Prosecution’s appeal against acquittal

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ
(IT-02-60-A)

9. […] Where the Prosecution is appealing, the Appeals Chamber will reverse only if it finds that no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to make the particular finding of fact beyond reasonable doubt and the acquittal relied on the absence of this finding.[1] […]

[1] See Brđanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 12-14.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI
(IT-04-82-A)

272. The Appeals Chamber recalls that when the Prosecution appeals against an acquittal it must show that, when account is taken of the errors of fact committed by the Trial Chamber, all reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt has been eliminated. 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 27.09.2007 LIMAJ et al.
(IT-03-66-A)

13. The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Rutaganda and Bagilishema held that the same standard of reasonableness and the same deference to factual findings of the Trial Chamber apply when the Prosecution appeals against an acquittal. The Appeals Chamber will only hold that an error of fact was committed when it determines that no reasonable trier of fact could have made the impugned finding.[1] Under Article 25(1)(b) of the Statute, the Prosecution, like the accused, must demonstrate “an error of fact that occasioned a miscarriage of justice”. For the error to be one that occasioned a miscarriage of justice, it must have been “critical to the verdict reached”.[2] Considering that it is the Prosecution that bears the burden at trial of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the significance of an error of fact occasioning a miscarriage of justice is somewhat different for a Prosecution appeal against acquittal than for a defence appeal against conviction. An accused must show that the Trial Chamber’s factual errors create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The Prosecution must show that, when account is taken of the errors of fact committed by the Trial Chamber, all reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt has been eliminated.[3]

[1] Blagovević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 9.

[2] Kupreškić Appeal Judgement, para. 29.

[3] Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 24; Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, paras 13-14. See also Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 9; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 14.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 24(1)(b) ICTY Statute Article 25(1)(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.10.2007 HALILOVIĆ Sefer
(IT-01-48-A)

11. The same standard of reasonableness and the same deference to factual findings of the Trial Chamber apply when the Prosecution appeals against an acquittal. Thus, when considering an appeal by the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber will only hold that an error of fact was committed when it determines that no reasonable trier of fact could have made the impugned finding.[1] However, since the Prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused at trial, the significance of an error of fact occasioning a miscarriage of justice takes on a specific character when alleged by the Prosecution.[2] In this context, the Appeals Chamber has endorsed the following holding by the ICTR Appeals Chamber:

[b]ecause the Prosecution bears the burden at trial of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the significance of an error of fact occasioning a miscarriage of justice is somewhat different for a Prosecution appeal against acquittal than for a defence appeal against conviction. An accused must show that the Trial Chamber’s factual errors create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The Prosecution faces a more difficult task. It must show that, when account is taken of the errors of fact committed by the Trial Chamber, all reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt has been eliminated.[3]

16. The Appeals Chamber notes that Halilović does not identify any authority for his assertion that the Prosecution’s right to appeal against acquittals should be exercised only exceptionally, nor does he provide support for his claim that such an appeal would have to reach a higher threshold of “diligence” to be exercised by the appellant in such a case.[4] Similarly, Halilović fails to specify on what ground he bases his assertion that an appeal against acquittal by the Prosecution would have, as a pre-condition, to serve the “purposes for which th[e] [International] Tribunal has been created”,[5] in a manner different from all other appeals against judgements rendered by the International Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber also stresses that it is not its task, as suggested by Halilović, to ascertain whether the Prosecutor has fulfilled her responsibilities in accordance with the Completion Strategy laid out in Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003).[6] The Appeals Chamber further considers that Halilović has failed to point to any element suggesting that the Prosecution abused its discretion in appealing his acquittal. It should also be recalled that the Appeals Chamber has already dismissed Halilović’s request to dismiss the appeal without hearing the parties’ arguments.[7] Thus, Halilović’s request for summary dismissal of the entire appeal is denied.

[1] Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 9; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 14; Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, para. 13.

[2] Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 14.

[3] Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, para. 14, cited with approval in Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 13.

[4] In this context, the Appeals Chamber recalls (see supra, para. 11) that the Prosecution’s task in the case of appealing an acquittal is “more difficult”, in as much as it has “to show that, when account is taken of the errors of fact committed by the Trial Chamber, all reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt has been eliminated” (Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, para. 14).

[5] Respondent’s Brief, para. 6.

[6] See, in particular, Security Council Resolution 1503, S/RES/1503 (2003), adopted on 28 August 2003, para. 6, as well as Security Council Resolution 1534, S/RES/1534 (2004), adopted on 26 March 2004, paras 4 and 6, requesting the Prosecutor to review the case load of the International Tribunal and to explain, in its progress reports submitted to the Security Council every six months, “what measures have been taken to implement the Completion Strategy and what measures remain to be taken”.

[7] See Decision on Defence Motion for Prompt Scheduling of Appeals Hearing, 27 October 2006, paras 8-9, where the Appeals Chamber found that, since the Prosecution opposed the request for summary disposition of the appeal, the question of whether or not it was open to the parties to waive their entitlement to an oral hearing did not arise.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2002 BAGILISHEMA Ignace
(ICTR-95-IA-A)

9. With regard to allegations of errors on a question of law, the Appeals Chamber considers that the standards of review are the same for the two types of appeal: following the example of a party appealing against conviction, an appeal by the Prosecution against acquittal, which alleges that the Trial Chamber committed an error on a question of law, must establish that the error invalidates the decision.

10. With regard to errors of fact in appeals against conviction, the Appeals Chamber applies the standard of the “unreasonableness” of the impugned finding. The Appeals Chamber must determine whether the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is one which no reasonable tribunal of fact could have reached, it being understood that the Appeals Chamber can only overturn a decision of the Trial Chamber where the alleged error of fact occasioned a miscarriage of justice. An appellant who alleges an error of fact must therefore show both the error that was committed and the miscarriage of justice resulting therefrom.[1]

[…]

13. The same standard of unreasonableness and the same deference to factual findings of the Trial Chamber apply when the Prosecution appeals against an acquittal. Thus, when considering an appeal by the Prosecution, as when considering an appeal by the accused, the Appeals Chamber will only hold that an error of fact was committed when it determines that no reasonable trier of fact could have made the challenged finding.

14. Under Article 24(1)(b) of the Statute, the Prosecution, like the accused, must demonstrate “an error of fact that occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” For the error to be one that occasioned a miscarriage of justice, it must have been “critical to the verdict reached.”[2] Because the Prosecution bears the burden at trial of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the significance of an error of fact occasioning a miscarriage of justice is somewhat different for a Prosecution appeal against acquittal than for a defence appeal against conviction. An accused must show that the Trial Chamber’s factual errors create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The Prosecution faces a more difficult task. It must show that, when account is taken of the errors of fact committed by the Trial Chamber, all reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt has been eliminated.

See also paras. 8, 11-12.

[1] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 17; Akayesu Appeal Judgement, para. 178.

[2] Kupreškić Appeal Judgement, para. 29.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 24(1)(b) ICTY Statute Article 25(1)(b)