At paras 11-14, the Appeals Chamber recalls that such exceptional circumstances, assessed case by case, might be constituted by a breakdown of trust, but not by an accused’s refusal to cooperate and, in the present case, by the alleged conflict between the Appellant and his Co-Counsel on issues of legal strategy.  

11. Under Article 19(A)(ii) of the Directive the Registrar may, in exceptional circumstances and at the request of lead counsel, withdraw the assignment of co-counsel.[1] The burden of proof of existence of such circumstances squarely lies on lead counsel.[2] The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that each case must be considered on its own and that what constitutes exceptional circumstances justifying a request for withdrawal may vary from one case to another. In addition, exceptional circumstances justifying withdrawal of a co-counsel might be substantially different from those applicable to withdrawal of a lead counsel.

12. The Appeals Chamber considers that the alleged conflict between the Appellant and his Co-Counsel on issues of legal strategy does not constitute an exceptional circumstance justifying a withdrawal of Co-Counsel. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in most decisions holding that a breakdown of trust between the accused and his legal representatives constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying the withdrawal of assignment, the breach of trust was attributable to one or more of the following circumstances: alleged incompetence or lack of knowledge of the Rwandan context and history; a lack of initiative in the defence of the accused; an exceptional workload incompatible with other professional commitments; a breach of professional responsibilities, including the obligation to communicate with the client; and misconduct or manifest negligence.[3] No allegations of this kind were made against Co-Counsel in the present case. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Registrar’s Decision and the President’s Decision contradict the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.

13. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, according to the jurisprudence of both the Tribunal and the ICTY, an accused’s refusal to cooperate with his lawyers does not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting the Registrar’s withdrawal of assigned counsel.[4] More precisely, an accused does not have the right to unilaterally destroy the trust between himself and his counsel, or to claim a breakdown in communication through unilateral actions, in the hope that such actions will result in the withdrawal of his counsel by the Registrar.[5] A lack of trust in counsel based on disagreements in approach to one’s defence strategy is distinguishable from a lack of trust due to a breach by counsel in fulfilling his professional and ethical responsibilities in the course of representation.[6] Thus, a divergence of opinion as to the defence strategy cannot in itself justify that there is a loss of trust in the counsel’s abilities or commitment to the case. It is even more so when the divergence is between an appellant and a co-counsel, whose mandate is to assist the lead counsel.[7]

14. In the present case, Lead Counsel did not provide the Registrar with any specific complaints regarding the performance of Co-Counsel that may have warranted her disqualification on the grounds of ineffective assistance or breach of professional duties. The Appeals Chamber rejects the Appellant’s argument that it is sufficient “to state in broad terms” that the trust and confidence have broken down[8] and, consequently, finds that it was open to the Registrar and the President to conclude that the Appellant’s request for withdrawal was not justified.[9]

Pages 2-3:

RECALLING that, pursuant to paragraphs 6(a) and 7 of the Practice Direction on Lengths of Briefs and Motions, an appellant’s and a respondent’s briefs in an appeal from a trial judgment should not exceed 30,000 words where the appeal is not restricted to sentencing issues;[1]

RECALLING that, pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Practice Direction, a party must seek advance authorization to exceed the word limits set out in the Practice Direction, and must provide an explanation of the exceptional circumstances that necessitate the oversized filing;

RECALLING FURTHER that, pursuant to the same paragraph of the Practice Direction, a judge may dispose of a motion for an extension of a word limit without hearing the other party unless it is considered that there is a risk that the other party may be prejudiced;

EMPHASIZING that the quality and effectiveness of an appeal brief do not depend on its length, but on the clarity and cogency of the arguments presented and that, therefore, excessively long briefs do not necessarily facilitate the efficient administration of justice;[2]