Knowledge of the subordinates' intent
|Appeal Judgement - 29.09.2014||
KAREMERA & NGIRUMPATSE
307. […] In the case of specific intent crimes such as genocide, the Appeals Chamber has found that this requires proof that the superior was aware of the criminal intent of the subordinate. In most cases, the superior’s knowledge or reason to know of his subordinate’s genocidal intent will be inferred from the circumstances of the case.
 See Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 114, fn. 257 (finding that a commander must have reason to know of the facts in question that make the conduct criminal). This is the same approach that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has taken with holding a superior responsible for other crimes which require proof of specific intent or other attendant circumstances. See, e.g., Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 155 (finding that, to hold a superior responsible for torture, it must be established that the superior had information that a beating inflicted by a subordinate is for one of the prohibited purposes provided for in the prohibition against torture).
 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 524.
|ICTR Statute Article 6(3) ICTY Statute Article 7(3)|