10. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is well established that in undertaking a first judicial review of an administrative decision, the Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber or President, as the case may be, must apply the standard set out in the Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision.[1] The Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision first considered the nature of a judicial review of an administrative decision:

A judicial review of such an administrative decision is not a rehearing. Nor is it an appeal, or in any way similar to the review which a Chamber may undertake of its own judgment in accordance with Rule 119 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. A judicial review of an administrative decision made by the Registrar in relation to legal aid is concerned initially with the propriety of the procedure by which [the] Registrar reached the particular decision and the manner in which he reached it.[2]

With this approach in mind, the Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision then set out that an administrative decision by the Registrar will be quashed if the decision-maker:

(a) failed to comply with the legal requirements of the Directive, or

(b) failed to observe any basic rules of natural justice or to act with procedural fairness towards the person affected by the decision, or

(c) took into account irrelevant material or failed to take into account relevant material, or

(d) reached a conclusion which no sensible person who has properly applied his mind to the issue could have reached (the “unreasonableness” test).[3]

The Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision also specified that “[t]hese issues may in the particular case involve, at least in part, a consideration of the sufficiency of the material before the Registrar, but (in the absence of established unreasonableness) there can be no interference with the margin of appreciation of the facts or merits of that case to which the maker of such an administrative decision is entitled”.[4] Finally, in the review, the party contesting the administrative decision bears the onus of persuasion and must show that (a) an error of the nature described has occurred, and (b) that such error has significantly affected the impugned decision to his detriment.[5]