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Decision on Amicus Prosecutor - 08.12.2015 KAMUHANDA Jean de Dieu
(MICT-I3-33-AR90/108.1)

11.     Pursuant to Rule 90(J) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism (“Rules”), a decision disposing of a contempt case rendered by a Single Judge is subject to appeal as of right. The Appeals Chamber notes that in the Impugned Decision, the Single Judge dismissed Kamuhanda’s request for the appointment of an amicus curiae Prosecutor to complete the investigations into contempt identified in the ICTR Oral Decision, thus effectively disposing of the contempt case before the Mechanism. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that an appeal as of right lies from the Impugned Decision under Rule 90(J) of the Rules, and recognizes the Appeal as validly filed.

[1] Impugned Decision [The Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. MICT-13-33, Decision on Motion for Appointment of Amicus Curiae Prosecutor to Investigate Prosecution Witness GEK, 16 September 2015], paras. 3, 11.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Amicus Prosecutor - 08.12.2015 KAMUHANDA Jean de Dieu
(MICT-I3-33-AR90/108.1)

15.     To the extent that Kamuhanda’s request before the Single Judge may have been based on new circumstances, demonstrating an injustice, that have emerged after the Kamuhanda Decision of 25 August 2011 [Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-R, Decision on Request for Review, 25 August 2011] was rendered, it amounted to a request for a reconsideration of the ICTR Appeals Chamber’s decision on the matter of the contempt investigations.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Mechanism’s mandate is to continue the jurisdiction, rights and obligations, and essential functions of the ICTR and the ICTY and that in doing so, it is bound to consider the relevant precedents of the ad hoc tribunals.[2] Accordingly, while decisions of the ICTR Appeals Chamber, as correctly noted in the Impugned Decision, retain their validity before the Mechanism, applicants are not barred from seeking reconsideration of such decisions before the Mechanism, where appropriate.

16.     It is well established in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals that the Appeals Chamber has inherent discretionary power to reconsider a previous non-final decision if a clear error of reasoning has been demonstrated or if it is necessary in order to prevent an injustice.[3] The Appeals Chamber shall not reconsider final decisions terminating the proceedings in a case.[4] Such decisions include final judgements[5] and decisions denying requests for review.[6] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Kamuhanda Decision of 25 August 2011, in the part concerning the matter of the contempt investigations, does not belong to either category and that it may be subject to reconsideration before the Mechanism. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber emphasizes that the principle of finality dictates that the discretionary power to reconsider previous decisions should be exercised sparingly and a party must therefore meet a high threshold in its request for reconsideration.[7]

17.     The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that a request for reconsideration, by definition, has to be made before the chamber that rendered the impugned decision.[8] Considering that the Statute of the Mechanism and the Rules reflect normative continuity with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR,[9] the Appeals Chamber observes that the proper forum for a request for reconsideration of a decision rendered by the ICTR Appeals Chamber is the Appeals Chamber of the Mechanism. […]

[1] See Motion for Appointment of Amicus Curiae [The Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. MICT-13-33, Motion for Appointment of Amicus Curiae Prosecutor to Investigate Prosecution Witness GEK, 2 August 2015 (with public annexes A-D and confidential annex E)], para. 13; Appeal [Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. MICT-13-33-AR90/108, Appeal of Decision on Jurisdiction to Investigate Prosecution Witness GEK, 15 October 2015], para. 45.

[2] Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14, Decision on Appeal Against the Referral of Phénéas Munyarugarama’s Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to Strike, 5 October 2012 (“Munyarugarama Decision of 5 October 2012”), paras. 4, 6.

[3] Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-A, Decision on Motions for Reconsideration, 5 September 2014 (“Prlić Decision of 5 September 2014”), p. 3; Ferdinand Nahimana v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52B-R, Decision on Ferdinand Nahimana’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 27 September 2011 and of his Sentence, 29 June 2012, p. 3; Jean Uwinkindi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-75-AR11bis, Decision on Uwinkindi’s Motion for Review or Reconsideration of the Decision on Referral to Rwanda and the Related Prosecution Motion, 23 February 2012 (“Uwinkindi Decision of 23 February 2012”), para. 11, referring to Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, 23 May 2005, para. 203; Aloys Ntabakuze v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A, Decision on Peter Erlinder’s Motion to Reconsider Order Imposing Sanctions, 1 September 2011, p. 3.

[4] See Uwinkindi Decision of 23 February 2012, para. 10, referring to Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Décision relative à la requête de l’appelant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza demandant l’examen de la requête de la Défense datée du 28 juillet 2000 et réparation pour abus de procédure, 23 June 2006, para. 21; Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-R, Decision on Request for Reconsideration of the Decision on Request for Review, 27 September 2006 (“Niyitegeka Decision of 27 September 2006”), p. 3, referring to Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), signed on 31 March 2000, filed on 7 April 2000, para. 49. Cf. Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-Misc.1, Decision on Strugar’s Request to Reopen Appeal Proceedings, 7 June 2007, para. 25.

[5] Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin [ljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Decision on Motion on Behalf of Veselin [ljivančanin Seeking Reconsideration of the Judgement Rendered by the Appeals Chamber on 5 May 2009 – or an Alternative Remedy, 8 December 2009, p. 2; Hassan Ngeze v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-R, Decision on Hassan Ngeze’s Motions and Requests Related to Reconsideration, 31 January 2008, p. 3; Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-03-R Decision on Requests for Reconsideration, Review, Assignment of Counsel, Disclosure, and Clarification, 8 December 2006, para. 6; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-R, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration, 23 November 2006 (public redacted version), paras. 79, 80; Prosecutor v. Zoran Žigić a/k/a “Ziga”, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision on Zoran Žigić’s “Motion for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber Judgement IT-98-30/1-A Delivered on 28 February 2005”, 26 June 2006, para. 9.

[6] Eliézer Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-16-R, Decision on Niyitegeka’s Request for Assignment of Counsel, 6 November 2014, para. 11, referring to François Karera v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-24-R, Decision on Request for Assignment of Counsel, 4 December 2012, para. 11; François Karera v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-74-R, Decision on Requests for Reconsideration and Review, 26 March 2012, para. 8; Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-R, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration of Fifth Review Decision, 25 March 2010, para. 5; Niyitegeka Decision of 27 September 2006, pp. 2, 3.

[7] Prlić Decision of 5 September 2014, p. 3, referring to Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-A, Decision on Mićo Stanišić’s Motion Seeking Reconsideration of Decision on Stanišić’s Motion for Declaration of Mistrial and Župljanin’s Motion to Vacate Trial Judgement, 24 July 2014, para. 12.

[8] Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-A & IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Motion by Radovan Karadžić for Reconsideration of Decision on Motion for Access to Confidential Materials in the Stanišić and Simatović Case, 16 February 2015, p. 2, referring to Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Decision on the Prosecution’s “Motion for Reconsideration and Rescission of the Order to Disclose Issued in Trial Chamber’s ‘Decision on Motion by Radovan Karadžić for Access to Confidential Materials in the Lukić and Lukić Case’ of 10 July 2009“, 7 December 2009, para. 4.

[9] Munyarugarama Decision of 5 October 2012, para. 5.

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Decision on Motions to Strike Parts of Response Brief - 22.07.2015 PRLIĆ et al.
(IT-04-74-A)

NOTING that the contested paragraphs of the Prlić Response Brief make submissions on the merits of certain arguments advanced in the ]orić Appeal Brief and the Stojić Appeal Brief;[1]

RECALLING that paragraph 5 of the Practice Direction[[2]]] provides that the “opposite party” shall file a “Respondent’s Brief”, the content of which “shall be limited to arguments made in response to [the Appellant’s Brief]”;

CONSIDERING that the “opposite party” means the Prosecution when the appellant is a convicted person, and a defendant when the appellant is the Prosecution, and that arguments made in response must be limited to those raised by the relevant opposite party;

CONSIDERING that the Appeals Chamber will only consider the arguments raised in the Prlić Response Brief to the extent that they respond to the arguments raised by the Prosecution in its appeal against Prlić;

FINDING that to the extent that the Prlić Response Brief contains submissions on the merits of the ]orić Appeal Brief and the Stojić Appeal Brief, the Appeals Chamber will disregard these submissions for the purposes of adjudicating the Prosecution’s appeal against ]orić and Stojić, without prejudice to any possible similar arguments advanced by the Prosecution in its appeal against ]orić and Stojić;

[1] [Jadranko Prlić’s Respondent’s Brief, 7 May 2015 (confidential)]], paras 58(f), 96-97, 116-117, 123-127 (Stojić), 142-146 (]orić).

[2] Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, IT/201, 7 March 2002. 

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Other instruments Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement (ICTY); para 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision re Review and Counsel - 13.07.2015 NIYITEGEKA Eliézer
(MICT-12-16-R)

12.     The Appeals Chamber cannot exclude that this potential ground for review may have a chance of success. The provision of materially inconsistent testimony in a domestic proceeding, which was unavailable at the time of trial or appeal, could impact the credibility of an uncorroborated witness and thus the verdict. The scope of Witness GGV’s testimony during the domestic proceedings and any justifications for providing different accounts underscore the complexity of this matter. Given this complexity, Niyitegeka, who is serving his sentence in Mali, would benefit from the assistance of counsel to better evaluate the viability of his potential grounds for review and to provide a new and more focused submission supporting his request for review. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Niyitegeka has shown that it is necessary in order to ensure the fairness of the proceedings that counsel be appointed under the auspices of the Mechanism’s legal aid program.

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IRMCT Rule Rule 146
Notion(s) Filing Case
Review Decision - 08.07.2015 LUKIĆ Sreten
(MICT-14-67-R.1)

11. The Appeals Chamber observes that Lukić’s condition was in issue at trial and on appeal, and the reports he relies upon for the purposes of his request are merely additional evidence going to proof of matters considered in the original proceedings.[1] Accordingly, the material submitted that relates to Lukić’s health condition does not amount to a “new fact” for the purposes of review under Rule 146 of the Rules. In any case, Lukić’s request for reduction of his sentence, and release on grounds of the recent deterioration of his health and diminished life expectancy, are more appropriately characterized as grounds in support of a request for early release. The Statute and Rules provide that the supervision of enforcement of sentences pronounced by the ICTY, and competence over requests for early release, lie within the powers of the President of the Mechanism.[2]

[1] Trial Judgement, vol. 3, para. 1203; Appeal Judgement, para. 1827.

[2] Statute, Article 25; Rules 127-128, 149-151 of the Rules.

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IRMCT Rule Rule 146
Notion(s) Filing Case
Review Decision - 08.07.2015 LUKIĆ Sreten
(MICT-14-67-R.1)

22. The Appeals Chamber considers that the relevant findings in the Ðorđević Appeal Judgment do not amount to “new information of an evidentiary nature of a fact” and thus cannot be considered a new fact for the purposes of review under Rule 146 of the Rules.[1] In the Appeals Chamber’s view, Lukić is essentially requesting reconsideration of the final judgment. However, in principle, the Appeals Chamber has no power to reconsider a final judgment in light of the legal analysis on the elements of a crime adopted by a subsequent Appeals Chamber judgment.[2]

[1] See Tharcisse Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-R, Decision on Request for Variation of Protective Measures and Request for Review, 28 September 2012, para. 24 (“the Appeals Chamber considers that a finding made by a separate trial chamber on the criminal liability of another accused based on a different evidentiary record does not amount to a new fact for the purposes of review”); Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-96-14-R, Decision on Request for Review, 6 March 2007, para. 7 (“The Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that the reasoning applied in the Rwamakuba Trial Judgement constitutes new information of an evidentiary nature of a fact that was not in issue during the trial or appeal proceedings”); Prosecutor v Goran Jelišić, IT-95-10-R, Decision on Motion for Review, 2 May 2002, pp. 2-3 (“Noting the Applicant’s submissions that a new fact has arisen, being the development, since the Appeal Judgement, in the case law of the Tribunal with respect to the approach to sentencing […] Finding that the alleged new fact relied upon by the Applicant is not of an evidentiary nature and, therefore, that the Applicant has failed to show the existence of a new fact”). See also Eliézer Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-16-R, Decision on Niyitegeka’s Request for Assignment of Counsel, 6 November 2014, para. 8.

[2] See Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perisić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration, 20 March 2014, p. 2

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IRMCT Rule Rule 146
Notion(s) Filing Case
Review Decision - 07.07.2015 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(MICT-13-52-R.1)

14.     The Appeals Chamber recalls the critical distinction between material submitted in support of a fact, which was not in issue or considered in the original proceedings, and material, which consists of additional evidence relating to a fact that was in issue or considered in the original proceedings.[1] Review will not be available where a fact was previously in issue.[2] Therefore, it is the definition of the fact in issue in the original proceedings, which will determine the availability of the review procedure.[3] The burden for showing that the information in the tendered material amounts to a “new fact” lies with the moving party.[4] […]

[1] Blaškić Review Decision [Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-R, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration, 23 November 2006], para. 40; Prosecutor v. Mlađo Radić, IT-98-30/1-R.1, Decision on Defence Request for Review, 31 October 2006, para. 22; Prosecutor v. Drago Josipović, IT-95-16-R2, Decision on Motion for Review, 7 March 2003 (“Josipović Review Decision”), para. 18; Prosecutor v. Hazim Delić, IT-96-21-R-R119, Decision on Motion for Review, 25 April 2002 (“Delić Review Decision”), para. 11, referring to Prosecutor v Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 15 October 1998, paras. 30, 32; Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v The Prosecutor, ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration, 31 March 2000, para. 42.

[2] Delić Review Decision, para. 11.

[3] Blaškić Review Decision, paras. 15-18; Josipović Review Decision, para. 19.

[4] François Karera v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-01-74-R, Decision on Requests for Reconsideration and Review, 26 March 2012 (“Karera Review Decision”), para. 17; Blaškić Review Decision, para. 16; Delić Review Decision, paras. 10, 13.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.04.2015 TOLIMIR Zdravko
(IT-05-88/2-A)

141.    With respect to Tolimir’s argument that the Trial Chamber erred in law in applying an incorrect standard to establish the mens rea of extermination by not requiring that the civilian population was the intended target of mass murder,[1] the Appeals Chamber recalls that, as noted by the Trial Chamber,[2] it is well-established that with regard to the victims of the underlying acts of crimes against humanity, “[t]here is nothing in the text of Article 5 of the Statute, or previous authorities of the Appeals Chamber that requires that individual victims of crimes against humanity be civilians”.[3] The Appeals Chamber has more specifically clarified that:

whereas the civilian status of the victims, the number of civilians, and the proportion of civilians within a civilian population are factors relevant to the determination of whether the chapeau requirement of Article 5 of the Statute that an attack be directed against a “civilian population” is fulfilled, there is no requirement nor is it an element of crimes against humanity that the victims of the underlying crimes be “civilians”.[4]

142.    Accordingly, while the establishment of the actus reus of a crime against humanity requires that the crime occur as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population,[5] the victims of the underlying crime do not have to be civilians. The Appeals Chamber thus rejects Tolimir’s argument that the Trial Chamber erred in law by applying an incorrect mens rea standard for extermination when not requiring proof of intent to commit mass murder against civilians. It was sufficient for the Trial Chamber to be satisfied in that regard that the mens rea for the crime of extermination was established on the basis of evidence of the intent to kill on a massive scale as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

[1]    Appeal Brief, paras 65-66. See also Reply Brief, para. 31.

[2]    Trial Judgement, para. 697.

[3]    Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 307. See also Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 569; Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 29.

[4]    Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 569. See also Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 32.

[5]    See Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 569; Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 41; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 99-100.

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ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 08.04.2015 TOLIMIR Zdravko
(IT-05-88/2-A)

616. The Appeals Chamber notes that there is no appellate jurisprudence which addresses the specific cumulative convictions for genocide and murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war. However, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has upheld cumulative convictions for war crimes, as a broad category, and genocide based on the materially distinct elements of genocide and war crimes.[1] Relevantly, genocide requires proof of specific intent while war crimes require proof of the existence of a nexus between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict.[2]

See also para. 617.

[1] See Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 368; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 583.

[2] Ibidem.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.04.2015 TOLIMIR Zdravko
(IT-05-88/2-A)

146.    With regard to Tolimir’s argument that the killing of the three Žepa leaders was not part of the one murder operation involving the mass killings of the men of Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the actus reus of the crime of extermination is “the act of killing on a large scale”[1] and the mens rea is the intention to kill on a large-scale.[2] It further recalls that the crime of extermination differs from murder in that it requires an element of massiveness, which is not required for murder.[3] The Appeals Chamber has clarified that:

The assessment of “large scale” is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the circumstances in which the killings occurred. Relevant factors include, inter alia: the time and place of the killings; the selection of the victims and the manner in which they were targeted; and whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than victims in their individual capacity.[4]

147.    The actus reus of the crime of extermination may be established through an aggregation of separate incidents. It is not required that the killings be on a vast scale in a concentrated location over a short period of time.[6] The ICTR Appeals Chamber has, on the other hand, stated that “[a]s a general matter, the element of killing on a large scale cannot be satisfied by a collective consideration of distinct events committed in different locations, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, and over an extended period of time, i.e. a period of two months”.[7]

See also paras 148-150.

[1]    Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259.

[2]    Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para.701 citing Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259. The Appeals Chamber observes that Tolimir does not specify whether he challenges the actus reus or the mens rea of the crime of extermination or both with regard to killing of the three Žepa leaders. Appeal Brief, para. 69; Reply Brief, paras 34-35.

[3]    Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[4]    Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538 (internal citations omitted).

[5]    Cf. Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662.

[6]    Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259, affirming Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 640.

[7]    Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396. The Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement further specifies that in that case, each of the incidents which formed the basis of the appellant’s convictions presented distinct features and could not be said to constitute one and the same incident, referring to incidents as described in the sections addressing grounds of appeal 6-10. In the Karemera and Ngirumpatse case, the Appeals Chamber nevertheless found it permissible for the trial chamber in that particular case, to connect and aggregate sets of killings in order to meet the large-scale requirement. Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662. The Appeals Chamber referred to sets of “massive killings throughout Rwanda by mid-July 1994”. Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662.

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Appeal Judgement - 08.04.2015 TOLIMIR Zdravko
(IT-05-88/2-A)

225. Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute provides that genocide can be committed by “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.[1] This provision has been analysed and interpreted by a number of trial chambers of the ICTY and the ICTR. The Trial Chamber in this case correctly summarised this jurisprudence as:

The underlying acts covered by Article 4(2)(c) are methods of destruction that do not immediately kill the members of the group, but ultimately seek their physical destruction. Examples of such acts punishable under Article 4(2)(c) include, inter alia, subjecting the group to a subsistence diet; failing to provide adequate medical care; systematically expelling members of the group from their homes; and generally creating circumstances that would lead to a slow death such as the lack of proper food, water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, or subjecting members of the group to excessive work or physical exertion.[2]

Unlike Articles 4(2)(a) and (b), Article 4(2)(c) does not require proof of a result such as the ultimate physical destruction of the group in whole or in part. However, Article 4(2)(c) applies only to acts calculated to cause a group’s physical or biological destruction deliberately and, as such, these acts must be clearly distinguished from those acts designed to bring about the mere dissolution of the group. Such acts, which have been referred to as “cultural genocide”, were excluded from the Genocide Convention. For example, the forcible transfer of a group or part of a group does not, by itself, constitute a genocidal act, although it can be an additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of a group.[3]

226. The Appeals Chamber has not previously been called upon to address the issue of what acts qualify as the actus reus of genocide under Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute. However, it is satisfied that the legal principles stated by the Trial Chamber are consistent with the existing case law of the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as the letter and spirit of the Genocide Convention. The Appeals Chamber recalls, in this respect the relevant findings of the ICJ in the recent Croatia v. Serbia case. Citing ICTY jurisprudence, the ICJ held that:

[d]eliberate infliction on the [protected] group of conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, within the meaning of Article II(c) of the Convention, covers methods of physical destruction, other than killing, whereby the perpetrator ultimately seeks the death of the members of the group. Such methods of destruction include notably deprivation of food, medical care, shelter or clothing, as well as lack of hygiene, systematic expulsion from homes, or exhaustion as a result of excessive work or physical exertion.[4]

The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not bound by the legal determinations reached by trial chambers of this Tribunal or by the ICJ.[5] The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that the ICJ is the principal organ of the United Nations and the competent organ to resolve disputes relating to the interpretation of the Genocide Convention.[6] The Appeals Chamber further notes that the ICJ’s interpretation of Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention cited above was based on ICTY trial jurisprudence and is consistent with it. The Appeals Chamber is therefore satisfied that the jurisprudence set out by the Trial Chamber accurately reflects the applicable law.

227. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute covers “methods of destruction that do not immediately kill the members of the group, but ultimately seek their physical destruction”.[7] It is clear from the Tribunal’s case law, explicitly relied upon by the ICJ, that killings may not be considered, under Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute, as acts resulting in the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the protected group’s physical destruction.

228. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the different categories of genocidal acts proscribed in Article 4(2) of the Statute correspond to and aim to capture different methods of physical destruction of a protected group: subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 4(2) of the Statute proscribe acts causing a specific result, which must be established by the evidence, i.e., killings and serious bodily or mental harm respectively;[8] on the other hand, subparagraph (c) of the same Article purports to capture those methods of destruction that do not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.[9] The chambers of the Tribunal and the ICJ have listed several acts as examples of such methods of destruction that could potentially meet the threshold of Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute and Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention, including deprivation of food, medical care, shelter or clothing, lack of hygiene, systematic expulsion from homes, or subjecting members of the group to excessive work or physical exertion.[10] Notably, killings, which are explicitly mentioned as a separate genocidal act under Article 4(2)(a) of the Statute, may not be considered as a method of inflicting upon the protected group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction under Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute.

229. The Appeals Chamber, therefore, finds merit in Tolimir’s contention that the Trial Chamber was legally barred from considering the combined effect of the killing and the forcible transfer operations under Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber recognises that in the Indictment, this actus reus of genocide was alleged to have been perpetrated through “the forcible transfer of the women and children from Srebrenica and Žepa, the separation of the men in Potočari and the execution of the men from Srebrenica”, all of which operations were to be considered together.[11] Such combined consideration, however, was contrary to the legal principles governing the application of Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute, which limit the scope of the provision to “methods of physical destruction, other than killing”.[12]

230. Another error committed by the Trial Chamber in its application of Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute was its consideration of the destruction of mosques in Srebrenica and Žepa as an additional act through which the Bosnian Serb Forces inflicted on the protected group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction.[13] […] [A]cts amounting to “cultural genocide” are excluded from the scope of the Genocide Convention.[14] Notably, the ICJ also held that “the destruction of historical, cultural and religious heritage cannot be considered to constitute the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group”.[15] The Trial Chamber, therefore, committed a legal error in considering the destruction of mosques in Srebrenica and Žepa under Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute.

[…]

234. The Appeals Chamber recalls again that the forced displacement of a population “does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act”[16] and that acts meeting the threshold of Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute typically relate to the deliberate withholding or taking away of the basic necessities of life over an extended period of time.[17] […]

[1]    The same language is used in Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention.

[2]    Trial Judgement, para. 740, citing Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras 505-506, Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 691, Stakić Trial Judgement, paras 517–518, Musema Trial Judgement, para. 157, Rutaganda Trial Judgement, para. 52, Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, paras 115–116, Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 814.

[3]    Trial Judgement, para. 741, and authorities cited therein.

[4]    ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Judgment, para. 161, citing Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 691, Stakić Trial Judgement, paras 517–518.

[5]    Karadžić Rule 98bis Appeal Judgement, para. 94.

[6]    See Charter of the United Nations, Art. 92; Genocide Convention, Art. IX. See also supra, n. 580.

[7]    Trial Judgement, para. 740 (emphasis added).

[8]    Trial Judgement, para. 737, and authorities cited therein.

[9]    Trial Judgement, para. 741, citing Brđanin Trial Judgement, paras 691, 905, Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 517.

[10]   See Trial Judgement, para. 740 (referring to “subjecting the group to a subsistence diet; failing to provide adequate medical care; systematically expelling members of the group from their homes; and generally creating circumstances that would lead to a slow death such as the lack of proper food, water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, or subjecting members of the group to excessive work or physical exertion.”). See also Karadžić Rule 98bis Appeal Judgement, para.  47 (referring to cruel and inhumane treatment, inhumane living conditions, and forced labour); ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Judgment, para. 161 (referring to “deprivation of food, medical care, shelter or clothing, as well as lack of hygiene, systematic expulsion from homes, or exhaustion as a result of excessive work or physical exertion”).

[11]   Indictment, para. 24.

[12]   ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Judgment, para. 161.

[13]   Trial Judgement, para. 766. The Appeals Chamber notes that Tolimir does not challenge this finding. However, considering that the issue is of general significance to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, in the exercise of its discretion, the Appeals Chamber has decided to consider the issue proprio motu.

[14]   Trial Judgement, para. 741, and authorities cited therein.

[15]   Bosnia Genocide Judgment, para. 344. See also ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Judgment, paras 386-390 (affirming that the destruction of cultural property cannot qualify as an act of genocide under any of the categories of Article II of the Genocide Convention, even if such acts may be taken into account to establish genocidal intent).

[16]   See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 33.

[17]   See Trial Judgement, para. 740, and authorities cited therein. See also Karadžić Rule 98bis Appeal Judgement, paras 34, 37, 47; ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Judgment, para. 161.

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261. The Appeals Chamber first observes that the Trial Chamber correctly stated that the prominence of the targeted portion of the protected group is a relevant factor in determining whether the perpetrator intended to destroy at least a substantial part of the protected group.[1] Indeed, as the Trial Chamber held, “genocidal intent may […] consist of the desired destruction of a more limited number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such”.[2] This holding is consistent with other trial judgements of the Tribunal,[3] as well as the Appeals Chamber’s own jurisprudence. The Appeals Chamber recalls, in this respect, that “[i]f a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4” of the Statute.[4]

262. The Commission of Experts Report, on which the Trial Chamber relied as support for its legal analysis vis-à-vis the killings of the three Žepa leaders,[5] states, in relevant part:

[i]f essentially the total leadership of a group is targeted, it could also amount to genocide. Such leadership includes political and administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, business leaders and others – the totality per se may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers killed. A corroborating argument will be the fate of the rest of the group. The character of the attack on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate or what happened to the rest of the group. If a group has its leadership exterminated, and at the same time or in the wake of that, has a relatively large number of the members of the group killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example deported on a large scale or forced to flee, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its purpose.[6]

263. The Appeals Chamber finds no legal error in the Trial Chamber’s statement that the selective targeting of leading figures of a community may amount to genocide and may be indicative of genocidal intent.[7] The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded that the commission of genocide through the targeted killings of only the leaders of a group suggests that the leaders of the group are subject to special, stronger protection than the other members of the group, as Tolimir suggests. Recognising that genocide may be committed through the killings of only certain prominent members of the group “selected for the impact that their disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such”[8] aims at ensuring that the protective scope of the crime of genocide encompasses the entire group, not just its leaders. […]

264. […] For a finding of genocide it suffices that the leaders were “selected for the impact that their disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such”.[9] Genocide may be committed even if not all leaders of a group are killed – even though targeting “the totality [of the leadership] per se may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers killed”.[10]

265. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that according to the Commission of Experts Report and as the Trial Chamber itself recognised, “[t]he character of the attack on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate or what happened to the rest of the group […] at the same time or in the wake of that” attack.[11] As the Trial Chamber found, the selective targeting of a protected group’s leadership may amount to genocide only if the leaders are selected because of “the impact that their disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such”.[12] The impact of the leaders’ disappearance may of course be assessed only after the leaders are attacked. Only by considering what happened to the rest of the protected group at the same time or in the wake of the attack on its leadership could “the impact that [the leaders’] disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such” be assessed.[13]

[…]

267. The Appeals Chamber has already established that the Trial Chamber did not err in finding that the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that the three Žepa leaders suffered a violent death at the hands of their Bosnian Serb captors.[14] However, the Trial Chamber failed to explain how their detention and killings – committed weeks after the entire Žepa population had been forcibly transferred from the enclave – had any impact “on the survival of the group as such”.[15] The Trial Chamber accepted in its conclusion that there was such an impact, but it did not consider or analyse whether or how the killings of the three Žepa leaders after the Bosnian Muslim civilian population of Žepa had been transferred to safe areas of BiH specifically affected the ability of those removed civilians to survive and reconstitute themselves as a group.[16] A finding that Žepa’s Bosnian Muslims lost three of their leaders[17] does not suffice to infer that those civilians were affected by the loss of their leaders in a way that would threaten or tend to contribute to their physical destruction as a group.

[…]

269. In this context, particularly in light of the fact that the forcible transfer operation of Žepa’s Bosnian Muslims had been completed before the three Žepa leaders were detained and killed and in the absence of any findings as to whether or how the loss of these three prominent figures affected the ability of the Bosnian Muslims from Žepa to survive in the post-transfer period, the inference of genocidal intent was not the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the record. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the evidence does not allow for the conclusion that the murders of the three Žepa leaders had a significant impact on the physical survival of the group as such so as to amount to genocide. There is, in sum, no sufficient evidentiary support for the finding that Hajrić, Palić, and Imamović were killed “with the specific genocidal intent of destroying part of the Bosnian Muslim population as such”.[18] […]

[1]    Trial Judgement, para. 749.

[2]    Trial Judgement, para. 749, citing Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 82.

[3]    See Sikirica et al. Judgement on Motions to Acquit, para. 77; Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 82.

[4]    Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 12 (cited in Trial Judgement, para. 749).

[5]    Trial Judgement, paras 749, 777. The Jelisić Trial Judgement also relied on this report as the basis for its holding that genocidal intent may consist of the desired destruction of a more limited number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such. See Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 82.

[6]    Commission of Experts Report, para. 94 (emphasis added).

[7]    Trial Judgement, paras 749, 777, and authorities cited therein. The Appeals Chamber notes that this statement correctly stated the applicable law, even though, with the exception of the present case, no conviction for genocide has ever been entered by the Tribunal, or other international criminal tribunals, on the basis of the selective targeting of a protected group’s leadership. See, e.g., Sikirica et al. Judgement on Motions to Acquit, paras 84-85; Jelisić Trial Judgement, paras 82-83.

[8]    Trial Judgement, para. 777, and authorities cited therein.

[9]    Trial Judgement, para. 777, and authorities cited therein.

[10]   Commission of Experts Report, para. 94 (cited in Trial Judgement, para. 777).

[11]   Commission of Experts Report, para. 94. The Trial Chamber also stated that the killings of the three Žepa leaders must not be seen in isolation, but in conjunction with “the fate of the remaining population of Žepa”. Trial Judgement, para. 781.

[12]   Trial Judgement, para. 749, citing Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 82.

[13]   Trial Judgement, para. 749, citing Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 82.

[14]   See supra, para. 144.

[15]   Trial Judgement, para. 782.

[16]   Trial Judgement, paras 780-782.

[17]   Trial Judgement, para. 782.

[18]   Trial Judgement, para. 782. 

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201. Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute provides that genocide can be committed by “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the [protected] group” with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as such.[1] “Serious bodily or mental harm” is not defined in the Statute. Drawing on the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR, the Trial Chamber held that serious bodily or mental harm:

must be of such a serious nature as to contribute or tend to contribute to the destruction of all or part of the group; although it need not be permanent or irreversible, it must go “beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation” and inflict “grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life”.[2]

The Trial Chamber also stated that the determination of the seriousness of the harm in question “must be made on a case-by-case basis”.[3]

202. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has not directly addressed what constitutes serious mental harm as an act of genocide. Nonetheless, it is satisfied that the definition of serious mental harm adopted in the Trial Judgement is consistent with the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR and aligns with the letter and spirit of the Genocide Convention. […]

203. As correctly stated by the Trial Chamber, serious mental harm must be of such a serious nature as to contribute or tend to contribute to the destruction of all or part of the group.[4] The ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Seromba case has held in this regard that:

serious mental harm includes “more than minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties such as the infliction of strong fear or terror, intimidation or threat”. Indeed, nearly all convictions for the causing of serious bodily or mental harm involve rapes or killings. To support a conviction for genocide, the bodily harm or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part.[5]

Contrary to Tolimir’s argument, serious mental harm must be lasting[6] but need not be permanent and irremediable.[7] Tolimir fails to show that these articulations of serious mental harm are “too general and imprecise”.[8]

204. The Appeals Chamber is also not persuaded that the United States of America’s “understanding” of serious mental harm as “the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques”, expressed in its instrument of accession to the Genocide Convention,[9] is correct under customary international law […]

[…]

207. […] The Appeals Chamber notes that there is ICTY and other international jurisprudence for the proposition that survivors of killing operations may suffer serious mental harm amounting to an act of genocide.[10] The Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the mental harm suffered by the survivors of the killings qualified as an act of genocide under Article 4 of the Statute. […]

[…]

209. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that while “forcible transfer does not in and of itself constitute a genocidal act […] it is […] a relevant consideration as part of the overall factual assessment”[11] and “could be an additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction” of the protected group.[12] Nothing in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence or in the Genocide Convention provides that a forcible transfer operation may only support a finding of genocide if the displaced population is transferred to concentration camps or places of execution. Tolimir cites no authority suggesting the existence of such a requirement. A forcible transfer operation may still “ensure the physical destruction” of the protected group[13] by causing serious mental harm or leading to conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction, even if the group members are not transferred to places of execution. […]

[…]

211. Further, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded that the Trial Chamber was not entitled to take into account the inability and fears of the group to return to their former homes, or the post-transfer quality of their life in making such an assessment. […] The Appeals Chamber notes that these factors are particularly relevant to considering whether the harm caused grave and long-term disadvantage to the ability of members of the protected group to lead a normal and constructive life.[14]

212. […] As noted above, serious mental harm need not result from acts causing permanent or irremediable mental impairment. It suffices that the harmful conduct caused grave and long-term disadvantage to the ability of the members of the protected group to lead a normal and constructive life[15] so as to threaten the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part.[16] […]

[…]

215. On the other hand, the Appeals Chamber recalls that serious mental harm results only from acts causing grave and long-term disadvantage to the ability of members of the protected group to lead a normal and constructive life[17] and threatening the physical destruction of the group as such.[18] […]

216. […] [S]erious mental harm must be “more than minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties such as the infliction of strong fear or terror, intimidation or threat”.[19] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that acts falling under Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute require proof of a result, i.e., that serious mental harm was inflicted.[20]

217. The Trial Chamber did not find that Žepa’s Bosnian Muslim population suffered a mass violent separation of families and the ongoing trauma of having lost their family members, like the Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica,[21] and failed to point to any evidence on the record establishing that the mental harm suffered by that group tended to contribute to the destruction of the Muslims of Eastern BiH as such.[22] Even if all the factors considered by the Trial Chamber were established, in the absence of findings or references to evidence of any long-term consequences of the forcible transfer operation on the Žepa population and the Bosnian Muslim population of Eastern BiH in general and of a link between the circumstances of the transfer operation in Žepa and the physical destruction of the protected group as a whole, no reasonable trial chamber could have found that the Bosnian Muslims forcibly transferred from Žepa suffered serious mental harm within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber, Judges Sekule and Güney dissenting, thus reverses the Trial Chamber’s findings in this regard and Tolimir’s remaining arguments are rendered moot and need not be addressed.

[1]    The same language is used in Article II(b) of the Genocide Convention.

[2]    Trial Judgement, para. 738, citing Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 862; Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Gatete Trial Judgement, para. 584, Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 690; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 516; Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras 502–504; Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 108; Bagosora et al. Trial Judgement, para. 2117; Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 513; Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 645.

[3]    Trial Judgement, para. 738.

[4]    Trial Judgement, para. 738, and authorities cited therein. See also ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Judgment, para. 157 (“in light of the [Genocide] Convention’s object and purpose, the ordinary meaning of 'serious’ is that the bodily or mental harm referred to in subparagraph (b) of that Article must be such as to contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the group, in whole or in part.”). The Appeals Chamber notes that, significantly, under Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is the competent organ to resolve disputes relating to the interpretation of that Convention. It is also the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and the community of nations at large. See Charter of the United Nations, Art. 92.

[5]    Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 46 (internal citations omitted). See also Krajišnik Trial Judgement, paras 862-863 (“‘failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities’ will not amount to the actus reus of genocide if the deprivation is not so severe as to contribute to the destruction of the group, or tend to do so. Living conditions, which may be inadequate by any number of standards, may nevertheless be adequate for the survival of the group”); International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (2011), Art. 6(b), n. 3 (specifying that an act of serious bodily or mental harm “may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment”.).

[6]     Judge Sekule dissents on the Majority’s interpretation of the jurisprudence in that “harm must be lasting” for reasons set out in his partly dissenting opinion appended to the present Judgement.

[7]    See Trial Judgement, para. 738; Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, paras 645-646; Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 690; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 516; Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 513 (holding that serious mental harm “must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation” and result “in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.”); Bagosora et al. Trial Judgement, para. 2117; Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 108; Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras 502–504. See also Bosnia Genocide Judgment, para. 300 (quoting with approval Stakić Trial Judgement in this regard).

[8]    See Appeal Brief, para. 73.

[9]    See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat. 3045, 18 U.S.C. §1091(a)(3) (1988), also available at 28 I.L.M. 754 (1989).

[10]   See Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 845; Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 647; Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 514; Bosnia Genocide Judgment, paras 290-291.

[11]   Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 123. See also Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 33.

[12]   Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 31.

[13]   Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 31.

[14]   See supra, para. 201.

[15]   See supra, para. 201.

[16]   Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 46.

[17]   See supra, paras 203-204, 209.

[18]   Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 46.

[19]   Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 46.

[20]   Trial Judgement, para. 737; Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 688; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 514. See also Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 811.

[21]   The Appeals Chamber acknowledges the Trial Chamber’s finding that, “[i]n the period leading up to the fall of the Žepa enclave, the population of Žepa, including the able-bodied men and some wounded, had fled to the surrounding mountains”. See Trial Judgement, para. 639. The Trial Chamber also found that, even though Žepa’s Muslim civilians “started returning to the centre of Žepa in order to be evacuated” once news about the 24 July 1995 evacuation agreement began to spread (Trial Judgement, para. 639), “[m]ost of the able-bodied men, including members of the ABiH, remained in the mountains at this time”. Trial Judgement, n. 2737, and authorities cited therein. In analysing whether the genocidal act of Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute had been committed, however, the Trial Chamber did not list the de facto separation of families in Žepa among the factors causing serious mental harm to the Bosnian Muslims of Žepa (Trial Judgement, para. 758), even though it did hold that serious mental harm was caused as a result of, inter alia, the forced, violent separation of Srebrenica’s Muslim families in Potočari, which resulted in the detention of men and boys from Srebrenica and their subsequent murders by the Bosnian Serb Forces. See Trial Judgement, para. 756.

[22]   Cf. Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 48 (“the Appeals Chamber cannot equate nebulous invocations of 'weakening’ and 'anxiety’ with the heinous crimes that obviously constitute serious bodily or mental harm, such as rape and torture.”).

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218. This conclusion, of course, does not amount to a conclusion that the Bosnian Muslims of Žepa were not the victims of genocide. The Appeals Chamber emphasises that the only question addressed here is whether the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the forcible transfer operation in Žepa – which the Trial Chamber distinguished from the transfer operation in Srebrenica and analysed separately vis-à-vis the actus reus of Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute – inflicted on the transferred Muslim population serious mental harm, as that term is used in Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute and the Genocide Convention. This question does not involve the definition of the protected group. In this sense, the Appeals Chamber recalls its earlier conclusion that the Trial Chamber did not err in holding that the Bosnian Muslims of Žepa are, along with the Muslims of Srebrenica and Eastern BiH in general, members of the protected group.[1] By virtue of being “within the targeted part of the protected group”, the Bosnian Muslims of Žepa were among the ultimate victims of the genocidal enterprise against the Muslims of Eastern BiH.[2]

[…]

236. As clarified above, and consistent with the Appeals Chamber’s recent case law, all members of the protected group as defined by the Trial Chamber – i.e., “the Bosnian Muslim population of Eastern Bosnia and in particular, of the enclaves of Srebrenica, Žepa and Goražde”[3] – were the victims of the genocidal acts of Article 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Statute (killings and acts causing serious mental harm), by virtue of being “within the targeted part of the protected group”.[4] In this and the previous subsections, the Appeals Chamber only finds that the displaced Bosnian Muslims of Žepa were not the direct victims of the specific genocidal act defined in Article 4(2)(b) and Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute – acts causing serious mental harm and acts deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the protected group’s physical destruction in whole or in part. The Appeals Chamber’s conclusions do not diminish the status of Žepa’s Muslim populations as victims of the genocide committed against the entire protected group by means of (i) the killings of Srebrenica’s male population (which qualifies as a genocidal act under both Article 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Statute) and (ii) the forcible transfer operation of Srebrenica’s women, children, and elderly (which qualifies as a genocidal act under Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute).[5]

[1]    See supra, paras 185-188. It is this group that is the victim of the crime of genocide – and each underlying act meeting the threshold of Article 4 of the Statute and committed with genocidal intent – and not the individual members of the group. See Trial Judgement, para. 747, citing Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 521.

[2]    See also Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 458. The Appeals Chamber refers, in this respect, to its relevant findings in the Popović et al. case, which involved facts and charges almost identical to the present case. The Popović et al. Appeal Judgement affirmed that “the Muslims of Eastern Bosnia including the inhabitants of Žepa were found to be victims of the genocidal enterprise” (Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 458), even though the Popović et al. Trial Chamber had confined its analysis of genocidal acts falling under Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute “to an analysis of the serious bodily and mental harm caused by the killing operation” of the Bosnian Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica. Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 843. See also Popović et al. Trial Judgement, paras 844-847. In the Popović et al. case, the Appeals Chamber did not address the Trial Chamber’s holding that the Bosnian Muslim of Žepa were victims of genocide, even though serious bodily or mental harm had only been caused by the killing operation of the Bosnian Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica, not the forcible transfer operations in either Srebrenica or Žepa and this issue was not challenged on appeal. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the same distinction between victims of genocide (which include all members of the protected group) and direct targets of each act that constitutes the actus reus of genocide applies to the present case.

[3]    Trial Judgement, para. 775, citing Indictment, para. 10.

[4]    Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 458. See also supra, para. 218.

[5]    See supra, paras 208-212.

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Fn. 587. The Appeals Chamber notes that views of a single signatory on the meaning of a particular term used in a treaty only bind that State for the purpose of domestic implementing legislation and do not necessarily suggest a universal consensus on this issue. Even if the United States of America had submitted an official reservation as to the use of the term “mental harm” in Article II of the Genocide Convention – which it did not – such a reservation would not have modified the Convention for other signatories in that respect. See VCLT, Art. 21(2) (“The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se.”).

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644.    As to Tolimir’s argument that it was the Trial Chamber’s duty to consider mitigating circumstances proprio motu […] Rule 86(C) of the Rules provides that sentencing submissions shall be addressed during closing arguments. Rule 85(A)(vi) of the Rules provides that a trial chamber will consider any relevant information that may assist it in determining an appropriate sentence.[1] Appeal proceedings are not the appropriate forum to raise such matters for the first time.[2] Therefore, it was incumbent on Tolimir to identify mitigating circumstances on the trial record in his final brief or during closing arguments.[3] Tolimir’s arguments in this regard are therefore dismissed.

[1] Rule 85(A)(vi) of the Rules.

[2] See Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 945. See also Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 674.

[3] See Đorđević Appeal Judgement, paras 945-946. See also Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 165.

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529. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the crimes of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide both require genocidal intent as a part of the mens rea element[…] [1] […].

[1]  In order for the mens rea for conspiracy to commit genocide to be satisfied “the individuals involved in the agreement must have the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such (mens rea)”. Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 894. Likewise, for genocide an accused must act “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such”. Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 141.

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544. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “a concerted agreement to commit genocide may be inferred from the conduct of the conspirators” and can be based on circumstantial evidence.[1] Further, the concerted or co-ordinated action of a group of individuals can constitute evidence of an agreement.[2] […]

553. […] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that “[w]hile [the] actus reus [of conspiracy to commit genocide] can be proved by evidence of meetings to plan genocide, it can also be inferred from other evidence. In particular, a concerted agreement to commit genocide may be inferred from the conduct of the conspirators”.[3]

[1]           Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 896. See Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 740; Nzabonimana Appeal Judgement, paras 392, 448; Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 221.

[2]           Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 897. See Nzabonimana Appeal Judgement, para. 391.

[3]           Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 896. See Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 221.

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567. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber notes that it is well-established that “the presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character”.[1] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “the civilian population need only be predominantly civilian”.[2] […]

569. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber reiterates that “there is no requirement nor is it an element of crimes against humanity that the victims of the underlying crimes be ‘civilians’”,[3] or even be predominantly civilians,[4] provided the acts form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population (the nexus requirement). The population targeted by the attack must be predominantly civilian,[5] but there is no legal requirement that a certain proportion of the victims of the underlying crime be civilians.[6] […]

[1]           Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 549; Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 31, citing Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 50. See also Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 113.

[2]           Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 25, affirming Mrkšić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 442.

[3]           Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 32.

[4]           See Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, paras 36-37.

[5]           See supra, para. 567.

[6]           See Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 307; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 85, 91.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 30.01.2015 POPOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-88-A)

537. In relation to crimes under different statutory provisions, as the Trial Chamber recalled, cumulative convictions for the same conduct are permissible if each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.[1] Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber correctly held that conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide involve different underlying acts or omissions and a materially distinct actus reus.[2]

538. In this case, the Trial Chamber reasoned that – as Popović’s and Beara’s participation in the JCE to Murder with genocidal intent was the basis of the convictions for genocide as well as for inferring an agreement to commit genocide – “entering a conviction for the substantive offence of genocide renders redundant a conviction for conspiracy”.[3] The Trial Chamber also concluded that “the full criminality of the Accused is accounted for by a conviction for genocide”.[4] The Appeals Chamber, however, recalls “that a trial chamber is bound to enter convictions for all distinct crimes which have been proven in order to fully reflect the criminality of the convicted person”.[5] As conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide are distinct crimes, it was necessary to enter convictions against Popović and Beara for conspiracy to commit genocide in order to reflect their full culpability.[6] […]

[1]           Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 710; Gatete Appeal Judgement, para. 259 & fn. 630. See [Popović et al.] Trial Judgement, para. 2111 & fns 6103-6104.

[2]           [Popović et al.] Trial Judgement, para. 2118 & fns 6115-6116. See Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 710; Gatete Appeal Judgement, para. 260 & fns 632-633.

[3]           Trial Judgement, paras 2124-2126.

[4]           Trial Judgement, para. 2127.

[5]           Gatete Appeal Judgement, para. 261. See Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 711.

[6]           See Gatete Appeal Judgement, para. 261.

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