any prior statements the detained witnesses may have given to the Rwandan authorities. The Appellant rather appears to argue that since the detained witnesses were called by the Prosecution, it was the Prosecution’s duty to obtain the statements. The Appeals Chamber does not accept such an extension of the scope of Rule 68.

[1] Blaškić Appeal Judgment, para. 268.

[2] See Blaškić Appeal Judgment, para. 268.

[3] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 153.

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ICTR Rule Rule 68 ICTY Rule Rule 68
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

336. It is true that the Trial Chamber found “that the evidence of the Accused’s influence in this case [did] not sufficiently demonstrate that he was a superior in some formal or informal hierarchy with effective control over the known perpetrators.”[1]  But that finding is not inconsistent with the finding that his “prominence and influence made it more likely that others would follow his negative example.”[2] […] The question of criminal responsibility as a superior is analytically distinct from the question of whether an accused’s prominent status should affect his or her sentence.  It was within the Trial Chamber’s competence and reasonable for it to conclude that the Appellant did not hold a hierarchical position sufficient to render him liable for criminal responsibility as a superior while also finding that his influence was substantial enough to constitute an aggravating factor.

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 417.

[2] Ibid., para. 573.

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ICTR Rule Rule 101(B)(i) ICTY Rule Rule 101(B)(i)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

36. There is nothing in the Rules to suggest that different dates must be set for each party to file its closing brief.  […] [T]he purpose of a closing brief […] is not to respond to the other party’s closing brief, but to express its own position regarding the charges set out in indictment and the evidence led in the case. The practice generally followed at the ICTR and the ICTY is for both parties to file their closing brief at the same time.  […]

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ICTR Rule Rule 86(B) ICTY Rule Rule 86(B)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

269. […] [T]he Prosecution did not have to prove the existence of an armed conflict: contrary to Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, Article 3 of the ICTR Statute does not require that the crimes be committed in the context of an armed conflict.[1]  This is an important distinction.

[1] Cf. Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 251; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 86.

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ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

269. […] Contrary to the submissions of the Appellant, the Prosecution did not have to prove the existence of a high-level policy against the Tutsi: although the existence of a policy or plan may be useful to establish that the attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread and systematic, it is not an independent legal element.[1]

[1] Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 98; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 120.

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ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

318. A conviction for genocide or complicity in genocide is not impermissibly cumulative with the convictions for crimes against humanity.  A conviction for genocide under Article 2 of the Statute requires proof of an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”[1]  That is a wholly different legal and factual showing from the finding of a “widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” that must support a conviction for crimes against humanity.[2]  Upon this basis, the Appeals Chamber has held that convictions for genocide and convictions for crimes against humanity, based on the same facts, are permissible.[3]

[1] Article 2(2) of the Statute.

[2] Article 3 of the Statute.

[3] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 370; Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 219-227; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 542.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

369. […] Simultaneous convictions are permissible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and complicity to commit genocide as each has a materially distinct element. The Appellant’s conviction for complicity to commit genocide was based on his aiding and abetting principal perpetrators who killed Tutsi because of their ethnicity.[1] As noted earlier, the mens rea for complicity in genocide, for those forms of complicity amounting to aiding and abetting, is knowledge of the specific intent of the perpetrator(s).[2] The Appellant’s convictions for crimes against humanity necessitated proof of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, whereas convictions for war crimes require that the offences charged be closely related to the armed conflict. In the Trial Chamber’s opinion, this nexus was clearly established.[3]

See also para. 368.

[1] Trial Judgement [The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and Sentence, 15 May 2003], paras 435-436.

[2] See supra para. 316.

[3] Trial Judgement, paras 516-522.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

303. The purpose of expert testimony is to supply specialized knowledge that might assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence before it.  Expert witnesses are ordinarily afforded wide latitude to offer opinions within their expertise; their views need not be based upon firsthand knowledge or experience.  Indeed, in the ordinary case the expert witness lacks personal familiarity with the particular case, but instead offers a view based on his or her specialized knowledge regarding a technical, scientific, or otherwise discrete set of ideas or concepts that is expected to lie outside the layperson’s ken.    

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 SEMANZA Laurent
(ICTR-97-20-A)

189. […] [I]t was proper for the Chamber to apply Rule 89 of the Rules, which is the general provision that governs the admission of evidence at trial, providing at paragraph (C) that “a Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”[1]  The Appeals Chamber affirms that Rule 94 of the Rules is not a mechanism that may be employed to circumvent the ordinary requirement of relevance and thereby clutter the record with matters that would not otherwise be admitted.[2]  Therefore, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber did not err in applying Rule 89 in addition to Rule 94 of the Rules.

[1] Rule 89(C).

[2] Momir Nikolic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-002-60/1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for Judicial Notice, 5 April 2005, para. 17.

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ICTR Rule Rule 89(C);
Rule 94
ICTY Rule Rule 89(C);
Rule 94