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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

97. The Appeals Chamber has not considered the video recording of the site visit, as it is not part of the record. The Appeals Chamber strongly emphasises that a detailed record of a Trial Chamber’s site visit should normally be maintained[1] and form part of the trial record. The purpose of a site visit is to assist a Trial Chamber in its determination of the issues, and therefore it is incumbent upon the Trial Chamber to ensure that the parties are able to review effectively any findings made by the Trial Chamber in reliance on observations made during the site visit.[2]

[1] See Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 36; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 50.

[2] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 50. 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

99. […] The term “common knowledge” encompasses facts that are widely known and not reasonably subject to dispute: in other words, commonly accepted or universally known facts, such as general facts of history or geography, or the laws of nature.[1]

[1] See Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 194; Karemera et al., Decision on Judicial Notice, paras. 22, 23. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 94 ICTY Rule Rule 94
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

99. […] Rule 94(A) of the Rules states: “[a] Trial Chamber shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.” This standard is not discretionary; if a Trial Chamber determines that a fact is “common knowledge”, it must take judicial notice of it.[1] […]

[1] Karemera et al., Decision on Judicial Notice [The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 16 June 2006], para. 22.

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ICTR Rule Rule 94 ICTY Rule Rule 94
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

101. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber could have taken into account the fact that the request was made late in the proceedings in assessing, for example, whether the facts sought to be judicially noticed were relevant to the Appellant’s case. However, the Trial Chamber erred in rejecting the Defence Motion for Judicial Notice solely on the basis of its late filing. The Trial Chamber should have considered whether the facts at issue were facts of common knowledge and, if so, whether they were relevant to the Appellant’s case. While the Trial Chamber erred in dismissing the application on the grounds that it was untimely, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that the facts submitted by the Appellant were capable of being judicially noticed by the Trial Chamber. The information contained in these documents regarding the movements of the troops of Operation Turquoise would certainly not qualify as facts that are commonly accepted or universally known or beyond reasonable dispute. As a consequence, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in rejecting the Defence Motion for Judicial Notice for lateness but considers that this error did not invalidate the decision.

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ICTR Rule Rule 94 ICTY Rule Rule 94
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

194. The Appeals Chamber further considers that, contrary to the Prosecution’s assertion,[1] the Trial Chamber was not obliged to accord “sufficient weight” to the absence of mitigating factors in this case, nor does the Prosecution cite any jurisprudence in support of this proposition. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber properly exercised its discretion when it examined the various mitigating factors advanced by the Appellant, and the submissions advanced by the Prosecution[2] and concluded that “there [were] no mitigating factors that should be taken into account in the determination of the sentence.”[3] The Appeals Chamber finds no discernible error in this approach. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber abused its discretion by failing to accord sufficient weight to the absence of any mitigating factors in this case.

[1] Prosecution’s Appellant’s Brief [Simon Bikindi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A, Prosecutor’s Appellant’s Brief, filed on 28 January 2009], paras. 4, 18.

[2] Trial Judgement [The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgement, 2 December 2008], paras. 453-457.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 458.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

165. […][W]hilst a Trial Chamber is required to take into account any mitigating circumstances in determining a sentence, it is the accused who bears the burden of establishing mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.[1] It was the Appellant’s prerogative to address sentencing submissions during closing arguments and to identify any mitigating circumstances in the trial record.[2] Having failed to specifically refer, in his Final Trial Brief or Closing Arguments, to the Defence evidence adduced during trial that he assisted several Tutsis in a camp in Mugunga after the genocide as a mitigating circumstance, the Appellant cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.[3] The Trial Chamber was not under an obligation to seek out information that Counsel did not put before it at the appropriate time.[4] The Appellant’s arguments in this respect are dismissed.

[1] Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 231.

[2] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 388, referring to Rule 86(C) of the Rules.

[3] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1049, citing Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 231; Bralo Appeal Judgement, para. 29; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 354; Deronjić Appeal Judgement, para. 150; Babić Appeal Judgement, para. 62.

[4] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 388; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

96. As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber notes that the alleged error in failing to keep a proper record of the site visit was not properly pleaded in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, which only refers to the alleged error in failing to take judicial notice of Operation Turquoise.[1] The Notice of Appeal thus fails to indicate the substance of the alleged errors and the relief sought, as required by Rule 108 of the Rules.[2] However, because the Prosecution did not object to this failure, the Appeals Chamber, exercising its discretion,[3] will consider whether the Trial Chamber erred in law by failing to include the video recording and any observations from the site visit in the official record of this case.

[1] Bikindi’s Notice of Appeal [Simon Bikindi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A, Notice of Appeal, filed on 31 December 2008], paras. 14, 15.

[2] See also Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement of 4 July 2005, para. 1(c)(i), which provides that a Notice of Appeal shall contain “the grounds of appeal, clearly specifying in respect of each ground of appeal [...] any alleged error on a question of law invalidating the decision [...]”.

[3] Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 12.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

158. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that in assessing the individual circumstances of the accused, the Trial Chamber shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalls that neither the Statute nor the Rules exhaustively define the factors which may be considered in mitigation. Rather, what constitutes a mitigating circumstance is a matter for the Trial Chamber to determine in the exercise of its discretion.[2] The Trial Chamber is endowed with a considerable degree of discretion in making this determination,[3] as well as in deciding how much weight, if any, to be accorded to the mitigating circumstances identified.[4]

[1] See supra [Bikindi’s Notice of Appeal] para. 140.

[2] See Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 316, citing Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 328; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 395.

[3] Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 316, citing Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para. 325; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 245; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 780.

[4] Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 316, citing Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 258; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 675; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 328.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

145. The Appellant contends that the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, whilst a “serious offence”, cannot be considered as a crime of similar gravity to genocide, since, unlike the crime of genocide, it is an inchoate offence.[1] The Appeals Chamber disagrees. There is no hierarchy of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.[2] […]

146. […] [T]he analysis in the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement in fact supports the proposition that the offence of direct and public incitement to commit genocide is, in and of itself, a serious offence warranting serious punishment, notwithstanding that no physical act of genocide may have been committed. It does not indicate any hierarchy between the two offences. […]

148. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that whilst a Trial Chamber is obliged to take into account the general sentencing practice in Rwanda, it is not obliged to follow it.[3] The Appeals Chamber notes that although it would appear that Rwandan law does not make direct and public incitement to commit genocide a separate offence, it nevertheless criminalizes genocide[4] and provides that the act of, inter alia, “incitement, by way of speech, image or writing, to commits [sic] such a crime, even where not followed by an execution” shall be punishable by penalties provided for under that law.[5]

[1] Bikindi’s Appellant’s Brief, para. 109, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 678. See also AT. [Transcript page from Appeal hearings held on 30 September 2009 in Simon Bikindi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A] 30 September 2009 pp. 72, 73.

[2] Mrkšić and [ljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 375, quoting D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 375. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1060.

[3] See supra [Bikindi’s Appellant’s Brief] para. 141.

[4] See, e.g., Organic Law No. 33bis/2003 Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, of 6 September 2003 (“Organic Law No. 33bis/2003”), Article 2.

[5] See Organic Law No. 33bis/2003, Article 17(3). The Appeals Chamber observes that whilst it would have been preferable for the Trial Chamber to also refer to Organic Law No. 33bis/2003 in its discussion on the Rwandan law relating to the offence of genocide, its failure to do so does not impact the validity of the Trial Chamber’s overall assessment of Rwanda’s sentencing practice.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

154. The Appeals Chamber considers that, pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute and Rule 101 of the Rules, the Trial Chamber was not obliged to take into account the sentencing practice of national jurisdictions other than Rwanda. […]

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

115. As for the Appellant’s claim that the Prosecution bears the burden of establishing that a Defence witness is giving false evidence, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a credibility determination may be based, but does not necessarily depend, on a judicial finding that a witness has given false testimony.[1] The fact that the Prosecution did not prove or even allege that Defence witnesses were giving false testimony did not prevent the Trial Chamber from exercising its discretion in assessing the weight to be attached to their evidence. The Appellant’s argument that unless the Prosecution established that Defence witnesses gave false testimony the Trial Chamber was compelled to believe their evidence is misguided.

116. With respect to the Appellant’s assertion that the Trial Chamber erred in considering the evidence of Defence witnesses with caution due to their “close relationship” with him, whereas the same criterion was not applicable to Prosecution evidence, the Appeals Chamber disagrees. In determining the weight to attach to the evidence of any witness, the Trial Chamber has a broad discretion to consider all relevant factors, as noted above.[2] The fact that a criterion for assessing the credibility of the Defence witnesses was not equally applicable to the Prosecution witnesses did not invalidate the application of this factor. The right to have Defence witnesses examined under the same conditions as Prosecution witnesses relates to the right to call witnesses, and the right to cross-examine witnesses called by the Prosecution under the same conditions as the Prosecution.[3] It does not encompass the factors that a Trial Chamber may consider relevant in assessing the credibility of those witnesses.

[1] Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 31.

[2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 194.

[3] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 181.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

151. […] The Appeals Chamber reiterates that the Trial Chamber is only obliged to have regard to the gravity of the crimes for which an accused has been convicted, and the form or degree of responsibility for these crimes. […]

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

22. Pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber is required to guarantee a fair and expeditious trial with full respect for the rights of the accused. However, it is not for the Trial Chamber to dictate to a party how to conduct its case.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 BIKINDI Simon
(ICTR-01-72-A)

22. Pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber is required to guarantee a fair and expeditious trial with full respect for the rights of the accused. However, it is not for the Trial Chamber to dictate to a party how to conduct its case.

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ICTR Statute Article 19(1) ICTY Statute Article 20(1)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 15.03.2010 NSHOGOZA Léonidas
(ICTR-07-91-A)

56. The Appeals Chamber is equally unconvinced by Nshogoza’s argument that the actus reus of contempt requires a certain threshold of gravity. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated, “[a]ny defiance of an order of a Chamber per se interferes with the administration of justice for the purposes of a conviction for contempt.”[1] No additional proof of harm to the Tribunal’s administration of justice is required.[2] The Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the defiance of a Chamber’s order conveys any different connotation than a knowing and wilful violation of one.[3]

57. Considerations of the gravity of an accused’s conduct or his underlying motivations are rather to be assessed in connection with the decision to initiate proceedings or in sentencing.[4] Bearing this in mind, the Appeals Chamber considers that the various statements by Trial Chambers, cited by Nshogoza, which take into account the minimal gravity surrounding a violation of a Chamber’s order should be understood, not as a finding that the conduct was not contempt, but as an exercise of the discretion of the Chamber not to initiate proceedings in such circumstances. The fact that other persons might also have engaged in similar conduct is not a defence.

[1] Prosecutor v. Josip Jović, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgement, 15 March 2007, para. 30 (“Jović Appeal Judgement”). See also Prosecutor v. Ivica Marijačić and Markica Rebić, Case No. IT-95-14-R.77.2-A, Judgement, 27 September 2006, para. 44 (“The language of Rule 77 shows that a violation of a court order as such constitutes an interference with the International Tribunal’s administration of justice. […] It has already been established in the jurisprudence that any defiance of an order of the court interferes with the administration of justice.”) (“Marijačić and Rebić Appeal Judgement”).

[2] Jović Appeal Judgement, para. 30.

[3] Jović Appeal Judgement, para. 30 (using “defiance” and “violation” interchangeably in describing the actus reus of a violation of Rule 77(A) of the Rules). See also Marijačić and Rebić Appeal Judgement, para. 44.

[4] Jović Appeal Judgement, para. 41 (noting that the Trial Chamber correctly considered in mitigation the fact that some of the witness protection measures which were violated were unnecessary). Cf. also Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 202; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para. 269.

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ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 15.03.2010 NSHOGOZA Léonidas
(ICTR-07-91-A)

80. As discussed in connection with the Second Ground of Appeal, the Trial Chamber did not err in determining that any violation of a court order interferes with the administration of justice.[1] Consequently, it correctly stated that the mens rea requirement for contempt under Rule 77(A) of the Rules is satisfied by proof of “any knowing and wilful conduct in violation of a Chamber’s order”.[2]

85. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber also fully considered the fact that Nshogoza was acting on the instructions and advice of the Lead Counsel.[3] However, the fact that he was following orders of a superior has no bearing on whether he possessed the requisite mens rea,[4] which, as stated above, is simply the knowing and wilful violation of a court order. Consequently, Nshogoza has failed to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s findings relating to the mens rea.

[1] See supra Section IV.A.1 (Ground 2: Alleged Errors Relating to the Actus Reus: Legal Requirements).

[2] See Trial Judgement [The Prosecutor v. Léonidas Nshogoza, Case No. ICTR-07-91-T, Judgement], para. 179.

[3] Trial Judgement, paras. 180-182.

[4] Cf. Haraqija and Morina Appeal Judgement, para. 53. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 77 ICTY Rule Rule 77
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 15.03.2010 NSHOGOZA Léonidas
(ICTR-07-91-A)

34. Article 20(4)(d) of the Statute guarantees an accused before the Tribunal the right to counsel of “his or her own choosing”. The Appeals Chamber observes that, throughout the proceedings, Nshogoza has benefited from his choice of counsel since Ms. Turner was acting on his behalf, albeit outside the framework of the Tribunal’s legal aid program, from the date of his arrest through her assignment under the program in October 2008.[1]

35. An accused who lacks the means to remunerate counsel has the right to have counsel assigned to him by the Registrar from the list drawn up in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules.[2] The crux of Nshogoza’s complaint is not that legal aid was not made available to him, but rather that the Registrar did not promptly assign him the counsel of his choice under the Tribunal’s legal aid program. While in practice, the Registrar will take account of an accused’s preferences in assigning counsel, where an accused’s defence is being paid for pursuant to the Tribunal’s legal aid program his right to legal counsel of his own choosing from the list kept by the Registrar is not absolute.[3] It is within the Registrar’s discretion to override that preference if it is in the interests of justice.[4]

[1] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that Nshogoza assigned power of attorney to Ms. Turner on 8 February 2008, and she appeared as his Counsel at the initial appearance. The Trial Chamber also noted that she represented him pro bono until 9 June 2008. Notwithstanding her stated intention to suspend all work on the file until formally assigned counsel under the legal aid program, she continued to represent Nshogoza and was accorded standing by the Trial Chamber as his Counsel, even during the brief assignment of Mr. Greciano as his Lead Counsel under the Tribunal’s legal aid program. See, e.g., Decision of 13 October 2008, para. 10; Trial Judgement (Annex), paras. 5, 8; Transcripts of 11 February and 28 August 2008.

[2] Article 20(4)(d) of the Statute; Rules 45 and 77(F) of the Rules; Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, as amended on 15 June 2007, Article 2.

[3] See Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgement, 9 May 2007, para. 17 (“Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement”); The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, 1 June 2001, paras. 61, 62; Jean Kambanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgement, 19 October 2000, para. 33.

[4] Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 17.

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ICTR Statute Article 20(4)(d) ICTY Statute Article 21(4)(d) ICTR Rule Rule 45 ICTY Rule Rule 45
Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 15.03.2010 NSHOGOZA Léonidas
(ICTR-07-91-A)

99. The Appeals Chamber considers, Judges Robinson and Güney dissenting, that the Trial Chamber properly considered the particular circumstances surrounding Nshogoza’s specific conduct. The Trial Chamber did not merely focus on contempt as an inherently grave offence, but addressed the gravity of the particular way in which Nshogoza committed contempt. It found that, by breaching the Kamuhanda Protective Measures Order, Nshogoza “undermined the authority of the Kamuhanda Trial Chamber, as well as confidence in the effectiveness of protective measures, and the administration of justice.”[1] The Trial Chamber did not merely focus on Nshogoza’s defiance of the authority of the Tribunal, but considered more specifically that his conduct “may also have the effect of dissuading witnesses from testifying before it.”[2] The Appeals Chamber does not deem that it was necessary for the Trial Chamber to have found that Witnesses GAA and A7/GEX lost confidence in their protective measures or that other witnesses were dissuaded from appearing before the Tribunal for it to consider that a breach of a protective measures order may have the effect of dissuading witnesses from testifying before the Tribunal.

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 219.

[2] Trial Judgement, para. 219.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 15.03.2010 NSHOGOZA Léonidas
(ICTR-07-91-A)

101. Finally, Nshogoza does not demonstrate how the Trial Chamber erred in imposing a custodial sentence to express its disapproval of his conduct. Such considerations are well within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to tailor appropriate sentences to individual cases. 

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Contempt Appeal Judgement - 15.03.2010 NSHOGOZA Léonidas
(ICTR-07-91-A)

65. Furthermore, the fact that the trial had concluded or that the protected witnesses may have approached Nshogoza did not in any way terminate their protected status. Rule 75(F) of the Rules states that protective measures once ordered continue to have effect in any proceeding before the Tribunal until rescinded, varied, or augmented.[1] In addition, the Kamuhanda Witness Protection Order clearly states that “the [protected] witness does not have the right, without authorization from the Chamber, to disclose his or her identity freely.”[2] This measure was added by the Trial Chamber proprio motu and was not challenged by the Kamuhanda Defence.

66. Although in some circumstances such a measure might be considered onerous, the Appeals Chamber is unable to determine that it was unreasonable or unjustified as a means of ensuring that any waiver is fully informed and voluntary given the information submitted by the Prosecution to the Trial Chamber at the time and the prevailing security climate. Furthermore, Nshogoza has failed to demonstrate why, in the particular circumstances of this case, it would have been impractical or particularly onerous to seek a variation of the Kamuhanda Witness Protection Order before proceeding with further contact with the protected witnesses. Indeed, at the relevant time of the contact, this case remained before either the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber and thus an urgent, and even ex parte, application could have been made.[3]

67. The Appeals Chamber recognizes that such measures might stifle effective Defence investigations where the Prosecution qualifies an excessive number of individuals as potential Prosecution witnesses, in particular without even ascertaining their willingness to appear. However, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that this was the case here. Witness A7/GEX was clearly identified to the Kamuhanda Defence as a potential witness willing to appear for the Prosecution on 26 March 2001 shortly before the trial.[4] Nshogoza’s contention that the witness protection measures for Witness A7/GEX should have lapsed at the conclusion of the trial fails to appreciate the Tribunal’s interest in protecting individuals who have agreed to cooperate and provide statements on a confidential basis. Potential witnesses who did not eventually testify may face similar risks as those who did, for instance by virtue of their cooperation with either party. Those who decided not to testify out of fear might also require continued anonymity, depending on the circumstances. In any case, even if Nshogoza were correct that the prohibitions on contact with this particular witness were no longer applicable, it cannot reasonably be argued that he had the right to disclose information, which had been consistently treated as confidential, to third parties without official sanction from a Chamber.

[1] See also Jović Appeal Judgement, para. 30 (“[A]n order remains in force until a Chamber decides otherwise.”).

[2] Kamuhanda Witness Protection Order, para. 12. See also Kamuhanda Witness Protection Order, p. 6 (“MODIFIES the measure sought in point 3(j) and recalls that it is the Chamber’s decision solely and not the decision of the witness to determine how long a pseudonym is to be used in reference to Prosecution witnesses in Tribunal proceedings, communications and discussions between the Parties to the trial, and with the public.”).

[3] Nshogoza brought Witnesses GAA and A7/GEX to the notary along with Augustin Nyagatare in March 2004. See Trial Judgement, para. 74. At the time, the Kamuhanda case was pending on appeal. The Trial Judgement does not specify when the earlier meetings occurred. However, the Trial Chamber in the Kamuhanda case was actively seized of this case until it delivered its Judgement on 22 January 2004. See Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, paras. 1, 440.

[4] Trial Judgement, para. 161. A review of the specific disclosure in the Kamuhanda case reflects that Witness A7/GEX was named among eight other witnesses in a confidential disclosure alluding to the Kamuhanda Witness Protection Order. The cover memo clearly indicates that the unredacted statements are “highly confidential” and the cover page of Witness A7/GEX’s statement is also marked in large bold type with the word “confidential”. See The Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-I, Interoffice Memorandum, Subject: Disclosure of unredacted witness statements in the case Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-54-I [sic], dated 26 March 2001, paras. 1, 3, 5, p. 514.

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ICTR Rule Rule 75 ICTY Rule Rule 75