153. The Appellants argue that the intention of the perpetrator was of a sexual nature, which, in their view, is inconsistent with an intent to commit the crime of torture.[1]  In this respect, the Appeals Chamber wishes to assert the important distinction between “intent” and “motivation”.  The Appeals Chamber holds that, even if the perpetrator’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering is a likely and logical consequence of his conduct. In view of the definition, it is important to establish whether a perpetrator intended to act in a way which, in the normal course of events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, to his victims. […]

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155. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber restates the conclusions of the Trial Chamber[2] that acts need not have been perpetrated solely for one of the purposes prohibited by international law.  If one prohibited purpose is fulfilled by the conduct, the fact that such conduct was also intended to achieve a non-listed purpose (even one of a sexual nature) is immaterial.