368.    Kayishema submits that a complete and objective analysis of the facts of the case will show that he is not guilty of the crimes alleged, and that in these circumstances, the Trial  Chamber has committed both an error of law and of fact in handing down a sentence for guilt which does not exist.[1]

369.    A similar, though not identical issue, was raised in the appellate proceedings in the case of Anto Furundžija before ICTY. In that case, the Appellant submitted that there were “substantive issues that hang over the case”, suggesting that innocence is a possibility and that that should be considered in sentencing. ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected such a submission, finding that:

[g]uilt or innocence is a question to be determined prior to sentencing. In the event that an accused is convicted, or an Appellant’s conviction is affirmed, his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus a possibility of innocence can never be a factor in sentencing.[2]

370.    Similarly in this case, a Trial Chamber cannot commit an error by sentencing an accused for crimes for which it has found that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. […]