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Contempt Appeal Judgement - 15.03.2010 NSHOGOZA Léonidas
(ICTR-07-91-A)

12. The Appeals Chamber recalls the applicable standards of appellate review pursuant to Article 24 of the Statute of the Tribunal (“Statute”). The Appeals Chamber reviews errors of law which invalidate the decision of the Trial Chamber and errors of fact which have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. This standard of review, applicable for appeals against judgements, also applies to appeals against convictions for contempt.[1]

[1] Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqija and Bajrush Morina, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4-A, Judgement, 23 July 2009, para. 14 (“Haraqija and Morina Appeal Judgement”). See also Contempt Proceedings Against Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-05-88-R77.1-A, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 25 June 2009, para. 11 (“Dragan Jokić Appeal Judgement”).

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Decision on Additional Evidence - 11.03.2010 ŠAINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-A)

17. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, for the purposes of Rule 115 of the Rules, whether the proffered evidence was available at trial is not merely a question of whether the evidence was “available” in a literal sense.[1] The applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that he acted with due diligence in obtaining the evidence and bringing it before the Trial Chamber.[2]

18. […] In order to establish whether, in seeking the admission of the untranslated documents Lukić acted with due diligence, the Appeals Chamber will need to address Lukić’s submission that the Trial Chamber obstructed his efforts to obtain appropriate translations. However, given that the latter issue bears on the merits of Lukić’s appeal, the Appeals Chamber will refrain from making such a determination at this juncture. […] Therefore, in light of the particular circumstances of this case, the pending resolution of Lukić’s appeal on the merits, and the interests of fairness, the Appeals Chamber finds that documents […] should be regarded as having been unavailable to Lukić for the purposes of Rule 115 of the Rules. […]

20. […] Considering that the duty to act with due diligence requires the parties “to make the best case in the first instance”,[3] the Appeals Chamber finds Lukić’s argument that he could not have anticipated the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the evidence unpersuasive. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it is the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal that the appeal process is not designed for the purpose of allowing the parties to remedy their own failings or oversights during trial.[4]

[1] Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin [ljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Decision on Mile Mrkšić’s Second Rule 115 Motion, 13 February 2009, para. 6, referring to Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-AR65.2, Decision on Lahi Brahimaj’s Request to Present Additional Evidence under Rule 115, 3 March 2006 (“Haradinaj et al. Rule 115 Decision”), para. 16.

[2] See supra, para. 5.

[3] Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Decision on Naletilić’s Consolidated Motion to Present Additional Evidence, 20 October 2004 (“Naletilić Rule 115 Decision”), para. 30, citing Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Admission of Additional Evidence Following Hearing of 30 March 2001, 11 April 2001 (confidential), para. 12.

[4] Naletilić Rule 115 Decision, para. 30, referring to Prosecutor v. Hazim Delić, Case No. IT-96-21-R-R119, Decision on Motion for Review, 25 April 2002, para. 15.

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Additional Evidence - 11.03.2010 ŠAINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-A)

41. Documents 6DA5 through 6DA9 bear some indicia of credibility, such as dates, recipients, and Lukić’s typed name as Head of Staff.[1] The Prosecution does not contest their credibility. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds the documents to be prima facie credible. […]

48. The Appeals Chamber recalls that when assessing the credibility of a piece of evidence it will consider whether it appears to be reasonably capable of belief or reliance.[2] Identification of the provenance of the evidence is important in this respect. […] [The Appeals Chamber] notes that the documents in question are not signed and do not bare any proof of their origin, such as MUP insignia, contemporary stamps, or stamps from an archive. Also, no source for the facts contained in the documents is mentioned, and there is no indication of who authored the documents. […] The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that documents 6DA10 and 6DA11 do not bear sufficient indicia of credibility and therefore do not appear to be reasonably capable of belief or reliance. […]

[1] The Appeals Chamber observes that the copies of documents 6DA5 through 6DA9 contained in Annex E of the Motion are of very poor quality. In this particular instance, the Appeals Chamber was able to compare the currently submitted versions of the documents with those tendered at trial in relation to Lukić’s Motion of 7 May 2008 (documents MNA 6D1262, MNA 6D1263, MNA 6D1264, MNA 6D1265, MNA 6D1266) and is satisfied that the documents are indeed the same. Therefore, the fact that in this case the submitted copies of the documents were of poor quality does not affect the Appeals Chamber’s finding in relation to the credibility of the documents. The Appeals Chamber however notes that it is Counsel’s duty to ensure that the documentary evidence sought to be admitted is of good quality.

[2] See supra, para. 6.

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ICTR Rule Rule 115 ICTY Rule Rule 115
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Decision on Motion for Stay - 02.03.2010 ŠAINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-A)

10. Pursuant to Article 24(C) of the Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel[1] (“Directive”),

[d]uring appellate proceedings, assigned counsel and assigned members of the defence team shall be remunerated on the basis of a maximum allotment of working hours paid at a fixed hourly rate as established in Annex I to this Directive, for the work reasonable and necessary to the preparation and presentation of the defence case.

The amount of such maximum allotment depends principally on the phase of the case and its complexity.[2] In determining the latter, the Registry generally takes into account a number of factors, including: the number and nature of the grounds of appeal; whether there is a cross-appeal; whether the appeal raises any novel legal issues; the complexity of the legal and factual issues involved; the number of documents that have to be reviewed; and the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber. At present, different allocations of hours are as follows: Level 1 (difficult) with 1050 counsel hours and 450 support staff hours; Level 2 (very difficult) with 1400 counsel hours and 600 support staff hours; and Level 3 (extremely difficult) with 2100 counsel hours and 900 support staff hours.[3] In addition, all appeals hearing hours for counsel are reimbursed.

12. The Appeals Chamber confirms, however, that the present decision will not address the issue of allocating additional hours to Pavković’s Defence team given that it is the Registry which has the primary responsibility in the determination of matters relating to remuneration of counsel.[4] […]

14. […] [T]the Appeals Chamber reiterates that Pavković’s Counsel agreed to represent him in full awareness of the system of remuneration for assigned counsel and is bound thereby.[5] In a letter addressed to the then Acting Head of OLAD and attached to the Motion (“Letter to OLAD”), Pavković’s Counsel argues that the understanding that he “accepted this appeal assignment with full understanding that resources were limited and that [he] could not be paid for each hour worked is incorrect”. He asserts that he was in fact “never formally assigned to handle this appeal [which] just carried over from the trial”.[6] The Appeals Chamber finds these claims untenable.[7] Pavković’s Counsel is therefore under the obligation to continue working in his client’s best interests until the representation is terminated (with the completion of the proceedings or an approved withdrawal).

[1] IT/73/Rev.11, 11 July 2006.

[2] The Appeals Chamber notes that Pavković’s statement that payment on appeal is made on an hourly basis (Reply to the Registry’s Submission, para. 5) is therefore not entirely correct, as the applicable system implies the remuneration for validly billed hours of work within a maximum allotment (see Registry’s Submission, Annex VI).

[3] The Appeals Chamber notes that in the history of the Tribunal, only two cases on appeal were considered to be “Level 2” and none has so far been qualified as “Level 3”.

[4] E.g. Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, 13 November 2003 (“Decision of 13 November 2003”), para. 19.

[5] Cf. Decision of 13 November 2003, para. 22, referring to Article 9(C) of the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal, IT/125 Rev. 1, 12 July 2002. The Appeals Chamber notes that the current version of the said document as amended on 22 July 2009 and promulgated on 6 August 2009, IT/125 Rev. 3 (“Code of Conduct”) contains the same provision.

[6] Letter to OLAD. See also, Reply to the Registry’s Submission [General Pavković’s Reply to Registry Submission Pursuant to Rule 33(B) Concerning General Pavković’s Motion for Stay of Proceedings Pending Action by the Registrar, 26 February 2010], paras 3-5.

[7] See Registry’s Submission substantiating the assignment procedure of Pavković’s Counsel, including the appeal proceedings and the fact he was expressly notified that “in the event [Pavković] (or the Prosecution) wished to file an appeal, the appeal phase would be preliminary ranked at level 1 complexity pending further information from Mr. Ackerman and consultation with the Appeals Chamber” (para. 7). Having represented Pavković for almost a year in these appeal proceedings on this basis and with an upgraded level of complexity, and accepted full payment for counsel and support staff hours, Pavković’s Counsel cannot plausibly argue that he has never been assigned to represent his client on appeal in full awareness of the remuneration schemes (paras 4-16; Annex I-IV). See also, Directive [Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, IT/73/Rev.11, 11 July 2006], Articles 16(B) and 16(C).

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Other instruments Code of Professional conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal.
Directive on the Assignment of Defence counsel (ICTY): Article 16; Article 24(C).
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Motion for Stay - 02.03.2010 ŠAINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-A)

12. […] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that

where the Directive expressly provides for a review of the Registrar’s decision, the Trial Chamber cannot interfere in the Registrar’s decision, and its only option is to stay the trial until that procedure has been completed. Where, however, the Directive does not expressly provide for a review of the Registrar’s decision, the Trial Chamber, pursuant to its statutory obligation to ensure the fairness of the trial, is competent to review the Registrar’s decision in the light of its effect upon the fairness of the trial.[1]

In the present case, as Pavković himself points out, no definitive decision has yet been rendered by the Registry on the merits of his request for additional hours.[2] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber can only intervene in the matter once a decision is rendered by the Registry and the review procedure in relation to such a decision under Article 31 of the Directive is completed, and if it is satisfied that the matter affects the fairness of the appeal proceedings.

[1] Ibid. (footnotes omitted).

[2] Motion [General Pavković’s Motion for Stay of Proceedings Pending Action by the Registrar, 19 February 2010], paras 8-9. The Appeals Chamber further notes the background provided in the Registry’s Submission [Registry Submission Pursuant to Rule 33 (B) Concerning General Pavković’s Motion for Stay of Proceedings Pending Action by the Registrar, 26 February 2010 (confidential)], including the fact that the first request for additional hours submitted by Pavković’s Counsel on 2 February 2010 was denied by the Registry on 10 February 2010 as it lacked sufficient detail and that his second request submitted on 17 February 2010 is currently under consideration (Registry’s Submission, paras 8-16, 21, 23; Annex VI).

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Other instruments Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel (ICTY): Article 31.
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Disclosure - 19.02.2010 KANYARUKIGA Gaspard
(ICTR-02-78-AR73)

16. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, in order to show that the Prosecution is in breach of its disclosure obligation pursuant to Rule 68(A) of the Rules, the Defence must identify specifically the materials sought, present a prima facie showing of their probable exculpatory nature, and prove the Prosecutor’s custody or control of the materials requested.[1] Thus, contrary to the Appellant’s submission,[2] his burden of proof could not be met by merely showing a prima facie case of custody or advancing a “presumption of possession”.

[1] See, e.g., Karemera Decision [The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.13, Decision on “Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal From Decision on Tenth Rule 68 Motion”, 14 May 2008], para. 9; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Decision on Motions for Access to Ex Parte Portions of the Record on Appeal and For Disclosure of Mitigating Material, 30 August 2006, para. 31; Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, 23 May 2005, para. 262.

[2] Appeal [Appeal of the 30 October 2009 Trial Chamber II[’s] ‘Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure and Return of Exculpatory Documents Seised from the Accused’, 27 November 2009], paras. 70, 73, 74; Reply [Reply to Respondent’s Response to Appeal of the 30 October 2009 Trial Chamber II[’s] ‘Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure and Return of Exculpatory Documents Seised from the Accused’, 7 December 2009], paras. 12, 13. Referring to paragraph 17 of the Response, the Appellant notes that the Prosecution acknowledges that custody and control need only be shown on a prima facie basis (see Reply, para. 12). It is nevertheless clear from paragraphs 16, 18, and 19 of the Response [Respondent’s Response to Appeal of the 30 October 2009 Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure and Return of Exculpatory Documents Seised from the Appellant’, 1 December 2009] that the Prosecution has made a technical error. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 68 ICTY Rule Rule 68
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on False Testimony - 16.02.2010 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR91.2)

19. With respect to the fact that the Amicus Report[1] did not establish when Witness BTH gave false testimony or which portions of his evidence were false, and the Trial Chamber’s finding that as a result any indictment would necessarily be insufficiently precise, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber applied the incorrect legal test. The legal test is whether there are “sufficient grounds to proceed against a person for giving false testimony”.[2] The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Šešelj case held that “the ‘sufficient grounds’ standard under Rule 77(D) of the ICTY Rules only requires the Trial Chamber to establish whether the evidence before it gives rise to a prima facie case of contempt of the Tribunal and not to make a final finding on whether contempt has been committed”.[3] While the Šešelj Decision concerned the initiation of contempt proceedings under Rule 77 of the ICTY Rules rather than proceedings for false testimony under Rule 91 of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber observes that the language in the two rules is identical with respect to the initiation of proceedings.[4] It therefore considers that since the “sufficient grounds” requirement, as prescribed in Rule 77 of the ICTY Rules, is satisfied where the evidence establishes a prima facie case, the “sufficient grounds” requirement of Rule 91(C) of the Rules is also satisfied by the existence of evidence which establishes a prima facie case. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in basing its decision upon the fact that the Amicus Report did not determine when Witness BTH gave false testimony or which portions of his evidence were false because this does not necessarily preclude the existence of a prima facie case of false testimony.

[1] [The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Final Report of Amicus Curiae of the Investigations into the False Testimony of Prosecution Witness BTH/GFA in The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al. and The Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., filed confidentially on 17 April 2009.]

[2] Rule 91(C) of the Rules [of Procedure and Evidence].

[3] Prosecutor v. Vojislav [ešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR77.2, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 10 June 2008, 25 July 2008 (“[ešelj Decision”), para. 16. See also Karemera et al. Decision on Refusal to Investigate a Witness for False Testimony, para. 17; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Order Concerning Allegations Against Milka Maglov, 15 April 2003, p. 3.

[4] Rule 77(D) of the ICTY and Tribunal Rules states: “If the Chamber considers that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against a person for contempt, the Chamber may: (i) in circumstances described in paragraph (C)(i), direct the Prosecutor to prosecute the matter; or (ii) in circumstances described in paragraph (C)(ii) or (iii), issue an order in lieu of an indictment and either direct amicus curiae to prosecute the matter or prosecute the matter itself.”

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Decision on False Testimony - 16.02.2010 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR91.2)

20. The Appeals Chamber further finds that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that ordering the prosecution of Witness BTH was premature because an assessment of his credibility will be undertaken when deliberating on the Karemera et al. case and that such prosecution would risk causing serious prejudice to the Karemera et al. proceedings. An assessment of a witness’s credibility is a separate inquiry from that of the prosecution of a witness for false testimony.[1] The Trial Chamber hearing the case in which the witness testified will assess the witness’s credibility in its consideration of the evidence adduced in that case.[2] Prosecution for false testimony is a separate trial conducted by a separate chamber of judges, who will consider evidence relating to the allegation of false testimony.[3] Therefore, proceedings for false testimony need not be deferred until the completion of the trial in which the false testimony was allegedly given but can proceed contemporaneously. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls the finding in Rutaganda that:

A credibility determination may be based, but does not necessarily depend, on a judicial finding that a witness has given false testimony. The testimony of a witness may lack credibility even if it does not amount to false testimony within the meaning of Rule 91. Thus, an investigation for false testimony is ancillary to the proceeding and does not impact on the accused’s right to a fair trial.[4]

[…]

[1] The Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Decision on Appeals of the Decisions by Trial Chamber I Rejecting the Defence Motions to Direct the Prosecutor to Investigate the Matter of False Testimony by Witnesses “E” and “CC”, 8 June 1998, (“Rutaganda Decision”), para. 28.

[2] See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, 28 February 2005, para. 659 (“The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber was entitled to exercise discretion in its assessment of evidence presented by all parties to the case, in accordance with the relevant Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Whether all of the Defence or Prosecution witnesses were credible was a matter for the Trial Chamber to decide.”)

[3] Rule 91(F) of the Rules stipulates that “[n]o Judge who sat as a member of the Trial Chamber before which the witness appeared shall sit for the trial of the witness for false testimony.”

[4] Rutaganda Decision, para. 28. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that contempt proceedings have, on a number of occasions, been instituted contemporaneously with the trial in which such contempt was alleged to have arisen. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Contempt Proceedings Against Kosta Bulatović, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.4, Decision on Contempt of the Tribunal, 13 May 2005; Contempt Proceedings Against Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-05-88-R77.1-A, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 25 June 2009 (arising from Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, proceedings which are ongoing).

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Decision on False Testimony - 16.02.2010 KAREMERA et al.
(ICTR-98-44-AR91.2)

25. The Appeals Chamber considers that, similarly to proceedings for false testimony pursuant to Rule 91 of the Rules, discussed above, investigations and proceedings pursuant to Rule 77 of the Rules are independent of the proceedings out of which they arise and can be undertaken contemporaneously with those proceedings.[1] As separate proceedings, they give rise neither to concerns regarding inconsistent findings, nor to concerns regarding the expeditiousness of the trial. […]

[1] See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Contempt Proceedings Against Kosta Bulatović, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.4, Decision on Contempt of the Tribunal, 13 May 2005; Contempt Proceedings Against Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-05-88-R77.1-A, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 25 June 2009 (arising from Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, proceedings which are ongoing). 

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Decision on Motion to Vacate Appointment of Counsel - 12.02.2010 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.6)

9. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Trial Chamber decisions reviewing administrative decisions relate to the general conduct of trial proceedings, and as such are matters that fall within the discretion of the Trial Chamber. In order to successfully challenge a discretionary decision, a party must demonstrate that the Trial Chamber has committed a “discernible error” resulting in prejudice to that party. The Appeals Chamber will only overturn a Trial Chamber’s discretionary decision where it is found to be: (i) based on an incorrect interpretation of governing law; (ii) based on a patently incorrect conclusion of fact; or (iii) so unfair or unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of the Trial Chamber’s discretion.

25. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Registrar’s Response questions “whether a judicial decision on review can be subject to appellate scrutiny”.[5] The Appeals Chamber underscores that in instances where this power of review has not been explicitly conferred on another organ of the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber has exercised its authority to hear appeals of reviews of administrative decisions rendered by the Registrar.[6] Thus, in the present instance, where there is no explicit conferral of review power to another organ of the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber has the authority to hear the Appeal.[7]

[1] See Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Adequate Facilities, 7 May 2009 (“Karadžić Facilities Decision”), para. 11, citing Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, 13 November 2003 (“Milutinović Decision”), paras 21, 24-26.

[2] See Karadžić Facilities Decision, para. 11. See also Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.4, Decision on Prosecution Appeal Concerning the Trial Chamber’s Ruling Reducing Time for the Prosecution Case, 6 February 2007 (“Prlić Decision”), para. 8; Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, 1 November 2004 (“Milošević Decision”), para. 9.

[3] Karadžić Facilities Decision, para. 11. See also Prlić Decision, para. 8.

[4] Id. See also Milošević Decision, para. 10.

[5] Registrar’s Submission Pursuant to Rule 33 (B) Regarding Radovan Karadžić’s Appeal from Decision on Motion to Vacate Appointment of Richard Harvey, 4 February 2010 (“Registrar’s Response”), para. 9.

[6] See, e.g., Karadžić Facilities Decision, para. 11; Milutinović Decision, paras 21, 24-26.

[7] The Appeals Chamber notes that a Trial Chamber does not have the power to review an administrative decision where that review function has been explicitly assigned to another organ of the Tribunal. See Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-AR73.4, Public and Redacted Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojević to Replace his Defence Team, 7 November 2003, para. 7. Additionally, the Appeals Chamber notes the Registrar’s assertion that many of Karadžić’s arguments on appeal merely repeat arguments that were unsuccessful before the Trial Chamber. Registrar’s Response, para. 13. The Registrar’s submission in this respect misapprehends the standard of review in the current appeal, which requires an appellant to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber based its conclusions either on an error of law or a patent error of fact, or was so unfair or unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See supra, para. 9. Karadžić’s submissions in his Appeal, while touching on many of the points made before the Trial Chamber, are appropriately tailored to a review of the Trial Chamber’s discretionary decision. 

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Decision on Motion to Vacate Appointment of Counsel - 12.02.2010 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.6)

26. The fundamental issue underlying the Appeal is the relation between Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute and the Trial Chamber’s appointment of standby counsel to Karadžić. Article 21(4) of the Statute reads, in relevant part:

In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

(d) […] to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing […]

By their ordinary meaning, the rights provided for in Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute “stand in binary opposition”.[1] Accordingly, Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute does not provide an accused with the minimum guarantee of both the right to self-represent and the right to counsel of his own choosing; only the right to one or the other. Karadžić has elected to remain self-represented[2] and thus does not enjoy any rights that are derived from choosing to be represented by legal counsel.[3]

27. Karadžić’s contention that he should be accorded the rights of those who choose to be represented by legal counsel because the Trial Chamber has signalled its intention to override his election to self-represent is unpersuasive. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal establishes that the right to self-represent is not absolute and may be subject to certain limitations.[4] A Trial Chamber may restrict the right to self-representation in appropriate circumstances where “a defendant’s self-representation is substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial”.[5] It is under this rubric of curtailing Karadžić’s right to self-representation that the Trial Chamber issued its Decision on Appointment of Counsel.[6] If the Trial Chamber ultimately decides to assign counsel to represent Karadžić’s interests at trial, it will not be because the Trial Chamber is recognizing a voluntary decision on behalf of Karadžić to cease his self-representation. Instead, it will be because the Trial Chamber has found that Karadžić’s persistent obstructive behaviour has made it necessary, in the interests of justice, to limit his right to self-representation by assigning counsel to represent his interests.

28. […] The text and structure of the Directive, Rules and Article 21 of the Statute confirm that the Directive does not apply to individuals who have chosen to self-represent. The Preamble of the Directive explicitly references Article 21 of the Statute, which encompasses the binary opposition of self-representation and appointment of counsel. In addition, the Directive’s text emphasizes that its focus is on the process of providing “legal assistance to indigent suspects or accused”. It also references Rule 45 of the Rules, which again focuses on the assignment of counsel to indigent suspects and accused. Self-represented individuals, whose ability to pay for counsel is by definition irrelevant, do not fall within its compass. By contrast, assignment of counsel to self-represented individuals is addressed by Rule 45ter of the Rules, which is not within the Directive’s scope.

29. Insofar as the Registrar took guidance from certain provisions of the Directive, his exercise of discretion did not render the Directive’s procedures binding on him with regard to the appointment of standby counsel for Karadžić.[12] As the Trial Chamber correctly noted, “there exists no specific set of guidelines to be followed by the Registrar” in relation to the appointment of counsel to represent the interests of an obstructive self-represented accused.[13] Considering related legal authorities in developing a procedure to select standby counsel, where such procedures were not outlined in any binding manner ex ante, was well within the Registrar’s discretion, and did not render those legal authorities binding.

[1] Krajišnik Decision [Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on Krajišnik Request and on Prosecution Motion, 11 September 2007], para. 40 (internal quotation omitted). See also Milošević Decision, para. 11. Cf. Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Scheduling Order for Appeals Hearing and Decision on Hassan Ngeze’s Motion of 24 January 2006, 16 November 2006, p. 3 (addressing Article 20(4)(d) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which tracks Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute).

[2] Karadžić was provided the opportunity to choose whether to represent himself or be represented by counsel and chose to represent himself. Status Conference, T. 43, 17 September 2008. Karadžić currently retains and is exercising his right to self-representation. See Decision on Appointment of Counsel [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Appointment of Counsel and Order on Further Trial Proceedings, 5 November 2009], para. 25.

[3] See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.6, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal by the Amici Curiae Against the Trial Chamber Order Concerning the Presentation and Preparation of the Defence Case, 20 January 2004, para. 19. Rights Karadžić does not enjoy include, inter alia, the right to communicate with counsel of one’s own choosing guaranteed under Article 21(4)(b) of the Statute.

[4] Prosecutor v. Vojislav [ešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 20 October 2006, para. 8, citing Miloševic Decision, paras 12-13.

[5] Milošević Decision, para. 13.

[6] Decision on Appointment of Counsel, paras 21, 25, 28.

[7] Directive [Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, IT/73/Rev. 11, 11 July 2006], p. 4. See also supra, para. 26.

[8] Directive, Article 1(A).

[9] Id.

[10] Rule 45ter of the Rules provides that: “The Trial Chamber may, if it decides that it is in the interests of justice, instruct the Registrar to assign a counsel to represent the interests of the accused”.

[11] Article 2 of the Directive defines “Counsel” as “a person representing or eligible to represent a suspect or accused pursuant to Rules 44, 45 and 45 bis of the Rules”. Further evidence that Karadžić’s situation does not fall under the purview of the Directive is found in the Decision on Appointment of Counsel. This decision to order the Registrar to appoint standby counsel was rendered not pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules and the Directive, but instead pursuant to Rule 54 of the Rules, which allows Trial Chambers to issue various orders related to the preparation and conduct of a trial. See Decision on Appointment of Counsel, para. 28.

[12] Cf. Krajišnik Decision, fn. 100, quoting Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel’s Motions in Relation to Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 2007, 11 May 2007, para. 18 (finding that although Krajišnik was not entitled as of right to amicus curiae counsel, such appointment was warranted under the circumstances).

[13] Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on the Accused’s Motion to Vacate Appointment of Richard Harvey, 23 December 2009 (“Impugned Decision”), para. 30. 

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ICTR Statute Article 19(1);
Article 20(4)(d)
ICTY Statute Article 20(1);
Article 21(4)(d)
ICTR Rule Rule 45;
Rule 45 ter
ICTY Rule Rule 45;
Rule 45 ter
Other instruments Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel (ICTY).
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Decision on Motion to Vacate Appointment of Counsel - 12.02.2010 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.6)

30. Karadžić places significant emphasis on the Šešelj Decision’s instruction that the Trial Chamber provide Šešelj with a list from which he could select his standby counsel, rather than impose one directly, as the Trial Chamber had chosen to do. […]

31. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Šešelj Decision was rendered in a unique factual and procedural context very different from Karadžić’s. […]

Taking into account the context of the Šešelj trial, the Decision concluded that the provision of opportunities to participate in the selection of standby counsel beyond those required by the Rules or Article 21(4) of the Statute was necessary in order to ensure the [ešelj trial’s fair and expeditious conduct under Article 20(1) of the Statute.[2] The Appeals Chamber reiterates that a Chamber’s context-limited decision to provide for processes beyond those guaranteed by the Statute and the Rules does not create an automatic right to these processes.[3]

32. […] In the [Šešelj] case, the Appeals Chamber was acting to ensure an orderly and careful restart of trial proceedings, after having previously found that the Trial Chamber violated Šešelj’s right to self-representation guaranteed under Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute by failing to warn him that his behaviour might result in the curtailment of that right.[4] By contrast, Karadžić has been warned on numerous occasions that his behaviour obstructs the expeditious conduct of the proceedings and that, should it continue, he risks curtailment of his right to self-representation.[5] Given the flexibility exhibited by the Registrar in the provision of standby counsel to Karadžić, the Appeals Chamber sees no basis for requiring that he be provided with greater opportunities to select personally between individuals available to serve as standby counsel.

35. The Appeals Chamber underscores that limitations on the right to self-representation are a rare occurrence, and that their details are necessarily context-specific. More particularly, the appointment of standby counsel is not subject to more formalized procedures designed to regularize the assignment of counsel to indigent suspects and accused who do not choose to self-represent. In assigning standby counsel, the Registrar or a Chamber may, but are not required to, make reference to procedures used in the assignment of counsel in other contexts. This more fluid and individualized approach to the appointment of standby counsel in cases of self-representation is amply justified by the fact that the reasons for and specific parameters of each appointment will vary considerably.

[1] Šešelj Decision [Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 8 December 2006], para. 3.

[2] Id., para. 27.

[3] Cf. supra, fn. [19].

[4] Prosecutor v. Vojislav [ešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 8 December 2006 (“[ešelj Decision”), paras 26, 29-30.

[5] See supra, para. 5.

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ICTY Statute Article 20(1);
Article 21(4)(d)
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Decision on Additional Evidence - 12.02.2010 ŠAINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-A)

21. […] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the party seeking the admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules bears the burden of demonstrating how it exercised due diligence.[1] The Appeals Chamber finds that the simple assertion that he lacked sufficient time between the Trial Chamber’s order for the witness to testify and his appearance in court is per se insufficient to meet this burden.

23. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber considers that, in the particular circumstances of this case, it is conceivable that these documents remained undiscovered at trial despite the exercise of required due diligence. […] Consequently and for reasons of fairness, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the abovementioned documents were unavailable to Pavković for the purposes of Rule 115 of the Rules.

[1] See Krajišnik Rule 115 Decision of 20 August 2008, para. 23.

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Decision on Additional Evidence - 12.02.2010 ŠAINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-A)

28. The Appeals Chamber recalls that evidence is credible if it appears to be reasonably capable of belief or reliance.[1] […] As to the two remaining documents, 4DA2 and 4DA27, both bear sufficient indicia of credibility, such as stamps or signatures or both, and the Appeals Chamber finds them also to be prima facie credible in the sense of Rule 115(B) of the Rules.

[1] Milošević Rule 115 Decision, para. 8; Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on Appellant Momčilo Krajišnik’s Motion to Call Radovan Karadžić pursuant to Rule 115, 16 October 2008 (“Krajišnik Rule 115 Decision of 16 October 2008”), para. 5; Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-AR65.1, Decision on Prosecution’s Application to Present Additional Evidence in Its Appeal Against the Re-Assessment Decision, 10 March 2006 (confidential), para. 16; Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 23 October 2001, para. 63. 

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Decision on Provisional Release - 11.02.2010 PRLIĆ et al.
(IT-04-74-AR65.19)

14. The Appeals Chamber recalls that in the context of an application for provisional release on medical grounds, the availability of medical care in The Netherlands is a relevant factor in establishing whether sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds exist for the release.[1] At issue is not simply the availability of treatment, but of appropriate treatment.[2] In the present circumstances, the Trial Chamber did not incorrectly interpret governing law when it considered a variety of factors in order to determine the most appropriate treatment; namely, the availability of testing in The Netherlands as well as the opinion of two doctors from the UNDU. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Medical Officer of the UNDU opined that [REDACTED].[3] In light of this opinion, it was well within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to determine that the most appropriate treatment was available in Zagreb.

[1] See Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR65.8, Decision on Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Gvero’s Motion for Provisional Release, 20 July 2009 (“Popović 20 July Decision”), para. 11.

[2] Stanišić Appeal Decision [Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-AR65.4, Decision on Prosecution Appeal of Decision on Provisional Release and Motions to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, 26 June 2008 (confidential)], para. 68; Popović 20 July Decision, para. 13.

[3] Medical Report [Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Registry Submission Pursuant to Rule 33 (B) Concerning Medical Report, filed confidentially on 12 November 2009], items 4 and 5.

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Decision on Additional Evidence - 26.01.2010 ŠAINOVIĆ et al.
(IT-05-87-A)

13. The Appeals Chamber first notes that with respect to the standard for admission of evidence on appeal, Lazarević submits that two prerequisites must be met: (i) the material must have been unavailable at trial and (ii) its consideration by the Appeals Chamber must be in the interests of justice.[1] Had the material been available at trial, Lazarević argues that the Appeals Chamber retains the inherent power to consider it, if a failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.[2] The Appeals Chamber finds that Lazarević misapprehends the standard for admission of additional evidence on appeal, as the “interests of justice” test reflects neither the current requirements of Rule 115(B) of the Rules nor the established jurisprudence of the Tribunal.[3] The Appeals Chamber will therefore examine Lazarević’s submissions in accordance with the correct standard articulated above.[4]

[1] Motion [General Vladimir Lazarević’s Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115 with Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F”, 16 November 2009], paras 5, 8, 15.

[2] Ibid., para. 7.

[3] The jurisprudence relied upon by Lazarević refers to Rule 115 (B) prior to its amendment in July 2002 (Motion, paras 5, 8, referring to Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Admission of Additional Evidence Following Hearing of 30 March 2001 (confidential), 11 April 2001, para 6; Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 23 October 2001, paras 75-76). Prior to its amendment, Rule 115 (B) provided the following with respect to the admissibility of evidence that was unavailable at trial: “The Appeals Chamber shall authorize the presentation of such evidence if it considers that the interests of justice so require”. Following the amendment in 2002, the provision reads: “If the Appeals Chamber finds that the additional evidence was not available at trial and is relevant and credible, it will determine if it could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision at trial”. Therefore, the “interests of justice” is no longer the applicable standard for admissibility of additional evidence on appeal (cf. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Decision on the Fourth Defence Motion to Present Additional Evidence Before the Appeals Chamber (confidential), 29 August 2005, para. 19).

[4] See supra, paras 5-12.

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(IT-05-87-A)

26. […] [A] tactical decision not to seek the admission of certain evidence due to the expectation that evidence of greater probative value might become available later in the proceedings does not render the first evidence unavailable at trial in terms of its assessment for the purposes of admission under Rule 115 of the Rules.[1] […]

[1] See also supra, para. 7.

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Decision on Chambers Consultant or Legal Officer - 17.12.2009 BIZIMUNGU et al. (Government II)
(ICTR-99-50-AR73.8)

8. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber reasoned that Rule 15 of the Rules “applies expressly to [J]udges and does not contemplate the disqualification of [C]hamber’s legal officers or consultants”.[1] The Trial Chamber further considered that the disqualification of Chambers’ legal officers or consultants finds no support in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal.[2] In reaching this conclusion, the Trial Chamber also referred to a report from a Panel of the ICTY which had been appointed to provide an opinion on disqualification of Judges and legal staff in connection with a contempt case before the ICTY.[3] The Trial Chamber noted that in the Hartmann Report, the ICTY Panel stated that a plain reading of Rule 15 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which is similar to Rule 15 of the Rules, shows that it applies solely to Judges and does not extend to Chambers’ staff, and that the conduct of legal officers is not relevant to determining a Judge’s impartiality.[4] The Trial Chamber concluded that it did “not consider that Rule 15 [of the Rules] may be extended to apply to Chambers legal officers or legal consultants”.[5] The Appeals Chamber considers that it was open to the Trial Chamber to rely on the ICTY Panel’s reasoning on this issue and, accordingly, finds no discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning in this respect.

9. The Appeals Chamber further notes that the submissions of Mr. Bicamumpaka and Mr. Mugiraneza are premised on the erroneous notion that legal officers or consultants play a central role in the Judges’ deliberations. Judicial decision-making is the sole purview of the Judges and legal officers and consultants play no role in it. Rather, they merely provide assistance to the Judges in legal research and preparing draft decisions, judgements, opinions, and orders in conformity with the instructions given to them by the Judges.[6] Accordingly, there is no merit in Mr. Bicamumpaka’s and Mr. Mugiraneza’s assertions that legal officers and consultants must be subject to the same standards of impartiality as the Judges of the Tribunal.

10. The Appeals Chamber recalls that in the Furundžija case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that there is a “presumption of impartiality” which attaches to a Judge,[7] and that “… in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the Judges of the International Tribunal ’can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions’”.[8] Thus, “[t]here is a high threshold to reach in order to rebut the presumption of impartiality”.[9] The Appeals Chamber considers that it follows from this presumption that mere assertions to the effect that a staff member may influence a Judge during deliberations or the adjudication process are not a sufficient basis, in and of themselves, to warrant disqualification of a legal officer or consultant.

11. The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded that the Trial Chamber committed a discernible error and thereby abused its discretion in finding that Rule 15(A) of the Rules does not apply to legal officers and consultants. […] In some cases, a prospective staff member’s statements or activities may be so problematic as to either impugn the perceived impartiality of the Judges or the appearance thereof, or, even if this were not the case, the Tribunal’s fundamental guarantees of fair trial. However, the present case falls far short of such a situation. […]

 

[1] First Impugned Decision [Decision on the Objections of the Mugiraneza and Bicamumpaka Defence Teams to the Engagement of Mr. Everard O’Donnell as a Chambers Consultant, 28 August 2009], para. 13.

[2] First Impugned Decision, para. 13.

[3] In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Report of Decision on Defence Motion for Disqualification of Two Members of the Trial Chamber and of Senior Legal Officer, Public Redacted Version, (“Hartmann Report”), 27 March 2009.

[4] First Impugned Decision, para. 12, citing Hartmann Report, para. 25. The Appeals Chamber notes that the correct citation is Hartmann Report, para. 54. See contra Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/08-07-2009-ECCC-PTC, Decision on the Charged Person’s Application for Disqualification of Drs. Stephen Heder and David Boyle, 22 September 2009, para. 15 (wherein the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia relied on paragraph 54 of the Hartmann Report to find that “decisions of international tribunals related to court officers indicate that their lack of impartiality may bring cause for the disqualification of the judge with whom they are associated, not of the officer him or herself. Disqualification of a judge in these circumstances may be possible when the ‘objective test for bias’ is met by the applicant” (emphasis added).

[5] First Impugned Decision, para. 14.

[6] See, e.g., Articles 8(3)(B) and 51(3) of the Directive for the Registry of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Judicial and Legal Services Division Court Management Section, 14 March 2008 (“Directive for the Registry”).

[7] Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, 21 July 2000, para. 196 (“Furundžija Appeal Judgement”).

[8] Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 197.

[9] Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 197.

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Decision on Reconsideration - 07.12.2009 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

4. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that requests for reconsideration “are the product of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, and are permissible only under certain conditions”.[1] In particular, such a request by definition has to be made before the same Chamber that rendered the impugned decision […].

[1] Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Reconsideration, 23 July 2009 (“Karadžić Decision”), para. 7.

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Appeal Judgement - 16.11.2009 ZIGIRANYIRAZO Protais
(ICTR-01-73-A)

17. An alibi does not constitute a defence in its proper sense.[1] By raising an alibi, an accused is simply denying that he was in a position to commit the crime with which he was charged.[2] An accused does not bear the burden of proving his alibi beyond reasonable doubt.[3] Rather, “[h]e must simply produce the evidence tending to show that he was not present at the time of the alleged crime”[4] or, otherwise stated, present evidence “likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution case.”[5] If the alibi is reasonably possibly true, it must be accepted.[6]

18. Where an alibi is properly raised, the Prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true.[7] The Prosecution may do so, for instance, by demonstrating that the alibi does not in fact reasonably account for the period when the accused is alleged to have committed the crime. Where the alibi evidence does prima facie account for the accused’s activities at the relevant time of the commission of the crime, the Prosecution must “eliminate the reasonable possibility that the alibi is true,”[8] for example, by demonstrating that the alibi evidence is not credible.

19. The Appeals Chamber has considered on several occasions whether Trial Chambers have erroneously shifted the burden of proof to the accused with respect to their alibis. Appellants have frequently pointed to language in the assessment of alibi evidence intimating that they were required to disprove the Prosecution’s evidence through their alibis. The Appeals Chamber has recognized that language which suggests, inter alia, that an accused must “negate” the Prosecution’s evidence,[9] “exonerate” himself,[10] or “refute the possibility” that he participated in a crime[11] indicates that the Trial Chamber misapplied the burden of proof. Indeed, as stated in the Musema Appeal Judgement, “[i]n considering the manner in which the Trial Chamber applied the burden and standard of proof, the Appeals Chamber must start off by assuming that the words used in the Trial Judgement accurately describe the approach adopted by the Trial Chamber.”[12]

20. In assessing whether a Trial Chamber, when using this type of language, has in fact shifted the burden of proof, the Appeals Chamber carries out an in-depth analysis of the specific findings related to a given incident.[13] The Appeals Chamber has generally found that such language, while inappropriate, is not fatal when viewed in the broader context of a Trial Chamber’s findings. This is especially the case where the Trial Chamber accurately refers elsewhere in the judgement to the appropriate burden of proof for the evaluation of alibi evidence, its overall approach evinces a careful assessment of the alibi evidence, and its conclusion that the alibi evidence is ultimately not credible is reasonable when weighed against the evidence of participation in a crime.[14]

38. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber correctly stated that the Prosecution bears the burden of establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt[15] and that it would consider each piece of evidence in light of the totality of the evidence admitted at trial.[16] […]

39. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Zigiranyirazo’s alibi involves three serious errors that, taken together, invalidate his convictions based on the events at Kesho Hill. Specifically, the Trial Chamber erred by misapprehending the burden of proof in the context of alibi, failing to consider or provide a reasoned opinion with respect to relevant circumstantial evidence, and misconstruing key evidence which, properly considered, bolstered Zigiranyirazo’s alibi.

42. The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that a successful alibi does not require conclusive proof of an accused’s whereabouts.[17] Indeed, there is no requirement that an alibi “exclude the possibility” that the accused committed a crime.[18] The alibi need only raise reasonable doubt that the accused was in a position to commit the crime.[19]

[1] Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 66; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, paras. 41, 42; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106; Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 581.

[2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 66; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, paras. 41, 42; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 205, 206; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106; Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 581.

[3] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 184; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 331; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 107.

[4] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202.

[5] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 331 (internal citation omitted); Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 184 (internal citation omitted); Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 42 (internal citation omitted); Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60.

[6] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 38; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 41; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 205, 206.

[7] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 330; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 184; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 42; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 205, 206; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 107. See also Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 64, quoting Limaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 11 (“[A] finding that an alibi is false does not in itself ‘establish the opposite to what it asserts’. The Prosecution must not only rebut the validity of the alibi but also establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the Accused as alleged in the Indictment.”).

[8] Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 41 (internal citation omitted); Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106 (internal citation omitted). See also Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 64, 65 (internal citation omitted); Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 581.

[9] See Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 65 (“When evaluating Haradin Bala’s alibi evidence, the Trial Chamber observed that ‘the testimony of most of the witnesses for the Defence for Haradin Bala does not necessarily negate the evidence that Haradin Bala remained in Llapushnik/Lapušnik after the end of May.’ The use of the phrase ‘to negate the evidence’ could be read in the sense that the Trial Chamber required Haradin Bala to negate the Prosecution evidence”), quoting Limaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 647.

[10] See Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 39 (“the Appeals Chamber notes that in some instances the Trial Chamber applied language which prima facie supports the Appellant’s arguments [that the Trial Chamber shifted the burden of proof], for example in paragraph 174 of the [Kamuhanda] Trial Judgement: ‘[…] the evidence of Witness ALB does not exonerate the Accused from being present at Gikomero.’”) (emphasis in original).

[11] See Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 295 (“The wording ‘are by themselves, insufficient to refute the possibility’ used by the Trial Chamber with respect to alibi evidence might be an error on a point of law, had Musema’s evidence been sufficient to sustain a potential alibi.”)(emphasis in original), quoting Musema Trial Judgement, para. 740.

[12] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 209.

[13] See, e.g., Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 210, 211.

[14] See, e.g., Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, paras. 38-44; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 317, 318.

[15] Trial Judgement, para. 89 (“Pursuant to Article 20(3) of the Statute, an accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This presumption places on the Prosecution the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, a burden which remains on the Prosecution throughout the entire trial. A finding of guilt may be reached only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is satisfied that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.”) (internal citation omitted).

[16] Trial Judgement, paras. 87, 88.

[17] See Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 185 (“The Appeals Chamber is further satisfied that the Trial Chamber correctly applied [the legal standard on alibi evidence] in its subsequent findings on alibi. The Trial Chamber first found that, although the alibi evidence for the period of 6-13 April 1994 ‘[did] not account for every moment of [the Appellant’s time]], viewed as a whole and when weighed against the Prosecution evidence, it [provided]] a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for [the Appellant’s]] activities [for this period]].’ The Appeals Chamber notes that this wording reflects that in assessing the alibi evidence for this period the Trial Chamber did not require the Defence to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.”), quoting Simba Trial Judgement, para. 349. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 428-431, 473, 474 (reversing a Trial Chamber finding that an alibi based on hearsay had not been established).

[18] See supra Section III.A.1 (Burden of Proof in the Assessment of Alibi). See also Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 18 (“An accused does not need to prove at trial that a crime ‘could not have occurred’ or ‘preclude the possibility that it could occur’.”).

[19] See supra Section III.A.1 (Burden of Proof in the Assessment of Alibi).

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