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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Duration of Defence Case - 29.01.2013 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.10)

18. The Appeals Chamber first turns to Karadžić’s contentions regarding the Adjudicated Facts. Contrary to Karadžić’s suggestion, the Judicial Notice Decisions did not suggest that he would be allocated additional time to rebut the Adjudicated Facts.[1] In addition, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Robinson dissenting, considers Karadžić is unconvincing in asserting that the Impugned Decision did not sufficiently assess the time he would need to rebut the Adjudicated Facts.[2] The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber explicitly considered the “high number of adjudicated facts”[3] as one element underlying its decision granting Karadžić the same courtroom time as the Prosecution. The Trial Chamber also explicitly assessed the potential impact of the Adjudicated Facts on Karadžić’s case, concluding that not every Adjudicated Fact would need to be rebutted during Karadžić’s defence, as Karadžić had an opportunity to cross‑examine and elicit relevant evidence from Prosecution witnesses during the presentation of the Prosecution case.[4] While this analysis did not specify the amount of time being granted to rebut the Adjudicated Facts, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber is “not obligated to justify its decision [on the allocation of time] with reference to each piece of evidence proposed”.[5] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Robinson dissenting, is not satisfied that Karadžić has demonstrated that the Impugned Decision’s analysis of the Adjudicated Facts was deficient.

19. The Appeals Chamber notes that Karadžić challenges the Impugned Decision by discussing the Trial Chamber’s analyses of certain Adjudicated Facts which he contends are demonstrative of the Trial Chamber’s general failure to consider the full import of the Adjudicated Facts.[6] However, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber was intimately aware of the scope of the Adjudicated Facts, as demonstrated by its multiple detailed decisions considering adjudicated facts proposed by the Prosecution.[7] In addition, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Impugned Decision explicitly considered that Karadžić had the opportunity to cross-examine Prosecution witnesses on many of the topics covered by the Adjudicated Facts, further demonstrating the Trial Chamber’s familiarity with this evidence.[8] In these circumstances, recalling that trial chambers enjoy broad discretion in evaluating evidence,[9] the Appeals Chamber, Judge Robinson dissenting, finds that Karadžić has not demonstrated that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of the import or scope of the Adjudicated Facts in its consideration of the time allocated for the defence case.

[1] See First Judicial Notice Decision [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on First Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 5 June 2009], para. 36; Third Judicial Notice Decision [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Third Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 9 July 2009], para. 61.

[2] See Reply, para. 4.

[3] Impugned Decision, para. 10.

[4] Impugned Decision, para. 10.

[5] Prlić et al. Decision, para. 69.

[6] Appeal, paras 29-31, 33.

[7] These decisions totalled nearly 150 pages. See [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on First Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 5 June 2009; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Third Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 9 July 2009; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Second Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 9 October 2009; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Fourth Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 14 June 2010; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Fifth Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 14 June 2010; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s Motions for Reconsideration of Decisions on Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 14 June 2010; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Three Accused’s Motions for Reconsideration of Decisions on Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 4 May 2012].

[8] Impugned Decision, para. 10.

[9] See Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000, para. 63 (“Trial [c]hambers are best placed to hear, assess and weigh the evidence […] presented at trial.”).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Continuation of Appellate Proceedings for Gvero - 16.01.2013 POPOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-88-A)

21. […] An appellant claiming to be unfit to participate in the proceedings bears the burden of so proving by a preponderance of the evidence.[1]

[1] See Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 56.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Continuation of Appellate Proceedings for Gvero - 16.01.2013 POPOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-88-A)

21. The Appeals Chamber has held that an appellant’s ability to participate in the appellate proceedings is contingent upon whether he possesses the mental capacity to understand their essentials, and the mental and/or physical capacity to communicate, and thus consult, with his counsel.[1] It has further clarified that the following standard of fitness (“Standard of Fitness”) applicable to trial proceedings also applies mutatis mutandis with regard to an appellant's fitness to exercise his right to consult with counsel concerning the preparation of his appellate submissions:

[…] meaningful participation which allows the accused to exercise his fair trial rights to such a degree that he is able to participate effectively in his trial, and has an understanding of the essentials of the proceedings. [… A]n accused’s fitness to stand trial should turn on whether his capacities, “viewed overall and in a reasonable and commonsense manner, [are] at such a level that it is possible for [him or her] to participate in the proceedings (in some cases with assistance) and sufficiently exercise the identified rights”.[2]

[…]

22. […] [T]he Standard of Fitness focuses on an appellant’s ability to understand the essentials of the appellate proceedings. Processing the wealth of complex information inherent in international criminal proceedings is the role of defence counsel, in order to advise their clients. Indeed, the Standard of Fitness indicates that a defendant may sometimes require assistance to participate in the proceedings.[3]

[1] Decision of 20 April 2011 [Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion Seeking Clarification of Neurologist’s Conclusions, 20 April 2011 (confidential and ex parte)], p. 3; Decision of 13 December 2010, para. 11; Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgement, 17 July 2008 (“Strugar Appeal Judgement”), para. 55.

[2] See supra para. 21: “[…] possible for [him or her] to participate in the proceedings (in some cases with assistance) and sufficiently exercise the identified rights”.

 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Denial of Judgement of Acquittal - 11.12.2012 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.9)

6. Neither the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal […]] nor the Statute specify the standard by which the Appeals Chamber is to review the denial of a motion for acquittal under Rule 98 bis of the Rules. However, in previous rulings on interlocutory appeals from decisions on Rule 98 bis motions, the Appeals Chamber has reviewed trial chambers’ legal conclusions to determine whether the trial chamber committed errors of law.[1] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber will review, as relevant, the Impugned Decision to determine whether the Trial Chamber committed an “error on a question of law invalidating [its] decision”.[2]

[1] See Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR73.3, Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on Rule 98bis Motions for Acquittal, 11 March 2005, para. 15; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, 19 March 2004, paras 5-10. Cf. The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-AR98bis, Decision on Appeal of Decision Denying the Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 11 November 2009, paras 9-14.

[2] Statute, Article 25(1). See also Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgement, 16 November 2012, para. 10.

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ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis ICTY Rule Rule 98 bis
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Denial of Judgement of Acquittal - 11.12.2012 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.9)

16. As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber recalls that under Common Article 3, detention of a combatant during an armed conflict automatically renders him or her hors de combat, and that taking any individual hostage is among the acts which “are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever”.[1] The plain text of Common Article 3 thus indicates that the prohibition on hostage-taking is both absolute and without exception. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “any conduct of hostage-taking involving [Prisoners of War]] could not but be in violation of the Third Geneva Convention” and that “[t]]he main point confirming the relevance of the prohibition of hostage-taking under the Third Geneva Convention is the very existence of [C]]ommon Article 3, which expresses the shared principles which govern the Conventions”.[2]

[1] Common Article 3 [Common Article 3(1)(b) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949]], para. 1. See also Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgement, 17 July 2008, para. 179 n. 460 (“if a victim was found to be detained by an adverse party at the time of the alleged offence against him, his status as either a civilian or combatant would no longer be relevant because a detained person cannot, by definition, directly participate in hostilities.”).

[2] 2009 Hostage Decision [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR72.5, Decision on Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Preliminary Motion to Dismiss Count 11 of the Indictment, 9 July 2009]], para. 21. See also Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Judgement, 5 May 2009 […]], para. 70 (“Common Article 3 […] reflects the same spirit of the duty to protect members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and are detained as the specific protections afforded to prisoners of war in Geneva Convention III as a whole, particularly in its Article 13”). Cf. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Article 13 (“Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention.”).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Denial of Judgement of Acquittal - 11.12.2012 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.9)

17. Karadžić suggests that the pre-announced intention to take enemy combatants hostage if certain conditions are not met allows a military force to assume control over these individuals in a way that completes the crime of hostage-taking without triggering the protections of Common Article 3.[1] However, Karadžić does not identify any aspect of the text or history of Common Article 3 or any jurisprudence supporting his contention that in particular circumstances, detention of combatants falls outside the scope of Common Article 3 protections. Karadžić cites the Sesay Judgement, rendered by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,[2] which does not contradict the Appeals Chamber’s analysis here, because, even if the act of hostage-taking was completed upon the detention of the UN Personnel, as Karadžić asserts,[3] their detention by Bosnian Serb forces still triggered the protections of Common Article 3. 

18. Insofar as Karadžić asserts that the prohibition on hostage-taking is less broad than other prohibitions in Common Article 3, that contention contravenes the Appeals Chamber’s holding that “[t]]he prohibition of hostage-taking shares the very same scope of application with the remaining rules enshrined in [C]]ommon Article 3.”[4] Furthermore, Karadžić’s interpretation of Common Article 3 would allow for situations where detainees could not be assured of basic protections. This risks undermining a fundamental purpose of Common Article 3: providing minimum and absolute protections to detained individuals, whether combatants or not.[5]

19. Karadžić is unconvincing in suggesting that the Impugned Decision is erroneous because it renders the Chapeau Requirement of Common Article 3 superfluous.[6] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Impugned Decision addresses only one aspect of Common Article 3’s protections: the taking of hostages.[7] However, Common Article 3’s protections extend beyond hostage-taking and are also triggered in circumstances other than when an individual is detained and thus placed hors de combat. The Chapeau Requirement is indisputably meaningful and relevant to the other crimes prohibited under Common Article 3. For example, a sick soldier who has laid down his arms or is unable to fight because of sickness is a “[p]erson[] taking no active part in the hostilities” under Common Article 3 and may not be murdered or subjected to humiliating treatment; the Impugned Decision does not purport to apply to, nor does it affect, such situations.

20. Karadžić also fails to explain his assertion that considering all detained combatants to be hors de combat would render all detentions of combatants unlawful.[8] The fact that detainees are considered hors de combat does not render their detention unlawful in itself. Rather, their hors de combat status triggers Common Article 3’s protections, including the prohibition on their use as hostages. Likewise unconvincing is Karadžić’s argument that the similarity of his actions to those allegedly taken by UN troops at the same time as Bosnian Serb forces detained the UN Personnel somehow proves the lawfulness of Karadžić’s actions.[9] Karadžić’s speculative allegations on actions supposedly taken by UN troops are not relevant to Karadžić’s individual criminal responsibility, nor do they demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s analysis about the UN Personnel’s hors de combat status after their detention.

21. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber holds that Common Article 3’s prohibition on hostage‑taking applies to all detained individuals, irrespective of whether their detention is explicitly sought in order to use them as hostages and irrespective of their prior status as combatants. Karadžić has not demonstrated that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that “even if the UN [P]]ersonnel were combatants immediately before their detention, they were rendered ‘hors de combat’ by virtue of their detention and thus were entitled to the minimum protections guaranteed by Common Article 3.”[10]

[1] See Appeal [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.9, Appeal from Denial of Judgement of Acquittal for Hostage Taking, 25 July 2012]], paras 36-40; Reply [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.9, Reply Brief: Appeal from Denial of Judgement of Acquittal for Hostage Taking, 10 August 2012]], para. 4.

[2] Appeal, para. 39, quoting Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment, 26 October 2009 […]], para. 597.

[3] See Appeal, paras 36-40.

[4] 2009 Hostage Decision, para. 26.

[5] See 2009 Hostage Decision, paras 21, 23, 25-26.

[6] Appeal, para. 38; Reply, para. 13.

[7] SeeT. 28 June 2012 pp. 28735-28738.

[8] Reply, para. 12.

[9] See Reply, paras 14-16.

[10]T. 28 June 2012 p. 28735 (emphasis added).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Denial of Judgement of Acquittal - 11.12.2012 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.9)

22. Finally, turning to Karadžić’s contentions with respect to mens rea,[1] the Appeals Chamber recalls that “the principle of individual guilt requires that the perpetrator of a Common Article 3 crime knew or should have been aware that the victim was taking no active part in the hostilities when the crime was committed.”[2] Insofar as Karadžić contends that the Impugned Decision should be reversed because it did not respect this principle, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by his contentions. Even if Karadžić had believed that the UN Personnel were taking active part in the hostilities prior to their detention and thus were not entitled to protection under Common Article 3, his erroneous belief about the legal significance of the UN Personnel’s status would not shield him from criminal liability for using them as hostages after their detention. As explained above, Common Article 3 would apply to the detained UN Personnel irrespective of their status prior to detention,[3] and any misunderstanding by Karadžić with respect to this issue is not a valid defence.[4]

[1] Appeal, paras 53-60; Reply, paras 19-30.

[2] Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgement, 19 May 2010, para. 66.

[3] See supra [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.9, Decision of Appeal from Denial of Judgement of Aquittal for Hostage-Taking, 11 December 2012]], paras 16-17.

[4] Cf. In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5-A, 19 July 2011, para. 147, citing Prosecutor v. Josip Jović, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgement, 15 March 2007, para. 27 (rejecting the mistake of law defence in contempt cases).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

118. The Trial Chamber noted that there was a difference between “identification” witnesses, to whom the accused was “previously unknown by sight” and “recognition” witnesses who had prior knowledge of the accused enabling them to recognise the accused at the time of the alleged crime.[1] A witness’s prior knowledge of, or level of familiarity with, an accused is a relevant factor in the assessment of identification evidence. The Appeals Chamber considers that, as part of its reasoned opinion, a trial chamber should articulate the basis on which it was satisfied that the witness had prior knowledge of an accused and was therefore able to recognise that individual at the crime scene.[2]

119. The Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber having distinguished between “identification” and “recognition” witnesses. The Appeals Chamber further considers that the Trial Chamber rightly pointed out that a witness who has “acquired sufficient knowledge” of an accused, for example when a crime is committed over a long period of time, may be considered a “recognition” witness.[3] The Appeals Chamber finds that Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić have not shown that the Trial Chamber erred in law by distinguishing between “identification” and “recognition” witnesses.

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 31, referring to Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 545, Haradinaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 29.

[2] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 152, referring to Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39.

[3] See Trial Judgement, para. 34.

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

262. Milan Lukić submitted the Logbook Entry to the Trial Chamber without a translation into one of the working languages of the Tribunal.[1] The Logbook Entry, which related to 14 June 1992, was also admitted without a translation as part of Prosecution Exhibit P68, which comprised the whole logbook.[2] The Appeals Chamber emphasises that it is incumbent on the party seeking to admit an exhibit to provide a translation where necessary.[3] Milan Lukić failed to provide such a translation. However, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber admitted the Logbook Entry into evidence, as Exhibit 1D39, without noting or commenting on the lack of translation.[4] From this point, the document was part of the trial record, and was therefore before the Trial Chamber. Moreover, the Trial Chamber had the duty to consider all the evidence before it.[5]

263. In the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber stated that it had admitted the Logbook Entry “inadvertently” and was unable to attach any weight to it without a translation into one of the working languages of the Tribunal.[6] However, in its summary of the evidence in the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber demonstrated that, even without a translation, it was aware that the Logbook Entry showed that Vasiljević was registered at the Višegrad Health Centre on 14 June 1992.[7] Moreover, the Trial Chamber found that it was able to attach probative weight to Prosecution Exhibit P68, which had also been admitted into evidence without an official translation, but the substance of which had been commented on by a Prosecution witness.[8]

264. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to consider the substance of the Logbook Entry. However, the Appeals Chamber finds that this error has no impact.

[1] See Trial Judgement, para. 570.

[2] The logbook from the Višegrad Health Centre was initially admitted in its entirety without translation on 4 September 2008 as Exh. P68 (confidential) (see T. 1190 (4 September 2008)). On 10 September 2008, following the testimony of Vasiljević, the page from the logbook which comprises the Logbook Entry was admitted as Exh. 1D39 (see T. 1559-1561 (10 September 2008) (closed session)). This page had already been admitted as part of Exh P68 but was tendered by Milan Lukić as part of a set of documents in support of Vasiljević’s testimony that he was not present at Pionirska Street. Subsequently, on 27 October 2008, the Trial Chamber ruled that Exh. P68, as previously admitted, was no longer admitted in its entirety but that “the pages of the logbook which contain entries made on the 7th of June, 1992, [were]] admitted into evidence as Exhibit P68 under seal [and that] these pages in their redacted form [were]] admitted as Exhibit P70.” The Trial Chamber further clarified that “Exhibit 1D39 only comprises pages of the logbook which contain entries of 14th June 1992.” (T. 2766 (27 October 2008)). There was never an official translation submitted for any part of the logbook during trial.

[3] See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Defence Application for Forwarding the Documents in the Language of the Accused, 27 September 1996, paras 6, 10.

[4] T. 1559-1561 (10 September 2008) (closed session); T. 2766 (27 October 2008).

[5] Cf. Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 121, referring to Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23.

[6] Trial Judgement, para. 570.

[7] Trial Judgement, para. 439, referring to Logbook Entry.

[8] Trial Judgement, fn. 327. The Appeals Chamber notes that in relation to those portions of the logbook, witnesses discussed the contents of the pages and, to a certain extent, provided translations. However, the witness testimony was confined to discussing the specific patient and treatment on the corresponding page, and did not address specifically what the various columns meant (see Trial Judgement, fn. 327, referring to VG032, T. 1191-1193 (8 September 2008), VG133, T. 2963-2967 (28 October 2008)). Therefore, the Appeals Chamber does not accept Milan Lukić’s assertion that to the extent those portions of the logbook were translated, they also translated the Logbook Entry.

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

614. […] The Appeals Chamber, Judge Pocar and Judge Liu dissenting, considers that in-court viva voce evidence is generally more reliable than prior statements.[1] This is based on the indicia of reliability provided by cross-examination of in-court evidence. A trial chamber preferring a witness’s prior statement to his or her viva voce evidence should provide reasons for doing so. […]

[1] Cf. Akayesu Appeal Judgement, para. 134; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 469.

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

466. Article 23(2) of the Statute and Rule 98 ter(C) of the Rules provide that a judgement shall be rendered by a “majority of the judges”. Rule 87(A) of the Rules specifies that a majority of judges must be satisfied that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, there was no such majority as only Judge David was satisfied that Sredoje Lukić fulfilled the actus reus and mens rea of aiding and abetting extermination in the Pionirska Street Incident.[1] As set out above, for different reasons neither Judge Van den Wyngaert nor Judge Robinson was satisfied that Sredoje Lukić should be convicted of this offence. Thus, to conclude that the Trial Chamber’s majority findings on Sredoje Lukić’s participation in the murders and on their characterisation as extermination support a finding of guilt would lead to Sredoje Lukić’s conviction, despite the fact that only one Judge was satisfied that all the necessary elements were fulfilled. Such a conclusion is incompatible with the principle that a finding of guilt may be reached only when a majority of the trial chamber is satisfied that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, as enshrined in Rule 87(A) of the Rules. Thus, the Prosecution has not shown that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to convict Sredoje Lukić for aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity on Pionirska Street. The Prosecution’s first ground of appeal is therefore dismissed.

[1] Trial Judgement, paras 934, 953. 

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ICTR Statute Article 22(2) ICTY Statute Article 23(2) ICTR Rule Rule 87(A);
Rule 88(C)
ICTY Rule Rule 87(A);
Rule 98 ter(C)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

70. With respect to MLD1, the Trial Chamber held that “[t]]here are a number of aspects of MLD1’s account that are difficult to believe”.[1] It further found that Vilić’s testimony “raise[s] serious questions as to the credibility of MLD10 in general and in respect of her alibi evidence regarding the Drina river and Varda factory incidents”.[2] The Trial Chamber also found MLD15’s evidence “somewhat strange and artificial”.[3] The Appeals Chamber considers that in making these findings, the Trial Chamber explained its reasons for concluding that the witnesses lacked credibility. Such language does not indicate a reversal of the burden of proof. On the contrary, it shows that the Trial Chamber carefully considered the evidence of these alibi witnesses.

71. The Trial Chamber considered that inconsistencies in witness testimonies “call into question the alibi as a whole, as [they cast] reasonable doubt on the alibi evidence” of MLD1, MLD10, and Marković.[4] It also found that an “inconsistency resulting from MLD24’s evidence casts further doubt upon the veracity of the alibi presented as a whole.”[5] The use of these phrases is unfortunate since, taken in isolation, they could be interpreted as requiring Milan Lukić to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was in Belgrade at the time of the alleged crimes. However, the Appeals Chamber observes that such language must be viewed in the broader context of the Trial Chamber’s findings.[6] The fact that the Trial Chamber in some instances used language which may be misunderstood does not necessarily mean that the Trial Chamber fundamentally misplaced the burden of proof.[7]

72. The Trial Chamber articulated the correct legal standard applicable to the examination of alibi evidence. […] Thus, the Appeals Chamber considers that, when using this language, the Trial Chamber was explaining why it did not find that the proffered alibi raised a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case. The Trial Chamber rejected Milan Lukić’s alibi after having considered the evidence as a whole.[8] In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber finds that Milan Lukić has failed to show that the Trial Chamber erred in law in assessing his alibi for the DrinaRiver and Varda Factory Incidents.

361. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber correctly articulated the burden of proof applicable to alibi evidence. It stated that “in putting forward an alibi, an accused need only produce evidence likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case” and that “it remains incumbent on the Prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true.”[9]

362. The Appeals Chamber further finds that the Trial Chamber properly applied this burden of proof. Sredoje Lukić refers to the Trial Chamber’s finding that “certain aspects of the alibi evidence [were] difficult to believe”,[10] as well as the finding that witness accounts were “implausible”.[11] The Appeals Chamber is of the view that these considerations do not indicate a reversal of the burden of proof.

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 212.

[2] Trial Judgement, para. 216.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 221.

[4] Trial Judgement, para. 223 (emphasis added).

[5] Trial Judgement, para. 226 (emphasis added).

[6] Cf. Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 20.

[7] Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 39.

[8] Trial Judgement, paras 230, 329.

[9] Trial Judgement, para. 28.

[10] Trial Judgement, para. 633.

[11] Trial Judgement, para. 634. 

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

112. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has a broad discretion to consider all relevant factors in determining the weight to attach to the evidence of any given witness.[1] It is within the discretion of a trial chamber to evaluate the evidence as a whole, without explaining its decision in detail.[2] Merely stating that two witnesses, who testified about two separate events, were accorded different weight by the Trial Chamber does not meet the standard of appeal.

[1] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 86.

[2] Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23, referring to Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 481, 498; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 32.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

58. Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that, on 9 December 2008, the Prosecution submitted that three potential female witnesses were unwilling to speak to the Defence Team.[1] However, once Milan Lukić had received their identifying information, he was obliged to make use of all mechanisms of compulsion available under the Statute and the Rules had he wanted to contact them.[2]

[1] Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Prosecution Motion to Redact Identifying Information, 9 December 2008 (confidential with confidential Annex A), paras 3-6, 10-12, 16-17, 20.

[2] Cf. Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 50, referring to Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 16 October 1998, para. 47.

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

128. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has the discretion to rely upon evidence of accomplice witnesses.[1] However, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, the trial chamber is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered. In particular, consideration should be given to circumstances showing that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal or to lie.[2] This does not mean that corroboration is required.[3] However, a trial chamber must explain the reasons for accepting the evidence of an accomplice.[4]

[1] Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras 47, 305.

[2] Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras 42, 305. See also Blagojević and Jokiæ Appeal Judgement, para. 82.

[3] Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras 46-48.

[4] Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 146. See also Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 145.

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
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135. The Appeals Chamber recalls that minor inconsistencies commonly occur in witness testimony without rendering it unreliable.[1] It is within the discretion of a trial chamber to evaluate discrepancies and to consider the credibility of the evidence as a whole, without explaining every detail of its decision.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber is required to “carefully articulate the factors relied upon in support of the identification of the accused and adequately address any significant factors impacting negatively on the reliability of the identification evidence”.[3] A trial chamber should consider whether there is inconsistent or inaccurate testimony concerning an accused’s physical characteristics,[4] or any other evidence regarding an accused’s identity which may be decisive in a trial chamber’s decision to rely on the identification evidence.[5]

[1] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 134.

[2] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 112.

[3] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39.

[4] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 40.

[5] See Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 107. 

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
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149. The Appeals Chamber recalls that there is no requirement that the body of a victim be recovered in order to prove death beyond a reasonable doubt, and that a victim’s death can be inferred circumstantially from all the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber.[1] Consequently, the evidence of an eye-witness can be the sole basis for a finding that a person is dead. The Appeals Chamber also recalls that, in order to successfully challenge the trial chamber’s assessment of circumstantial evidence on appeal, an appellant must show that no reasonable trier of fact could have found that the conclusion reached by the trial chamber was the only reasonable inference.[2].

208. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber recalls that proof beyond reasonable doubt that a person was killed does not necessarily require proof that the dead body of that person has been recovered. Rather, a victim’s death may be inferred circumstantially from all the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber.[3] […]

316. As the Appeals Chamber noted above, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is dead does not necessarily require that the body of that person was recovered.[4] A victim’s death can be inferred circumstantially from all of the evidence presented to a trial chamber.[5] […]

[1] Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 260.

[2] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 13.

[3] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 149.

[4] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 149.

[5] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 149.

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
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261. Further, the Appeals Chamber recalls that adjudicated facts of which a trial chamber takes judicial notice pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the Rules “are merely presumptions that may be rebutted […] with evidence at trial”.[1] In this context, the Appeals Chamber emphasises that the final assessment of a piece of evidence is based on the totality of the evidence in a given case, as the same piece of evidence can be assessed differently in different cases because of other evidence on the record.[2] The mechanism of Rule 94(B) of the Rules does not allow a trial chamber to defer to the assessment of the evidence by another trial chamber on the ground that it was fashioned to favour consistency and uniformity in the Tribunal’s case-law.[3] The Trial Chamber therefore had the obligation to assess the evidence and reach its own conclusion.[4] The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in law in finding that the adjudicated fact in question, namely the accuracy of the Užice Hospital Records, was rebutted by the evidence presented at trial.

[1] See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-AR73.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and Prosecution’s Catalogue of Agreed Facts, 26 June 2007, para. 16, referring to The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 16 June 2006, para. 42.

[2] Édouard Karemera et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73.17, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal of Decision on Admission of Evidence Rebutting Adjudicated Facts, 29 May 2009 (“Karemera et al. Decision”), para. 19.

[3] Karemera et al. Decision, para. 21.

[4] See Karemera et al. Decision, para. 22.

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ICTR Rule Rule 94 ICTY Rule Rule 94
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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
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120. The Appeals Chamber recalls that in-court identification is generally permissible.[1] Contrary to the Appellants’ contention,[2] the fact that a witness fails to identify the accused during a pre-trial identification exercise does not bar a trial chamber from allowing in-court identification.[3] However, in-court identification should be given “‘little or no credence’ given the signals that can identify an accused aside from prior acquaintance”.[4] A trial chamber must therefore exercise caution in assessing such evidence.[5] The Appeals Chamber considers that, while little or no weight should be given to a witness’s in-court identification evidence,[6] a witness’s failure to identify an accused in court can be a reason for declining to rely on the identification evidence of that witness.[7] The distinction between an “identification” or “recognition” witness is thus irrelevant in the context of in-court identification. In the present case, the Trial Chamber allowed in-court identifications by several witnesses. The Appeals Chamber considers that, as a matter of law, Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić have not shown that the Trial Chamber erred by allowing in-court identification per se. The Appeals Chamber will evaluate the Appellants’ claims regarding each witness in the appropriate section.

136. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “where a finding of guilt is made on the basis of identification evidence given by a witness under difficult circumstances, the Trial Chamber must rigorously implement its duty to provide a ‘reasoned opinion’”.[8] In these instances, the Trial Chamber must “carefully articulate the factors relied upon in support of the identification of the accused and adequately address any significant factors impacting negatively on the reliability of the identification evidence”.[9]

137. Factors relevant to the Appeals Chamber’s determination of whether a trial chamber’s decision to rely upon identification evidence was unreasonable or rendered the conviction unsafe, include:

[I]dentifications of defendants by witnesses who had only a fleeting glance or an obstructed view of the defendant; identifications occurring in the dark and as a result of a traumatic event experienced by the witness; inconsistent or inaccurate testimony about the defendant’s physical characteristics at the time of the event; misidentification or denial of the ability to identify followed by later identification of the defendant by a witness; the existence of irreconcilable witness testimonies; and a witness’ delayed assertion of memory regarding the defendant coupled with the “clear possibility” from the circumstances that the witness had been influenced by suggestions from others.[10]

138. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber considers that this list is not intended to be exhaustive.[11] A trial chamber is not bound to consider all of these factors, but only those appropriate in the circumstances of the case.[12]

[1] See Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 96; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 243.

[2] Milan Lukić Appeal Brief, para. 84; Sredoje Lukić Appeal Brief, paras 19, 306.

[3] Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 29.

[4] Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 96. See also Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 243, referring to Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 562, Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 320.

[5] Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 96, referring to Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 243. See also Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 27-28; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 226-227, 320, upholding Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 562.

[6] See Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, paras 243 (referring to Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 562, Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 320), 244.

[7] Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, fn. 68; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 473.

[8] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 152. See also Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 24; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39; Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 527.

[9] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 152, referring to Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 39 (emphasis added).

[10] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 156, referring to Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 40 (internal citations omitted).

[11] See Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 116.

[12] See Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 382.

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Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

375.[…].The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has a broad discretion to assess the appropriate weight and credibility to be accorded to the testimony of a witness,[1] and is at liberty to rely on the uncorroborated evidence of a single witness when making its findings, even if it is related to a material fact.[2] […]

[1] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 86.

[2] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 219; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 33; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65.

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