Destruction of property

Notion(s)	Filing	Case
Persecution \| Destruction of property	Appeal Judgement - 08.10.2008	MARTIĆ Milan (IT-95-11-A)
Martić contested the purpose of the attack on the village of Kijevo. In response to Martić’s submission that the destruction of a church was due to its being used as a bell-tower for machine guns, the Appeals Chamber considered the legitimacy of attacking a church: 98. The […] Trial Chamber [relied] upon the evidence that the church was attacked as part of a pattern of persecutions against the non-Serb population of Kijevo. In relying upon the evidence for this purpose, the Trial Chamber did not consider whether the church was a legitimate military target[1] and disregarded the evidence that it might have been a legitimate military objective. The Appeals Chamber finds that in so doing, the Trial Chamber erred as this evidence was “clearly relevant to the findings” in question.[2] However, as the Appeals Chamber considers that the destruction of the church was not a decisive factor in the overall findings of the Trial Chamber on persecution, which included findings of torching of civilian buildings, looting and the effect of the ultimatum on the civilian population of Kijevo and other villages, the error of the Trial Chamber is not such as to warrant the interference of the Appeals Chamber.[3] show footnotes [1] Trial Judgement, para. 169; see also Trial Judgement, para. 426. [2] See Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 86, referring to Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23. [3] See, in general, Trial Judgement, paras 166-169, 426-430 and 432. Download full document		ICTR Statute Article 3(h) ICTY Statute Article 5(h)
Notion(s)	Filing	Case
Persecution \| Destruction of property	Appeal Judgement - 29.07.2004	BLAŠKIĆ Tihomir (IT-95-14-A)
148. The prohibition against pillage may therefore be considered to be part of customary international law. In addition, it may be noted that the Nuremberg Charter[1] and Control Council Law No. 10[2] prohibited the war crime of “plunder of public and private property,” and the crime of pillage was the subject of criminal proceedings before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and other trials following the Second World War, where in certain cases, it was charged both as a war crime and a crime against humanity.[3] There may be some doubt, however, as to whether acts of plunder, in and of themselves, may rise to the level of gravity required for crimes against humanity.[4] 149. The Appeals Chamber finds that the destruction of property, depending on the nature and extent of the destruction, may constitute a crime of persecutions of equal gravity to other crimes listed in Article 5 of the Statute. show footnotes [1] Article 6(b) (Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement)), London, 8 Aug. 1945, 85 U.N.T.S. 251. [2] Law No. 10 of the Control Council of Germany, Art. 2(1)(b) (Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, p. 22, Military Government Gazette, Germany, British Zone of Control, No. 5, p. 46, Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef Francais en Allemagne, No. 12 of 11 Jan. 1946). [3] See The Pohl Case, Vol. V TWC, p. 958 ff; The IG Farben Case, Vol. VIII TWC, p. 1081 ff; The Krupp Case, Vol. IX TWC, p. 1327 ff; The Flick Case, Vol. VI TWC, p. 1187 ff. [4] In The Flick Case, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal found that the compulsory taking of industrial property did not constitute crimes against humanity. The Tribunal stated: The “atrocities and offenses” listed [in Law No. 10] “murder, extermination,” etc., are all offenses against the person. Property is not mentioned. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis the catch-all words “other persecutions” must be deemed to include only such as affect the life and liberty of the oppressed peoples. Compulsory taking of industrial property, however reprehensible, is not in that category. The Flick Case, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 6, p. 1215. In the Eichmann case, the Israeli District Court held that the plunder of property could only be considered to constitute a crime against humanity if it was committed “by pressure of mass terror against a civilian population, or if it [was] linked to any of the other acts of violence defined by the [Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, 5710/1950] as a crime against humanity or as a result of any of those acts, i.e. murder, extermination, starvation, or deportation of any civilian population, so that the plunder is only part of a general process…” The Individual in International Law, in International Law Reports, E. Lauterpacht, ed., vol. 36, London (1968), p. 241. However, the Rome Statute is expansive in its definition of crimes which may fall under persecution; Art. 7(1)(h)(4) states that “The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” Pillaging constitutes a war crime under Art. 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute. The Appeals Chamber is aware, however, that the Rome Statute entered into force after the crimes at issue in this case took place. Download full document		ICTR Statute Article 3(h) ICTY Statute Article 5(h)
Notion(s)	Filing	Case
Crimes against humanity \| Persecution \| Destruction of property	Appeal Judgement - 17.12.2004	KORDIĆ & ČERKEZ (IT-95-14/2-A)
108. The Appeals Chamber finds that the destruction of property, depending on the nature and extent of the destruction, may constitute a crime of persecutions of equal gravity to other crimes listed in Article 5 of the Statute.[1] show footnotes [1] See Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 149. Download full document		ICTR Statute Article 3(h) ICTY Statute Article 5(h)
Notion(s)	Filing	Case
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions \| Destruction of property \| Plunder of public or private property \| Occupied territory \| Occupation	Judgement (volume I) - 29.11.2017	PRLIĆ et al. (IT-04-74)
303. With respect to the grave breaches of extensive destruction and appropriation of property, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber held that Article 2(d) of the Statute offers protection to certain property, e.g., civilian hospitals and medical convoys, from acts of destruction wherever such property is located.[1] The Trial Chamber further held that protection is also afforded to real or personal, public or private property, if situated on occupied territory.[2] Because there were allegations of grave breaches of extensive destruction and appropriation of real or personal, public or private property in the Indictment,[3] the Appeals Chamber finds that it was necessary for the Trial Chamber to inquire into whether there was a state of occupation in the municipalities at times when such alleged grave breaches of extensive destruction and appropriation occurred. show footnotes [1] See Trial Judgement, Vol. 1, paras 106, 108, 122 referring to, inter alia, Geneva Convention IV, Arts 18, 21-22. See also Geneva Convention IV, Art. 147; Commentary on Geneva Convention IV, pp. 301, 601. [2] See Trial Judgement, Vol. 1, paras 106-107, 122 referring to, inter alia, Geneva Convention IV, Art. 53. See also Geneva Convention IV, Art. 147; Commentary on Geneva Convention IV, pp. 301, 601. [3] See Indictment, paras 15-17.6, 39, 46, 48, 51,53, 57, 66-68, 82-85, 99-100, 107-108, 116, 159, 162, 164-166, 175, 177, 179-180, 182, 209, 211, 213. Download full document		ICTY Statute Article 2(d)