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Decision Regarding Leave to Amend Indictment - 19.12.2003 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR73 )

9. Because the question whether to grant leave to amend the indictment is committed to the discretion of the Trial Chamber by Rule 50 of the Rules, appellate intervention is warranted only in limited circumstances.  As the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has explained, the party challenging the exercise of a discretion must show “that the Trial Chamber misdirected itself either as to the principle to be applied, or as to the law which is relevant to the exercise of the discretion, or that it has given weight to extraneous or irrelevant considerations, or that it has failed to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or that it has made an error as to the facts upon which it has exercised its discretion.”  If the Trial Chamber has properly exercised its discretion, the Appeals Chamber may not intervene solely because it may have exercised the discretion differently.  However, if the Trial Chamber has committed an error that has prejudiced the party challenging the decision, the Appeals Chamber “will review the order made and, if appropriate and without fetter, substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the Trial Chamber.”

[1] Prosecutor v. Milosević, Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73 & IT-01-51-AR73, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal from Refusal to Order Joinder, 18 April 2002 (“Milosević”), para. 5 (footnotes omitted).

[2] Ibid., para. 4.

[3] Ibid., para. 6.

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Decision Regarding Leave to Amend Indictment - 19.12.2003 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR73 )

11. […] [T]he difference between an “amended” indictment and a “new” indictment is not useful.  It is true that if an amended indictment includes new charges, it will require a further appearance by the accused in order to plead to the new charges under Rule 50(B). […] Nothing in Rule 50 prevents the prosecution, as a general matter, from offering amendments that are substantial.

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ICTR Rule Rule 50 ICTY Rule Rule 50
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision Regarding Leave to Amend Indictment - 19.12.2003 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR73 )

12.  [] The Prosecution is entitled to decide that its theory of the accused’s criminal liability would be better expressed by an amended indictment.  Even if the trial can proceed on the basis of the Current Indictment, the Prosecution is not thereby precluded from seeking to amend it.

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ICTR Rule Rule 50 ICTY Rule Rule 50
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision Regarding Leave to Amend Indictment - 19.12.2003 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR73 )

13. The third point considered by the Trial Chamber was delay.  This factor arises from Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute of the International Tribunal, which entitles all accused before the International Tribunal to be “tried without undue delay,” and is unquestionably an appropriate factor to consider in determining whether to grant leave to amend an indictment.  Guidance in interpreting Article 20(4)(c) can be found in the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Kovačević,[1] in which the Trial Chamber refused amendment of an indictment on grounds that included undue delay.  The ICTY Appeals Chamber framed the question as “whether the additional time which the granting of the motion for leave to amend would occasion is reasonable in light of the right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial.”[2]  The ICTY Appeals Chamber noted that the requirement of trial without undue delay, which the Statute of the ICTY expresses in language identical to Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute of the International Tribunal,[3] “must be interpreted according to the special features of each case.”[4]  Additionally, the specific guarantee against undue delay is one of several guarantees that make up the general requirement of a fair hearing, which is expressed in Article 20(2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal and Article 21(2) of the ICTY Statute.[5]  “[T]he timeliness of the Prosecutor’s request for leave to amend the Indictment must thus be measured within the framework of the overall requirement of the fairness of the proceedings.”[6] 

14. Kovačević stands for the principle that the right of an accused to an expeditious trial under Article 20(4)(c) turns on the circumstances of the particular case and is a facet of the right to a fair trial.  This Appeals Chamber made a similar point recently when it stated, albeit in a different context, that “[s]peed, in the sense of expeditiousness, is an element of an equitable trial.”  Trial Chambers of the International Tribunal have also used a case-specific analysis similar to that of Kovačević in determining whether proposed amendments to an indictment will cause “undue delay.”

15 […] [A] Trial Chamber must also examine the effect that the Amended Indictment would have on the overall proceedings.  Although amending an indictment frequently causes delay in the short term, the Appeals Chamber takes the view that this procedure can also have the overall effect of simplifying proceedings by narrowing the scope of allegations, by improving the Accused’s and the Tribunal’s understanding of the Prosecution’s case, or by averting possible challenges to the indictment or the evidence presented at trial.  The Appeals Chamber finds that a clearer and more specific indictment benefits the accused, not only because a streamlined indictment may result in shorter proceedings, but also because the accused can tailor their preparations to an indictment that more accurately reflects the case they will meet, thus resulting in a more effective defence.

[1] No. IT-97-24-AR73, Decision Stating Reasons for Appeals Chamber’s Order of 29 May 1998, dated 2 July 1998 (“Kovačević”).

[2] Ibid., para. 28.

[3] Statute of the ICTY, Art. 21(4)(c).

[4] Kovačević, para. 30.

[5] Ibid., para. 30.

[6] Ibid., para. 31.

[7] Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Joint Case No. ICTR-98-42-A15bis, Decision in the Matter of Proceedings Under Rule 15bis (D), 24 September 2003, para. 24.

[8] E.g., Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, No. ICTR-96-15-T, Reasons for the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, 10 September 1999,  paras. 23-25; Prosecutor v. Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, 6 May 1999, para. 17.

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ICTR Statute Article 20(4)(c) ICTR Rule Rule 50 ICTY Rule Rule 50
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision Regarding Leave to Amend Indictment - 19.12.2003 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR73 )

20. […] [A]lthough Rule 50 does not require the Prosecution to amend the indictment as soon as it discovers evidence supporting the amendment, neither may it delay giving notice of the changes to the Defence without any reason.  The Prosecution cannot earn a strategic advantage by holding an amendment in abeyance while the defence spends time and resources investigating allegations that the Prosecution does not intend to present at trial.  In this regard, it is worth recalling that a substantial delay will be considered undue “if it occur[s] because of any improper tactical advantage sought by the prosecution.”   Strategic efforts to undermine the conduct of proceedings cannot be tolerated, especially if designed to disadvantage the ability of the Defence to respond to the Prosecution’s case.  

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ICTR Rule Rule 50 ICTY Rule Rule 50
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision Regarding Leave to Amend Indictment - 19.12.2003 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR73 )

17. […][T]he determination whether proceedings will be rendered unfair by the filing of an amended indictment must consider the risk of prejudice to the accused. 

See also para. 28.

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ICTR Rule Rule 50 ICTY Rule Rule 50
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision Regarding Leave to Amend Indictment - 19.12.2003 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR73 )

18. […][T]he Appeals Chamber agrees that judicial economy may be a basis for rejecting a motion that is frivolous, wasteful, or that will cause duplication of proceedings.

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Decision Regarding Additional Funds - 13.11.2003 MILUTINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-99-37-AR73.2)

25.     […] [T]he Registrar was correct to take the view that the amount of resources allocated to each Defence team depends on factors such as the level of complexity of the case and the amount of work required to ensure an effective pre-trial preparation.[1] As such, it is the amount of work required, rather than the length of the pre-trial stage, which should determine the allotment for each Defence team.

[1] See Registry Comments on Defence Motion for Additional Funds, 13 June 2003, paras. 4-5.

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Decision Regarding Additional Funds - 13.11.2003 MILUTINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-99-37-AR73.2)

19.     The Trial Chamber correctly considered that the Registrar has the primary responsibility in the determination of matters relating to remuneration of counsel under the Legal Aid System of the International Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber has already held that, where the Directive expressly provides for a review of the Registrar’s decision, the Trial Chamber cannot interfere in the Registrar’s decision, and its only option is to stay the trial until that procedure has been completed.[1] Where, however, the Directive does not expressly provide for a review of the Registrar’s decision, the Trial Chamber, pursuant to its statutory obligation to ensure the fairness of the trial, is competent to review the Registrar’s decision in the light of its effect upon the fairness of the trial.

20.     The exercise of such power should, however, be closely related to the fairness of the trial, and it should not be used as a substitute for a general power of review which has not been expressly provided in the Directive. […]

[1] Prosecutor v. Blagojević, IT-02-60-AR73.4, Ex Parte and Confidential Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace his Defence Team, 7 November 2003, para. 7.

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Decision Regarding Additional Funds - 13.11.2003 MILUTINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-99-37-AR73.2)

24.     […] The principle of equality of arms would be violated only if either party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its case. […]

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Decision on Provisional Release - 31.10.2003 LIMAJ et al.
(IT-03-66-AR65)

11.       The ICTY is entrusted with bringing justice to the former Yugoslavia.  First and foremost, this means justice for the victims, their relatives and other innocent people.  Justice, however, also means respect for the alleged perpetrators’ fundamental rights. Therefore, no distinction can be drawn between persons facing criminal procedures in their home country or on an international level.

12.      Rules 65 (B) and (D) of the Rules must therefore be read in the light of the ICCPR and ECHR and the relevant jurisprudence.

13.     Moreover, when interpreting Rule 65(B) and (D) of the Rules, the general principle of proportionality must be taken into account. A measure in public international law is proportional only when it is (1) suitable, (2) necessary and when (3) its degree and scope remain in a reasonable relationship to the envisaged target. Procedural measures should never be capricious or excessive. If it is sufficient to use a more lenient measure than mandatory detention, it must be applied.[1]    

[1]See, among others, Prosecutor v. Darko Mđra, Case No.: IT-02-59-PT, “Decision on Darko Mđra on Request for Provisional Release”, 15 April 2002, Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasonivić, Mehmed Alagić and Amir Kubura, “Decision granting Provisional Release to Enver Hadžihasonivić”, 19 December 2001.

 

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ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Provisional Release - 31.10.2003 LIMAJ et al.
(IT-03-66-AR65)

17.     […] [T]he right to be heard personally is not absolute. The granting of an oral hearing is a matter for the discretion of a Chamber, and it may legitimately be regarded as unnecessary when, as in the present case, the information before the Trial Chamber is sufficient to enable the Chamber to reach an informed decision. […] Finally, the Trial Chamber is not obliged to explain prior to its final decision why a hearing is unnecessary or to notify the parties of this.

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Decision on Provisional Release - 31.10.2003 LIMAJ et al.
(IT-03-66-AR65)

25.     According to the settled practice of the International Tribunal, it is the State into the territory of which the accused will be released, as the guarantor of public safety and order in that territory, that must provide the International Tribunal with guarantees that the accused will not flee and that if he does so, he will be arrested. […]  

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ICTR Rule Rule 65 ICTY Rule Rule 65
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Provisional Release - 31.10.2003 LIMAJ et al.
(IT-03-66-AR65)

30.    The Bench considers that, while under Rule 65(B) of the Rules the seriousness of the charges against an accused cannot be the sole factor that determines the outcome of an application for provisional release, it is certainly one that a Trial Chamber is entitled to take into account when assessing whether an accused, if released, would appear for trial.[1] It is evident that the more severe the sentence which an accused faces, the greater is the incentive to flee. […]

[1] The Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović and Dragoljub Ojdanić, “Decision on Provisional Release”, 30 October 2002, para 6.

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Decision on Whether to Continue or Restart Trial - 24.09.2003 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A15bis)

9. The Appeals Chamber will address two preliminary arguments. First, the Appellants contend that the two remaining judges in the Butare trial sat in the plenary which amended Rule 15bis on 27 May 2003 and that this impaired their impartiality.  The argument overlooks the fact that judges can in a legislative capacity make rules without prejudice to their right to pronounce in a judicial capacity on the vires or operation of the rules so made. In this case, article 14 of the Statute, which gives a rule-making competence to the judges of the Tribunal, does not prevent them from later deciding in their judicial capacity on the vires or operation of the rules adopted.

[1] The Appellants also argue that the amendment was designed to prevent them from benefiting from their previous refusal to consent. See, for example, the submissions of Nyiramasuhuko in her notice of appeal, paras.12-14, and Nteziryayo’s notice of appeal, paras. 15-17.

[2] Smokovitis v. Greece, ECHR, 11 April 2002, concerned a legislative judgment relating to specific claims, and not the laying down of a legislative norm; it is distinguishable.

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ICTR Statute Article 14 ICTY Statute Article 15
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Whether to Continue or Restart Trial - 24.09.2003 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A15bis)

11. The Appeals Chamber considers that anyone exercising a judicial power has the responsibility and the competence to ensure that he has the power which he is proposing to exercise. The new Rule 15bis (D) gives a judicial power to the two remaining judges, namely, the power to decide whether or not it is in the interests of justice to continue a part-heard case with a substitute judge. This power comprehends the incidental power to decide whether or not this provision is applicable to the particular case of the Butare trial. This incidental power has to be exercised by the two remaining judges to whom the main power is entrusted. […]

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ICTR Rule Rule 15 bis ICTY Rule Rule 15 bis
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Whether to Continue or Restart Trial - 24.09.2003 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A15bis)

25. There is a preference for live testimony to be heard by each and every judge. But that does not represent an unbending requirement. The Rules and the cases show that exceptions can be made. The exceptions may relate even to evidence involving an assessment of demeanour, various ways being available to assist a new judge to overcome any disadvantages. The Appellants have not attacked the procedure prescribed by Rule 15(A) or Rule 15(B). Under these provisions, a witness could be heard by two judges; that the procedure is, in effect, available only over a short period of time is not relevant to the principle involved. Nor have the Appellants attacked the procedure prescribed by the old Rule 15(C) by virtue of which, in a part-heard case, a substitute judge could come in for the remainder of the trial; that this was possible only with the consent of the accused (where opening statements had been made or evidence had begun to be presented) was, again, not relevant to the principle involved. And then there is the case of deposition evidence admitted under Rule 71. In all these cases, the temporarily absent judge or the substitute judge, as the case may be, is faced with the task of evaluating evidence not given before him.

[…]

34.     The recomposed Trial Chamber may recall witnesses so as to enable the substitute judge to assess their demeanour on particular points. The recall decision would be made by the recomposed Trial Chamber after the proposed judge has joined it. Where video-recordings are available, an absent judge who reviews such recordings does so as a member of the bench, as in all the cases mentioned in paragraph 25 above. In like manner, in this case the substitute judge would be hearing recalled testimony as a member of the recomposed Trial Chamber. The recall power lies within the normal competence of the recomposed Trial Chamber. It was not for the two judges to authorize it to exercise that competence, although they could note that competence.

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ICTR Rule Rule 15 bis ICTY Rule Rule 15 bis
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Whether to Continue or Restart Trial - 24.09.2003 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A15bis)

13. Statutes which make alterations in procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct; they apply to existing proceedings even though these were commenced before the statutes were made and in that sense may be regarded as retrospective. By contrast, there is a presumption that enactments affecting substantive rights are intended to be prospective. This presumption is however a rebuttable one; if it is rebutted, an amendment, though affecting substantive rights, applies retrospectively (barring any impediment of a constitutional nature) and so can affect existing proceedings.

14. Evidence capable of rebutting the presumption is furnished through Rule 6(C), which states that “an amendment shall enter into force immediately, but shall not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case”. It is true that a provision stipulating that a statute is to commence at a certain time does not necessarily mean that the statute is to govern previous conduct into which an inquiry is pending at that time. But it depends on the language of the commencement provision. Here there is one commencement provision; it applies to amendments of all kinds. Therefore, every amendment enters into force “immediately”, i.e., whether substantive or procedural, it applies to all cases of which the Tribunal is then or may in future be seised, the sole qualification being that the amendment, of whatever kind, must not “operate to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case”. So, the real and only question under the Rules, as they have been crafted, is whether the new amendment to Rule 15bis will operate to prejudice the rights of the Appellants.

[1] See for example, Rex v.Chandra [1905], 2 K.B.335 ; and Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974).

[2] See Turnbull v. Forman (1885) 15 Q.B.D 234, per Bowen L.J at p.238: “Where the legislature mean to take away or lessen rights acquired previously to the passing of an enactment, it is reasonable to suppose that they would use clear language for the purpose of doing so, or, to put the same thing in a somewhat different form, if the words are not unequivocally clear to the contrary, a provision must be construed as not intended to take away or lessen existing rights. A converse rule is that, where the legislature is dealing with matters of procedure as distinguished from substantive rights, the same presumption does not apply”.

[3] The presumption was not rebutted in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), which contains a number of helpful statements on the subject.

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ICTR Rule Rule 6(C) ICTY Rule Rule 6(D)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Whether to Continue or Restart Trial - 24.09.2003 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A15bis)

23. The discretion of the Trial Chamber meant that the Trial Chamber had the right to establish the precise point within a margin of appreciation at which a continuation should be ordered. In that decision-making process, the Appeals Chamber can intervene only in limited circumstances, as, for example, where it is of the view that there was a failure to exercise the discretion, or that the Trial Chamber failed to take into account a material consideration or took into account an immaterial one and that the substance of its decision has in consequence been affected. It is not enough that the Appeals Chamber would have exercised the discretion differently. However, even if a trial court has not otherwise erred, the appellate “court must, if necessary, examine anew the relevant facts and circumstances to exercise a discretion by way of review if it thinks that the judge’s ruling may have resulted in injustice to the appellants.”[1]

[…]

27. The Appeals Chamber does not consider it useful to lay down a hard and fast relationship between the proportion of witnesses who have already testified and the exercise of the power to order a continuation of the trial with a substitute judge. The discretion to continue the trial with a substitute judge is a discretion; the Appeals Chamber can only interfere with the way in which the discretion has been exercised if it has been incorrectly exercised in the circumstances mentioned above.  The stage reached in each case need not always be the same. […]

[1] See R. v. McCann, (1991), 92 Cr. App. R. 239 at 251, per Beldam, L.J., reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal and citing Evans v. Bartlam, [1937] A.C.473. A civil case can likewise be interpreted to mean that, even if there is no other vitiating error, an appellate court could interfere with the exercise by the lower court of its discretion where the latter “has exceeded the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible”.  See Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in G. v. G. (Minors: Custody Appeal), [1985] 2 All ER 210, H.L., at 228.

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Decision on Whether to Continue or Restart Trial - 24.09.2003 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A15bis)

24. The Appeals Chamber accepts that as between a speedy trial and an equitable trial preference should be given to the latter. But there is no necessary opposition between the two: a trial is inequitable if it is too long drawn out. Speed, in the sense of expeditiousness, is an element of an equitable trial. The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber meant otherwise or that, in particular, it was deferring to expediency. The Appeals Chamber will credit the Trial Chamber with knowing of the distinction between “expeditiousness” and “expedience”. It notes that the Trial Chamber referred to the command in article 19.1 of the Statute that “Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious …” and that it is in that sense – the sense of “expeditiousness” - that the expression “speedy trial” is understood in major jurisdictions.[1] […]

[1] See, for example, Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., p. 1408.

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ICTR Statute Article 19(1) ICTY Statute Article 20(1)