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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

252. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence in reaching its findings.[1]

[1] See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1709; Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 172; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 971.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

272. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt requires a finder of fact to be satisfied that there is no reasonable explanation of the evidence other than the guilt of the accused.[1] It is further recalled that a trial chamber does not have to discuss every possible hypothesis or inference it may have considered, as long as it is satisfied that the inference it retained was the only reasonable one.[2]

[1] See Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 220.

[2] See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 967. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 599; Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 220.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

283.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Galić case determined, by majority, that the ICTY had subject-matter jurisdiction over the crime of terror under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.[1] The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the same case confirmed, by majority, the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror, clarifying that customary international law imposed individual criminal responsibility for violations of the prohibition of terror against the civilian population at the time of the commission of the crimes for which Galić was convicted.[2] The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the D. Milošević case, by majority, subsequently reaffirmed the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror.[3] In light of this jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber and was therefore binding on the Trial Chamber in the present case.[4] As it was not open to the Trial Chamber to depart from the existing jurisprudence in this respect, the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to give sufficient weight to his submissions that there exist cogent reasons to do so.

284.   As to whether there exist cogent reasons for the Appeals Chamber to depart from the jurisprudence in this regard, the standards of appellate review require Mladić to demonstrate that the decision to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of terror was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was “wrongly decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill‑informed about the applicable law”.[5] […] 

285.  A review of the Galić Appeal Judgement reveals that the judges of the majority applied the same legal principles as Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case in reaching their conclusions, namely that: (i) the ICTY has jurisdiction to prosecute a violation of a rule of international humanitarian law under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute when four conditions are fulfilled, including when “the violation of the rule must entail, under customary international law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule” (“Fourth Condition”);[6] and (ii) the fulfilment of the Fourth Condition may be inferred from, inter alia, state practice indicating an intention to criminalize the violation.[7] 

286. In concluding that the Fourth Condition was fulfilled, the judges of the majority in the Galić case considered, inter alia, that: (i) references to terror as a war crime could be found in national and multinational documents as early as 1919 and 1945;[8] (ii) numerous states, including the former Yugoslavia, had criminalized terrorizing civilians as a method of warfare or in a time of war;[9] and (iii) a court in Croatia had entered a conviction under, inter alia, Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II for acts of terror against civilians which occurred between March 1991 and January 1993.[10] Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case, by contrast, expressed doubt as to whether the evidence referred to by the majority in the Galić case was sufficiently extensive and uniform to establish customary international law.[11]

287. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case applied the same legal principles as the majority in the Galić case in determining the sufficiency of the evidence of state practice before them and merely disagreed on the result.[12] Bearing in mind that “two judges, both acting reasonably, can come to different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence, both of which are reasonable”,[13] the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the finding by the ICTY Appeals Chamber that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was wrongly decided. In the absence of cogent reasons to depart from the controlling jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s determination that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror in the present case. 

288.   As to Mladić’s contention that the definition of the crime of terror nonetheless violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege for lack of specificity and foreseeability,[14] the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber set out the elements of the crime in accordance with the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s definition in the Galić Appeal Judgement, as clarified in the D. Milošević Appeal Judgement.[15] In particular, the Trial Chamber stated that the crime of terror requires proof of, inter alia, acts or threats of violence committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population and directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities causing the victims to suffer grave consequences.[16]

289.   Relying on Judge Shahabuddeen’s separate opinion in the Galić Appeal Judgement stating that “there is neither the required opinio juris nor state practice to support the view that customary international law knows of a comprehensive definition [of terror]”,[17] Mladić argues that the ICTY was not in a position to define the elements of the crime.[18] He further contends that the definition adopted by the ICTY, particularly the requirement that victims suffer “grave consequences” from the acts or threats of violence, did not provide a clear gravity threshold and was improperly determined through a jurisdictional analysis which was developed after the Indictment period.[19]   

290.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires that a person may only be found guilty of a crime in respect of acts which constituted a violation of a norm which existed at the time of their commission.[20] Moreover, the criminal liability in question must have been sufficiently foreseeable and the law providing for such liability must have been sufficiently accessible at the relevant time.[21] This principle does not, however, prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime, nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the court.[22]

291.   The Appeals Chamber notes that Judge Shahabuddeen specified in his separate opinion in the Galić Appeal Judgement that: (i) he agreed with the view that terror as charged is a crime known to customary international law;[23] (ii) the ICTY could recognize that customary international law does know of a core or predominant meaning of “terror” for which there was individual criminal responsibility at the material times;[24] and (iii) he was satisfied that a serious violation of the laws or customs of war within the meaning of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, namely, by resorting to the core of terror, gives rise to such responsibility, which existed at the time of the alleged acts of the appellant.[25] In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Galić and D. Milošević cases merely clarified the elements of the crime of terror, which existed in customary international law, for the purposes of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.[26] The Appeals Chamber considers that this is consistent with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, as recalled above. Consequently, Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s application of the elements of the crime of terror as clarified by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.[27]

292.   As to foreseeability, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the accused must be able to appreciate that his conduct was criminal in the sense generally understood, without reference to any specific provision.[28] Although the ICTY did not apply the law of the former Yugoslavia to the definition of the crimes and forms of liability within its jurisdiction, it had recourse to domestic law for the purpose of establishing that the accused could reasonably have known that the offence in question or the offence committed in the way charged in the Indictment was prohibited and punishable.[29]

See also para. 293.

294. […] [I]n the Appeals Chamber’s view, the specification that, for the purposes of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, the crime of terror also requires that victims suffered “grave consequences”,[30] in no way detracts from the conclusion that Mladić could reasonably have known that the commission of acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population was prohibited and punishable.[31] […]

[1] Galić Trial Judgement, para. 138. See Galić Trial Judgement, paras. 63-138. See also Galić Trial Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia, paras. 108-113.

[2] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 86-98. See also Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 2, 4-22, 24.

[3] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 30. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 1-13. The Appeals Chamber notes that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Prlić et al. case, by majority, upheld convictions for the crime of terror. See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 424, 562-564, 1774-1789, 2017-2026, 2400-2402, 2406, 2800-2802; Prlić et al. Trial Judgement, Volume 3, paras. 1689-1692. See also Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, Partially Dissenting, Dissenting Opinions and Declaration of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 8-10 (wherein Judge Liu reiterated his position that the ICTY does not have jurisdiction over the crime of terror and that such convictions should therefore have been vacated because the crime did not exist under customary international law at the relevant time). In addition, despite opposition to the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror by Karadžić at trial, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Karadžić case reiterated that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute covers the crime of terror, and entered a conviction for it, which was upheld on appeal. See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 777; Karadžić Trial Judgement, paras. 458, 6008, 6022, 6071; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-05/18-PT, Karadžić Pre-Trial Brief, 29 June 2009, paras. 24, 25.

[4] See Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 113. See also [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, and Mladen Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-AR73.6, Decision on Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač Interlocutory Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Decision to Reopen the Prosecution Case, 1 July 2010], para. 24.

[5] See supra [Mladić Appeal Judgement], para. 14 and references cited therein.

[6] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 91; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 5; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, para. 2. See also Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 94.

[7] Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 92; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 7; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6, 10. See also [Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995], para. 128.

[8] See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 93 and references cited therein.

[9] See Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 94-96 and references cited therein.

[10] See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 97 and references cited therein.

[11] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6-8; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 8-10.

[12] See D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6-8; Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 94, 95; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 7-11.

[13] See Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgement, para. 15 and references cited therein.

[14] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 350, 352-371; T. 25 August 2020 p. 64.

[15] See Trial Judgement, paras. 3186-3188.

[16] See Trial Judgement, para. 3186.

[17] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 3.

[18] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 354-358.

[19] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 359-370, referring to, inter alia, Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 94.

[20] See Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003 (“Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003”), para. 37; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, 30 May 2001 (“Aleksovski Contempt Appeal Judgement”), para. 38; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 576; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 126. See also Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003 (“Hadžihasanović et al. Decision of 16 July 2003”), para. 51.

[21] Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003, paras. 37, 38. In the case of an international tribunal such as the ICTY, accessibility does not exclude reliance being placed on a law which is based on custom. Hadžihasanović et al. Decision of 16 July 2003, para. 34.

[22] Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003, para. 38; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 173, 576; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras. 126, 127.

[23] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 3.

[24] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 4.

[25] Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 5.

[26] See D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 31-37; Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 100-104.

[27] Trial Judgement, paras. 3186-3188.

[28] Hadžihasanović et al. Decision of 16 July 2003, para. 34.

[29] Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003, paras. 40, 41.

[30] See Trial Judgement, para. 3186. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 32, 33.

[31] Mladić’s contention that the definition of the crime of terror adopted by the ICTY provided an unclear gravity threshold creating “two distinct sets of victims” (see Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 365, 366) also does not demonstrate an error. The “grave consequences” requirement to which Mladić points in this respect is jurisdictional, meaning that the crime of terror victim group remains the same: “the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities”, but that the ICTY could only exercise its jurisdiction over the crime where the grave consequences requirement is met. See Trial Judgement, para. 3186. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 31-33.

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ICTY Statute Article 3 of the ICTY Statute
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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

299.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute sets out a non-exhaustive list of punishable violations of the laws or customs of war, including, inter alia, under Article 3(c), the “attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings” (“crime of attacking undefended locales”).[1] The crime of attacking undefended locales is thus one of the violations of the laws or customs of war within the jurisdiction of the ICTY pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, which include, for instance, the crimes of murder, terror, unlawfully attacking civilians, or hostage-taking.[2]

[1] Article 3(c) of the ICTY Statute.

[2] Cf. Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, paras. 698, 742.

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ICTY Statute Article 3(c) of the ICTY Statute
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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

313. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mens rea of the crime of terror consists of the intent to make the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of acts of violence or threats thereof, and of the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population.[1] Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the acts or threats of violence, such as, inter alia, their nature, manner, timing, and duration.[2] Nothing precludes a reasonable trier of fact from relying on the same set of circumstances to infer that perpetrators willfully made civilians the object of acts or threats of violence, and, at the same time, that such acts or threats of violence were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.

[…] 

315. The Appeals Chamber recalls that terror could be defined as “extreme fear”,[3] and that such fear was merely one of several factors from which the Trial Chamber inferred specific intent in this case.[4] […]

[1] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37, referring to Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104.

[2] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104.

[3] See Galić Appeal Judgement, n. 320.

[4] See Trial Judgement, para. 3201.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

356. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that forcible transfer entails the displacement of persons from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.[1] The requirement that the displacement be forced is not limited to physical force but can be met through the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, or taking advantage of a coercive environment. It is the absence of genuine choice that makes the displacement unlawful. While fear of violence, use of force, or other such circumstances may create an environment where there is no choice but to leave, the determination as to whether a transferred person had a genuine choice is one to be made in the context of a particular case being considered.[2] Displacement may be permitted by international law in certain limited circumstances,[3] provided it is temporary in nature[4] and conducted humanely.[5] Notably, however, displacement is not permissible where the humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement is the result of the accused’s own unlawful activity.[6] In addition, the participation of a non-governmental organization in facilitating displacements does not in and of itself render an otherwise unlawful transfer lawful.[7]

[1] See Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 150, nn. 538, 541 and references cited therein; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 308.

[2] See Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 918 and references cited therein (internal citations omitted).

[3] See Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 308; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 284.

[4] See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 597, referring to Article 49(2) of Geneva Convention IV.

[5] See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 599, referring to Article 49(3) of Geneva Convention IV, Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol II.

[6] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 287.

[7] Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 180; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 286.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

393.  [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused’s contribution to a joint criminal enterprise need not be in and of itself criminal, as long as he or she performs acts that in some way contribute to the furtherance of the common purpose.[1] Thus, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, whether Mladić’s orders were legitimate in the military context is not relevant to determining his significant contribution to the common purpose. What matters is that the accused significantly contributed to the commission of the crimes involved in the joint criminal enterprise.[2] Considering the above, Mladić’s assertion that his orders were consistent with legitimate military operations in light of the military context of Srebrenica[3] cannot serve to demonstrate an error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the common objective.[4]

See also paras. 395, 429.

[…]

414. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the law does not foresee specific types of conduct which per se cannot be considered a contribution to the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise.[5] What matters is that the accused performs acts that in some way contribute to the furtherance of the common purpose.[6] Within these legal confines, the question of whether a failure to act could be taken into account to establish that the accused significantly contributed to a joint criminal enterprise is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.[7] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that failures to act or acts carried out in furtherance of a joint criminal enterprise need not involve carrying out any part of the actus reus of a crime forming part of the common purpose, or indeed any crime at all.[8]

[1] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1653; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 695.

[2] See, e.g., Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 430, 431.

[3] See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 623. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82, 83; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

[4] See Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1615 (in which the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the fact that the participation of an accused amounted to no more than his or her “routine duties” will not exculpate the accused).

[5] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696. […].

[6] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1653; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 695. See also Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 427.

[7] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110. See also Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1233, 1242.

[8] Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 215; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 427.

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Footnote 1560. […] While the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity require the attack to be committed against a civilian population, it is well-established jurisprudence that victims of the underlying acts of crimes against humanity need not be civilians and can be individuals hors de combat. See Tolimir Appeal Judgement, paras. 141, 142; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 569; Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 29; Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 307. […]

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488.  […] The Appeals Chamber recalls ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence holding that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute is a general and residual clause which refers to a broad category of offences, namely all “violations of the laws or customs of war”, not limited to the list of violations enumerated therein.[1] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has consistently held that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute may cover all violations of international humanitarian law not falling under Articles 2, 4, or 5 of the ICTY Statute, including violations of Common Article 3,[2] which contains a prohibition of hostage-taking.[3] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case examined, inter alia, findings of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, domestic prosecutions, military manuals and legislation – including the law of the former Yugoslavia – and Security Council resolutions, and confirmed the formation of opinio juris to the effect that customary international law imposes criminal liability for those who commit serious violations of Common Article 3.[4] Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has previously rejected arguments that there are cogent reasons to depart from the Tadić jurisprudence on the questions of whether Common Article 3 is included in the scope of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute[5] and whether breaches of its provisions give rise to individual criminal responsibility.[6] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated that the acts enumerated in Common Article 3 were intended to be criminalized within the international legal order as early as 1949.[7]

489.  Furthermore, the ICTY has exercised its jurisdiction under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute to try individuals for violations of Common Article 3,[8] including on the basis of hostage-taking.[9] In this respect, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Karadžić case upheld the ICTY Trial Chamber’s determination that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.[10] The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that, under Common Article 3, there is an absolute prohibition of taking hostage of any person taking no active part in hostilities as well as detained individuals irrespective of their status prior to detention.[11] It has also rejected the submission that the crime of hostage-taking is limited under customary international law to the taking of civilians hostage.[12] In light of this jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.

490.  In attempting to demonstrate that there are cogent reasons to depart from this well established jurisprudence, Mladić submits that during the Indictment period, with the exception of the killing of hostages or the taking of civilians hostage, the taking of “non-civilians” hostage was not prohibited and did not entail individual criminal responsibility under customary international law. Mladić’s argument that the laws and norms applicable to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg only apply to the killing of hostages[13] does not undermine the fact that the prohibition of hostage-taking of any person taking no active part in the hostilities was nevertheless well established in customary international law during the period covered by the Indictment and entailed individual criminal responsibility. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Article 4 of the ICTR Statute, which was adopted in 1994, expressly prohibits hostage-taking as a violation of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated that the ICTR applies existing customary international law and that it was established to prosecute crimes which were already the subject of individual criminal responsibility.[14] Furthermore, an analysis of state practice confirms the formation of opinio juris that customary international law imposes individual criminal responsibility for violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II during the Indictment period. For example, legislation and military manuals of a number of states prohibited such violations,[15] and Additional Protocol II, which specifically contains the prohibition against hostage-taking of “[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted”, was adopted in 1977 by consensus and had been ratified by over 120 states at the time of the events included in the Indictment.[16]

[1] Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 125; Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 87, 89. See also Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

[2] Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 125, 136; Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 87, 89, 91. See also Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

Common Article 3 provides, in relevant part, that:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a)     […]

(b)    taking of hostages; […]

 

[4] See Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 128-136. See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 153-156, 160, 162-168, 174.

[5] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 129-136. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the submissions that violations of Common Article 3 are not within the jurisdiction of the ICTY on the basis, inter alia, that: (i) the Security Council never intended to permit prosecutions under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute for violations of Common Article 3; (ii) Article 3 of the ICTY Statute is limited to the “Hague law”; and (iii) unlike the ICTR Statute, the ICTY Statute does not explicitly include Common Article 3. See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 130-133, 136, 178.

[6] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 157-174. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected, inter alia, the submissions that: (i) the evidence presented in the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 did not establish that Common Article 3 is customary international law that creates individual criminal responsibility on the basis that there is no showing of state practice and opinio juris; (ii) the exclusion of Common Article 3 from the Geneva Conventions grave breaches system demonstrates that it entails no individual criminal responsibility; (iii) Common Article 3 imposes duties on states only and is meant to be enforced by domestic legal systems; and (iv) there is evidence demonstrating that Common Article 3 is not a rule of customary law which imposes liability on individuals. See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 157, 158, 163, 167-170, 174. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić’s assertion that the lack of mention of the prohibition against hostage-taking in the ICTY Statute, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, and the “grave breaches provisions” of the three 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I does not undermine that hostage-taking entailed individual criminal responsibility in customary international law at the time of the events in question. As discussed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Čelebići case, the Geneva Conventions impose an obligation on State Parties to implement the conventions in their domestic legislation, including by taking measures necessary for the suppression of all breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including those outside the grave breaches provisions. See Article 49 of Geneva Convention I, Article 50 of Geneva Convention II, Article 129 of Geneva Convention III, Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV (“Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.”). See also ICRC, Commentary of 1958 on Article 146(3) of Geneva Convention IV, p. 594 (“[…]This shows that all breaches of the Convention should be repressed by national legislation. […] [T]he authorities of the Contracting Parties […] should institute judicial or disciplinary punishment for breaches of the Convention.”). See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 164-166.

[7] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 163.

[8] See, e.g., Strugar Appeal Judgement, paras. 164, 171-179, p. 146; Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, paras. 38, 47, 53; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 51, 66-70.

[9] See, e.g., Karadžić Trial Judgement, paras. 5951, 5993, 6010. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 654, 659-661, 775, 777.

[10] See [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR72.5, Decision on Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Preliminary Motion to Dismiss Count 11 of the Indictment], 9 July 2009 (“Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009”)], paras. 2-4, 6, 22-27, 29. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 777; Karadžić Trial Judgement, paras. 467, 468.

[11] [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR-73.9, Decision on Appeal From Final Judgement of Acquittal for Hostage-Taking, 11 December 2012 (“Karadžić Decision of 11 December 2012”)], paras. 16, 21; Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009, para. 22. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 659; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 794; Ɖorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 747; Strugar Appeal Judgement, n. 460.

[12] Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009, paras. 3, 6, 22, 27. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 659; Karadžić Decision of 11 December 2012, paras. 9, 10, 16, 20, 21.

[13] Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 704.

[14] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 170, 178.

[15] See, e.g., Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act as amended (1962), Sections 4(1) and 4(4) (providing that, in addition to grave breaches, any “minor breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Common Article 3, are punishable offences); Belgium, Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des infractions graves aux Conventions internationales de Genève du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977 additionnels à ces Conventions (1993), Article 1(7) (implementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols and providing that Belgian courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes under international law such as hostage-taking); France, Décret n°75-675 du 28 juillet 1975 portant règlement de discipline générale dans les armées (1975), as amended in 1982, Article 9(1) (prohibiting hostage-taking of persons placed hors de combat and providing that they be treated humanely); Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual (1992), para. 1209 (qualifying as an “indictable offence” hostage-taking of persons protected by Common Article 3); The Netherlands, Military Manual (1993), pp. VIII-3, XI-1, XI-4 (restating the prohibition of hostage-taking found in Common Article 3 and Article 4 of Additional Protocol II).

[16] Additional Protocol II, Articles 4(1), 4(2)(c). See also ICRC, Commentary of 1987 on Additional Protocol II, paras. 4417, 4418 (“[…] Protocol II was adopted as a whole by consensus on 8 June 1977.”).

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494.  The Appeals Chamber notes that in finding that it had jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking, the Trial Chamber recalled the four conditions set out in the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 to satisfy Article 3 of the ICTY Statute’s “residual jurisdiction”, namely that: (i) the offence charged must violate a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must bind the parties at the time of the alleged offence; (iii) the rule must protect important values and its violation must have grave consequences for the victim; and (iv) that such a violation must entail the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator.[1] The Trial Chamber relied, inter alia, on the ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence in the Tadić, Čelebići, and Karadžić cases and concluded that hostage-taking under Article 3(1)(b) common to the Geneva Conventions met these conditions as the rules in Common Article 3 are part of customary international law in international and non-international armed conflicts, the acts prohibited by Common Article 3 breach rules protecting important values and involve grave consequences for the victims, and violations of such rules entail individual criminal responsibility.[2] In light of the established jurisprudence on this matter, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber correctly relied on the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 and other consistent ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking and, contrary to Mladić’s argument, it was not required to conduct a more detailed analysis in this respect.[3]

495.  With respect to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the Appeals Chamber recalls that this principle prescribes that a person may only be found guilty of a crime in respect of acts which constituted a violation of a norm which existed at the time of their commission.[4] In light of the well-established jurisprudence that hostage-taking was a crime under customary international law during the period covered by the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s contention that, by relying on the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, the Trial Chamber breached the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 3009, referring to [The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 (“Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995”], paras. 94, 143.

[2] Trial Judgement, para. 3010, referring to, inter alia, Karadžić Decision of 9 July 2009, paras. 23, 25, 26, Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 138, 139, 143, 147, 167, 173, 174, Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 89, 98, 134.

[3] The Appeals Chamber finds without merit Mladić’s argument that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Čelebići and Kunarac et al. cases “implicitly” affirmed the need for a trial chamber to conduct a detailed analysis of its jurisdiction where jurisdiction may be in issue. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 699, referring to Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 67, 68, Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 167, 168. The relevant jurisprudence to which he refers shows that the ICTY Appeals Chamber relied on the Tadić jurisprudence and reaffirmed that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute encompasses violations of Common Article 3. See Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68, nn. 60-62; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 168, 169.

[4] See [Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović and Dragoljub Ojdanić, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003 (“Milutinović et al. Decision of 21 May 2003”)], para. 37; Aleksovski Contempt Appeal Judgement, para. 38; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 576; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 126. […].

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529.   In convicting and sentencing Mladić for crimes under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber stated that his superior responsibility was “encapsulated” within his joint criminal enterprise liability.[1] The Appeals Chamber considers that this statement on Mladić’s superior responsibility falls short of a reasoned opinion.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber should set out in a clear and articulate manner the factual and legal findings on the basis of which it reached the decision to convict or acquit an accused. In particular, a trial chamber is required to provide clear, reasoned findings of fact as to each element of the crime charged.[3] Notwithstanding, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić confuses superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute with abuse of authority as an aggravating factor in sentencing. These two issues are distinct and the consideration of abuse of an accused’s position of authority as an aggravating factor in sentencing does not require a finding of superior responsibility.[4] The Appeals Chamber therefore dismisses Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber should have made findings on the elements of Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute in order to consider his abuse of authority as an aggravating factor in sentencing.[5]  

[1] See Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

[2] See Article 23(2) of the ICTY Statute and Rule 98 ter (C) of the ICTY Rules.

[3] See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 700; Ndindiliyimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 293; Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 320. See also Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1778.

[4] Cf. Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 170; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, paras. 347, 348; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras. 80, 81; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 336. According to the ICTR Appeals Chamber, “[t]he question of criminal responsibility as a superior is analytically distinct from the question of whether an accused’s prominent status should affect his or her sentence”. See Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 336. Indeed, while an accused’s superior position per se does not constitute an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes, the abuse of authority may. See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3264; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 302; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 411. See also Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 347.

[5] [Footnote omitted].

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545.  The Appeals Chamber recalls that the primary goal in sentencing is to ensure that the final or aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the criminal conduct and overall culpability of the offender.[1] While gravity of the offence is the primary factor in sentencing, the inherent gravity must be determined by reference to the particular circumstances of the case and the form and degree of the accused’s participation in the crime.[2] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls that while a position of influence or authority, even at a high level, does not automatically warrant a harsher sentence, its abuse may constitute an aggravating factor.[3]

546.  The Appeals Chamber notes that, in assessing his liability, the Trial Chamber stated that “Mladić’s conduct and superior position [were] encapsulated within the conduct relied upon to establish his participation in the four [joint criminal enterprises]”.[4] The Trial Chamber did not enter convictions pursuant to superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute but indicated that it would consider Mladić’s superior position for the purposes of sentencing.[5] The Appeals Chamber is of the view that this legal approach is consistent with settled jurisprudence.[6] In the sentencing portion of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber considered that Mladić’s participation in all four joint criminal enterprises “was undertaken in his official capacity as Commander of the VRS Main Staff”, and that he held this position throughout the entire Indictment period. The Trial Chamber then concluded that he therefore “abused his position” and found that “Mladić’s abuse of his superior position” added to the gravity of the offences.[8]

547.  Contrary to Mladić’s contention, the Appeals Chamber finds no indication that the Trial Chamber aggravated his sentence with superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.[9] Rather, according to the Trial Chamber, it was the abuse of his position as Commander of the VRS Main Staff that aggravated the gravity of his offences.[10] The Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić was “responsible for having committed a wide range of criminal acts through his participation in four [joint criminal enterprises]”,[11] and that he did so while, inter alia: (i) commanding and controlling VRS units and other groups subordinated to the VRS; (ii) having knowledge of crimes committed by those under his command; (iii) placing severe restrictions on humanitarian aid; (iv) providing misleading information about crimes to representatives of the international community; and (v) failing to investigate crimes and/or punish perpetrators of the crimes.[12] Given the totality of the Trial Chamber’s findings on Mladić’s responsibility, the Appeals Chamber finds no discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić abused his position of authority and that this added to the gravity of the crimes. […]

[1] See Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 350; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 430.

[2] See, e.g., Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3431; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1837; Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 350; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 442.

[3] See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3264; Nzabonimana Appeal Judgement, para. 464; Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 170; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 250; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 302; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 80.

[4] Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

[5] Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

[6] Where liability under both Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute is alleged, and where the legal requirements for both are met, a trial chamber should enter a conviction on the basis of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute alone and consider the superior position in sentencing. See, mutatis mutandis, Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. See also Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3359; Ɖorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 939; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 266; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 34. The Trial Chamber correctly recalled this principle. See Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

[7] Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

[8] Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

[9] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 917, 919.

[10] See Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

[11] Trial Judgement, paras. 5188-5192. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4612, 4688, 4893, 4921, 5098, 5131, 5156, 5163.

[12] See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4612, 4893, 5097, 5098, 5146, 5156.

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554. In relation to Mladić’s health and age, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the age of the accused may be a mitigating factor[1] and that poor health is accepted as a mitigating factor in exceptional cases only.[2]  […]

555.  […] According to Article 24(2) of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber was required to take into account “the individual circumstances of the convicted person” in the course of determining the sentence. The Appeals Chamber recalls that such circumstances could include family circumstances but that little weight is afforded to this factor in the absence of exceptional family circumstances.[3]  […]

556. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused’s assistance to victims or detainees can be considered in mitigation of his or her sentence.[4] However, such acts must be weighed against the gravity of the offences.[5]  […]

[1] See, e.g., Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 1170; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, paras. 974, 980; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 696. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has noted the limited weight given to advanced age as a mitigating factor in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. See Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 1170, n. 3847 and references cited therein.

[2] See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3315; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1827; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 436; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 696.

[3] See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3309; Ntabakuze Appeal Judgement, para. 284; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 816; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 696.

[4] See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 3301, 3302; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 817; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 696; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 776.

[5] See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 3296, 3302; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 817; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 266; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 776.

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562. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Article 24(1) of the ICTY Statute, trial chambers “shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia”.[1] Furthermore, according to Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules, a “convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life”.[2] The Appeals Chamber also recalls that the principle of nulla poena sine lege prohibits retroactive punishment.[3] The principle of lex mitior prescribes that if the law relevant to the offence of the accused has been amended, the less severe law should be applied;[4] however, the relevant law must be binding upon the court.[5]

563. The Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić’s submission regarding “oversights in the jurisprudence” is based on the erroneous foundation that, having “recourse” to the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia meant that Article 24 of the ICTY Statute “incorporated” or “import[ed]” domestic sentencing practices into international law and the sentencing practice of the ICTY.[6] It is settled jurisprudence that the ICTY was not in any way bound by the laws or sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia; rather, trial chambers were only obliged to take such practice into consideration.[7]

564. There is also no merit in Mladić’s submissions that the introduction of Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules created another sentencing regime within the jurisdiction of the ICTY and “retroactively” provided for life imprisonment,[8] or that life imprisonment was not “accessible or foreseeable” to accused, including himself, at the ICTY.[9] His contention that Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules, which was adopted subsequent to the ICTY Statute, established a different sentencing regime is misguided. The Appeals Chamber recalls that judicial power to adopt rules of procedure and evidence at the ICTY was subject to the principles and parameters set out in the ICTY Statute and international law.[10] Given that Article 24 of the ICTY Statute does not adopt or incorporate the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia into the ICTY’s sentencing practices, Mladić fails to establish that the creation of Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules deviates from the principle set out in the ICTY Statute.[11] Regarding the foreseeability of life imprisonment, Mladić ignores jurisprudence that the imposition of life imprisonment has been available for the most serious violations of international humanitarian law since at least the tribunals established after World War II.[12] Additionally, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Mladić’s submission that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Čelebići case conflated issues of liability (nullem crimen sine lege) and punishment (nulla poena sine lege).[13] The ICTY Appeals Chamber specifically considered the question of penalty independent of liability, concluding that there could be no doubt that the accused must have been aware that the crimes for which they were indicted were the most serious violations of international humanitarian law, punishable by the most severe penalties.[14] Furthermore, since the establishment of the ICTY, convicted persons before it have received sentences of life imprisonment pursuant to the ICTY Statute and Rules.[15] Most recently, the Appeals Chamber imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the Karadžić case before the Mechanism.[16] The Appeals Chamber thus finds that Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules did not create another sentencing regime inconsistent with Article 24(1) of the ICTY Statute,[17] and Mladić fails to demonstrate that life imprisonment was not an accessible or foreseeable punishment. 

[1] See also Rule 101(B)(iii) of the ICTY Rules. There are almost identical provisions in the Statute and Rules of the Mechanism. See Article 22(2) of the Statute; Rule 125(B)(iii) of the Rules.

[2] There is an almost identical provision in the Rules of the Mechanism. See Rule 125(A) of the Rules.

[3] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, n. 1382, referring to, inter alia, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), UN Doc. A/RES/21/2200, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“ICCPR”). Article 15(1) of the ICCPR stipulates, inter alia, that a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. See also Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 750; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 398.

[4] See Deronjić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 96; D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 81. Article 15(1) of the ICCPR states, in part, that if, subsequent to the commission of the offence, a provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.

[5] See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 398, n. 1201; Deronjić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 97; D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras. 81, 84, 85.

[6] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 951, 953, 955; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 133.

[7] See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, n. 11069; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 2087; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1830; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 398; D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, paras. 69, 84.

[8] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 932, 938, 945, 946, 952, 954; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 133.

[9] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 951, 953, 956.

[10] See Article 15 of the ICTY Statute; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević et al., Case Nos. IT-02-60-AR73, IT‑02‑60-AR73.2 & IT-02-60-AR73.3, Decision, 8 April 2003, para. 15.

[11] See also D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 82.

[12] Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 817, n. 1401 (where the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted that judgements rendered at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other successor tribunals provide clear authority for custodial sentences up to and including life imprisonment, and that individuals convicted before the Nuremberg Tribunal were given life sentences). See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, n. 1382, referring to, inter alia, Article 15(2) of the ICCPR (stating that “[n]othing in [Article 15] shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations”).  

[13] See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 947-949.

[14] See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 817.

[15] See D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 83. See, e.g., Tolimir Appeal Judgement, paras. 648, 649; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 2110, 2111, 2117; Galić Appeal Judgement, p. 185.

[16] See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 776, 777.

[17] See D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 82.

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576. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a protected group “in part”, the targeted part must be a substantial part of that group.[1] The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Krstić case identified the following non-exhaustive and non-dispositive guidelines that may be considered when determining whether the part of the group targeted is substantial enough to meet this requirement: (i) the numeric size of the targeted part as the necessary starting point, evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group; (ii) the targeted part’s prominence within the group; (iii) whether the targeted part is emblematic of the overall group or essential to its survival; and/or (iv) the perpetrators’ areas of activity and control, as well as the possible extent of their reach.[2] The applicability of these factors, together with their relative weight, will vary depending on the circumstances of the particular case.[3]

See also para. 577.

[…]

578. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, because the intent to destroy formed by perpetrators of genocide will always be limited by the opportunity presented to them, the perpetrators’ areas of activity and control, as well as the possible extent of their reach, should be considered when determining whether the part of the protected group they intended to destroy was substantial. [4]In this respect, the Trial Chamber determined that, from the perspective of the physical perpetrators, the Count 1 Communities were the only parts of the Bosnian Muslim group within their respective areas of control, and that the perpetrators’ authority did not extend beyond each of the Count 1 Municipalities in which they committed prohibited acts. [5]The Appeals Chamber considers that these conclusions, when viewed in the light of the Trial Chamber’s finding that the perpetrators intended to destroy the Count 1 Communities,[6] evince that the perpetrators targeted as substantial a part of the overall Bosnian Muslim group for destruction as they could. While this factor alone will not indicate whether the targeted group is substantial, it can – in combination with other factors – inform the analysis.[7] The Trial Chamber in the present case considered this factor, among others, in its analysis concluding that the physical perpetrators did not have the intent to destroy the Count 1 Communities as a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. [8] […]

580. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not just any impact on a protected group that supports a finding of genocidal intent; rather, it is the impact that the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of that group which indicates whether there is intent to destroy a substantial part thereof.[9] […]

[…]

588. As recalled above, where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a protected group “in part”, the targeted part must be a substantial part of that group.[10] […]

589. The Appeals Chamber recalls ₣…ğ that a substantiality assessment considers the impact that the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of that group.[11] Noting that the Count 1 Communities collectively comprised approximately 6.7 per cent of the Bosnian Muslim group,[12] the Appeals Chamber considers that a reasonable trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that the Count 1 Communities, individually as well as cumulatively, formed “a relatively small part” thereof.[13] The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that a reasonable trier of fact could also have found that the destruction of the Count 1 Communities, individually as well as cumulatively, was not sufficiently substantial to have an impact on the group’s overall survival at the relevant time.[14]

See also paras. 577-581.

 

[1] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 8. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1093(8) (2006) (“the term ‘substantial part’ means a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part”).

[2] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras. 12-14. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 727 and references cited therein; Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Prepared by Mr. B. Whitaker U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985, para. 29 (“‘In part’ would seem to imply a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group, such as its leadership.”).

[3] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 14. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Popović et al. case noted that “it is the objective, contextual characteristics of the targeted part of the group, […] that form the basis for determining whether the targeted part of the group is substantial”. Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 422.

[4] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 13.

[5] See Trial Judgement, paras. 3530-3534. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3535.

[6] Trial Judgement, para. 3526.

[7] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 13. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that a relevant factor in the determination of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Krstić case that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica formed a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group was that the authority of the Bosnian Serb forces charged with the take-over of Srebrenica did not extend beyond the Central Podrinje region, and that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica were the only part of the Bosnian Muslim group within the perpetrators’ area of control. See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 17.

[8] Trial Judgement, para. 3535.

[9] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 8 (“the substantiality requirement both captures genocide’s defining character as a crime of massive proportions and reflects the Convention’s concern with the impact the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of the group”). See also Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 261 and references cited therein.

[10] See supra [Mladić Appeal Judgement] para. 576, referring to Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 8.

[11] See supra [Mladić Appeal Judgement] para. 580, referring to, inter alia, Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 8 (“the substantiality requirement both captures genocide’s defining character as a crime of massive proportions and reflects the Convention’s concern with the impact the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of the group”).

[12] The Count 1 Communities collectively comprised 128,443 Bosnian Muslims, whereas the overall size of the Bosnian Muslim group in 1991 was approximately 1.9 million people, noting that 43.7 per cent of 4.4 million is 1,922,800. See Trial Judgement, paras. 3529-3534. See also supra para. 577; Prosecution Appeal Brief, n. 122. 

[13] See Trial Judgement, para. 3535. See also supra [Mladić Appeal Judgement] para. 577.

[14] See supra [Mladić Appeal Judgement] Section IV.A.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

50.  In articulating its approach to evidence presented in rebuttal to adjudicated facts, the Trial Chamber specified, in part, as follows:

The Trial Chamber analysed the evidence and considered, as an initial step, whether evidence contradicted the Adjudicated Facts. The Trial Chamber required evidence to be unambiguous in its meaning in order to be termed as ‘contradicting the Adjudicated Facts’. For example, evidence suggesting mere possibilities was deemed not to reach that threshold. In other words, merely pointing at the possibility of alternative scenarios was in itself not sufficient ground to reopen the evidentiary debate. A contradiction can exist in either presenting evidence on a specific alternative scenario, as opposed to a mere suggestion of one or more possible alternative scenarios, or in the unambiguous demonstration that the scenario as found in the Adjudicated Fact must reasonably be excluded as true. […] The Trial Chamber was mindful that evidence contradicting adjudicated facts does not automatically rebut the adjudicated fact. The presumption of accuracy of the adjudicated fact is only rebutted by ‘reliable and credible’ contradictory evidence.[1]

[…]

54. […] The ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Karemera et al. case has clarified that “the effect [of judicially noticing an adjudicated fact] is only to relieve the Prosecution of its initial burden to produce evidence on the point; the defence may then put the point into question by introducing reliable and credible evidence to the contrary”.[2]  In this respect, Mladić contends that “[t]he need for rebuttal evidence to be ‘credible and reliable’ […] must be read in light of the general standard for the admissibility of evidence”,[3] which is “relatively low”,[4] and “was never intended to be applied in conjunction with an additional requirement that the evidence be 'unambiguous’”.[5] He argues that the Trial Chamber’s error in heightening the standard resulted in his evidence being deemed “insufficient to enliven the rebuttal procedure or to rebut the accuracy of the adjudicated fact”.[6]

55.   In the Appeals Chamber’s view, Mladić confuses the standard for the admissibility of evidence with the final evaluation thereof. A reading of the Trial Judgement shows that the Trial Chamber’s criterion of unambiguity was not related to the reliability or credibility of evidence, but rather to its contrary nature.[7] In accordance with the standard elucidated by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Karemera et al. case, in order for evidence presented in rebuttal of an adjudicated fact to be admissible, and thereby bringing the presumption of its accuracy into dispute, such evidence must be contrary to the adjudicated fact and bear sufficient indicia of prima facie reliability and credibility.[8] The Appeals Chamber stresses, however, that “adjudicated facts that are judicially noticed […] remain to be assessed by the Trial Chamber to determine what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from them when considered together with all the evidence brought at trial”.[9] As such, the final evaluation of the probative value of rebuttal evidence, which includes a final assessment of its reliability and credibility, as well as the extent to which it is consistent with or contradicts adjudicated facts, “will only be made in light of the totality of the evidence in the case, in the course of determining the weight to be attached to it”.[10]

56.   In light of the above, and considering that, once judicially noticed, an adjudicated fact is presumed to be true, the Appeals Chamber finds no dissonance in the Trial Chamber’s requirement that evidence produced in rebuttal thereof should be “unambiguous in its meaning” – namely that it must either point to “a specific alternative scenario” or “unambiguous[ly] demonstrat[e] that the scenario as found in the Adjudicated Fact must reasonably be excluded as true”[11] – in order to successfully contradict it. […]

[1] Trial Judgement, paras. 5273, 5274 (internal citations omitted).

[2] The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 16 June 2006 (“Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006”)], para. 42. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 452; Édouard Karemera et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.17, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal of Decision on Admission of Evidence Rebutting Adjudicated Facts, 29 May 2009 (“Karemera et al. Decision of 29 May 2009”)], paras. 13, 14; [Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-AR73.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and Prosecution’s Catalogue of Agreed Facts, 26 June 2007 (“D. Milošević Decision of 26 June 2007”)], paras. 16, 17; Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, para. 49.

[3] Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 103; T. 25 August 2020 p. 36. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 98.

[4] Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 103, quoting Karemera et al. Decision of 29 May 2009, para. 15 (“the threshold for admission of this type of rebuttal evidence is relatively low: what is required is not the definitive proof of reliability or credibility of the evidence, but the showing of prima facie reliability and credibility on the basis of sufficient indicia”); T. 25 August 2020 p. 36.

[5] Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 104; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 37, 38.

[6] Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 106; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 39, 40. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 112; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 27.

[7] See Trial Judgement, para. 5273 (“The Trial Chamber required evidence to be unambiguous in its meaning in order to be termed as ‘contradicting the Adjudicated Facts’.”).

[8] See Karemera et al. Decision of 29 May 2009, paras. 13-15. See also D. Milošević Decision of 26 June 2007, paras. 16, 17; Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, paras. 42, 49.

[9] Karemera et al. Decision of 29 May 2009, para. 21. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 452.

[10] Karemera et al. Decision of 29 May 2009, para. 15. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 128.

[11] Trial Judgement, para. 5273.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Mladic Decision on Request for Right of Audience - 03.06.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

Pages 3, 4

RECALLING that assigned counsel are responsible for all aspects of defence in a given case before the Mechanism;[1]

RECALLING, however, that the Appeals Chamber may exercise its discretion to allow persons other than counsel and co-counsel to make representations before it;[2]

RECALLING that Ms. [Peta-Louise] Bagott was granted the right of audience for the Appeal Hearing and, appearing with the co‑counsel, made oral submissions on behalf of Mr. Mladić;[3]

CONSIDERING that […] Mr. Mladić consents to having Ms. Bagott represent him at the Pronouncement of Judgement, and that the Prosecution does not oppose this request;

RECALLING that, during the Pronouncement of Judgement, a Judge of the Appeals Chamber will read a summary of the written judgement and publicly pronounce the verdict, with no action required from the parties or counsel;[4]

[…]

FINDING that, in these circumstances, it is appropriate to exceptionally grant Ms. Bagott the right of audience before the Appeals Chamber at the Pronouncement of Judgement […];

[…]

HEREBY EXCEPTIONALLY EXTENDS Legal Consultant Ms. Bagott the right of audience to appear in court and act without either Lead Counsel Mr. [Branko] Lukić or Co-Counsel Mr. [Dragan] Ivetić being present in the courtroom for the Pronouncement of Judgement;

[1] See Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, MICT/5, 14 November 2012, Article 16(B); Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, Decision on Karadžić’s Request to Participate in the Appeal Hearing, 27 February 2018 (“Karadžić Decision of 27 February 2018”), p. 2. 

[2] See Karadžić Decision of 27 February 2018, p. 2, n. 11 and references cited therein.

[3] See [Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. MICT-13-56-A], T. 25 August 2020 pp. 4, 5, 14-24, 27-40, 60-64; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 2, 43, 44, 59-73, 86-97.

[4] [Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. MICT-13-56-A, Decision on Defence Urgent Motion to Postpone Pronouncement of Judgement, 28 May 2021], p. 3. See also Rule 144(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism.

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IRMCT Rule Rules 144(D)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Defence Urgent Motion to Postpone Pronouncement of Judgement - 28.05.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

Pages 2, 3

RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 144(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism […], the judgement on appeal shall be pronounced in public by the Appeals Chamber or a Judge thereof, on a date of which notice shall be given to the parties and counsel and at which they shall be entitled to be present;

[…]

OBSERVING that the Rules do not restrict the scheduling or conduct of appeal proceedings, including the pronouncement of judgement, on the basis of a stayed status conference;[14]

[…]

CONSIDERING that, during the Pronouncement of Judgement, a Judge of the Appeals Chamber will read a summary of the written judgement and publicly pronounce the verdict, with no action required from the parties or counsel;[18]

[18] See Rule 144(D) of the Rules.

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IRMCT Rule Rule 69(B)

Rule 144(D)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Defence Urgent Motion to Postpone Pronouncement of Judgement - 28.05.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

Page 3

RECALLING that the right to be present during appeal proceedings does not require physical presence in the courtroom, at least where no additional evidence is being admitted, and can be satisfied through videoconference link;[15]

[15] See [Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. MICT-13-56-A, Decision on the Scheduling of the Appeal Hearing and a Status Conference, 17 July 2020], paras. 16, 17.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Defence Urgent Motion to Postpone Pronouncement of Judgement - 28.05.2021 MLADIĆ Ratko
(MICT-13-56-A)

Page 3

RECALLING that counsel have an obligation to represent their client and to comply with orders of the Appeals Chamber,[16] and that, where the client is represented by counsel and co-counsel, either one may assume the responsibility for participating in proceedings;[17]  

[…]

CONSIDERING that, notwithstanding Co-Counsel’s unavailability, the Defence has failed to demonstrate that Mr. Mladić or his Lead Counsel cannot be present for the Pronouncement of Judgement, in court or via videoconference;[19]

[…]

CONSIDERING that […] Mr. Mladić has been able to communicate with his legal team and provide instructions following the issuance of the Scheduling Order, and in doing so he, inter alia, “spoke definitively” and “provided his unwavering position”;[21]

FINDING that, in light of the considerations above, the Defence has failed to justify the request to stay the Pronouncement of Judgement and postpone it until a time when both counsel can be present in court in person with Mr. Mladić;

[…]

[16] See [Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. MICT-13-56-A,] Decision on a Defence Motion to Reconsider the “Decision on Defence Submissions”, 20 August 2020 (“Decision of 20 August 2020”), p. 3, n. 17; [Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. MICT-13-56-A,] Decision on Defence Submissions, 14 August 2020 (“Decision of 14 August 2020”), p. 5, n. 30 and references cited therein.

[17] See Decision of 20 August 2020, p. 3, n. 17; Decision of 14 August 2020, p. 5, n. 31 and references cited therein.

[19] [Footnote omitted].

[21] [Footnote omitted].

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IRMCT Rule Rule 144(D)