Specific intent
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal Judgement - 29.09.2014 |
KAREMERA & NGIRUMPATSE (ICTR-98-44-A) |
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307. […] In the case of specific intent crimes such as genocide, the Appeals Chamber has found that this requires proof that the superior was aware of the criminal intent of the subordinate.[1] In most cases, the superior’s knowledge or reason to know of his subordinate’s genocidal intent will be inferred from the circumstances of the case.[2] [1] See Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 114, fn. 257 (finding that a commander must have reason to know of the facts in question that make the conduct criminal). This is the same approach that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has taken with holding a superior responsible for other crimes which require proof of specific intent or other attendant circumstances. See, e.g., Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 155 (finding that, to hold a superior responsible for torture, it must be established that the superior had information that a beating inflicted by a subordinate is for one of the prohibited purposes provided for in the prohibition against torture). [2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 524. |
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 08.06.2021 |
MLADIĆ Ratko (MICT-13-56-A) |
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313. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mens rea of the crime of terror consists of the intent to make the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of acts of violence or threats thereof, and of the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population.[1] Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the acts or threats of violence, such as, inter alia, their nature, manner, timing, and duration.[2] Nothing precludes a reasonable trier of fact from relying on the same set of circumstances to infer that perpetrators willfully made civilians the object of acts or threats of violence, and, at the same time, that such acts or threats of violence were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population. […] 315. The Appeals Chamber recalls that terror could be defined as “extreme fear”,[3] and that such fear was merely one of several factors from which the Trial Chamber inferred specific intent in this case.[4] […] [1] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37, referring to Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104. [2] D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104. [3] See Galić Appeal Judgement, n. 320. [4] See Trial Judgement, para. 3201. |
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