Accomplice testimony
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal Judgement - 30.01.2015 |
POPOVIĆ et al. (IT-05-88-A) |
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134. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has the discretion to rely upon evidence of accomplice witnesses. However, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, the trial chamber is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered. In particular, consideration should be given to circumstances showing that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal or to lie.[1] The Appeals Chamber also recalls that evidence of witnesses who might have motives or incentives to implicate the accused is not per se unreliable, especially where such a witness may be thoroughly cross-examined; therefore, reliance upon this evidence does not, as such, constitute an error of law.[2] However, a trial chamber must explain the reasons for accepting the evidence of such a witness.[3] Particularly relevant factors for the assessment of accomplice witnesses’ credibility include: the extent to which discrepancies in the testimony were explained; whether the accomplice witness has made a plea agreement with the Prosecution; whether he has already been tried and, if applicable, sentenced for his own crimes or is still awaiting the completion of his trial; and whether the witness may have any other reason for holding a grudge against the accused.[4] 135. A trial chamber’s discretion to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony applies equally to the evidence of witnesses who may have motive to implicate the accused, provided that appropriate caution is exercised in the evaluation of their testimonies.[5] [1] Bizimungu Appeal Judgement, para. 63; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 128 and references cited therein. See Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 42. [2] Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1101; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 146. [3] See Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 128; Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 242; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 146. [4] Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 47 (internal references omitted) and references cited therein. [5] Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1101, referring to Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras 42-48. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
SETAKO Ephrem (ICTR-04-81-A) |
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143. The Appeals Chamber notes that a trial chamber has the discretion to rely upon evidence of accomplice witnesses.[1] However, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, the trial chamber is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered. In particular, consideration should be given to circumstances showing that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal or to lie.[2] 144. In the present case, the Trial Chamber was well aware of the criminal records of Witnesses SLA and SAT.[3] It also acknowledged that the witnesses were accomplices of Setako with regard to the killings on 25 April 1994 and, precisely for this reason, stated that it would view their evidence with caution.[4] It considered various credibility issues raised by the Defence, including allegations of fabrication and manipulation of evidence,[5] and, “out of an abundance of caution”, only accepted the witnesses’ evidence about the events at Mukamira camp where they corroborated each other.[6] 145. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber finds that it was not unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to rely on the evidence of Witnesses SLA and SAT. The Appeals Chamber discerns no error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the witnesses, who had not previously confessed to crimes with respect to 25 April 1994, exposed themselves to the risk of being held accountable for them in future criminal proceedings before Rwandan judicial authorities. The fact that they testified as protected witnesses did not render this consideration unreasonable. [1] Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras. 42, 305; Muvunyi I Appeal Judgement, para. 128. [2] Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras. 47, 305; Muvunyi I Appeal Judgement, para. 128. [3] See Trial Judgement, fns. 393, 398. [4] Trial Judgement, para. 339. See also Trial Judgement, para. 367. [5] Trial Judgement, paras. 338-359, 367. [6] See Trial Judgement, para. 367. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36A-A) |
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93. The Appeals Chamber has stated that the ordinary meaning of the term “accomplice” is “an association in guilt, a partner in crime”. The caution associated with accomplice testimony is most appropriate where a witness “is charged with the same criminal acts as the accused.” Like Munyakazi, Witness ELB was charged and convicted based on his participation in several attacks, including at Shangi parish. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Trial Chamber correctly described Witness ELB as an accomplice. [1] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 203, quoting Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. [2] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 234. [3] Trial Judgement, para. 131. See also T. 17 September 2009 pp. 24, 25. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 |
NCHAMIHIGO Siméon (ICTR-01-63-A) |
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42. The Appeals Chamber has held that nothing in the Statute or the Rules prohibits a Trial Chamber from relying upon the testimony of accomplice witnesses.[1] However, such evidence is to be treated with caution, “the main question being to assess whether the witness concerned might have motives or incentives to implicate the accused”.[2] Nevertheless, a Trial Chamber retains discretion to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony[3] because it is best placed to evaluate the probative value of evidence.[4] Acceptance of and reliance upon uncorroborated evidence does not in itself constitute an error of law.[5] The Appeals Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has extended this proposition to accomplice witnesses, stating that a Trial Chamber “may convict on the basis of the evidence of a single witness, even an accomplice, provided such evidence is viewed with caution.”[6] 43. Similarly, in a number of domestic jurisdictions, judges and jurors can rely on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice witness provided they assess such evidence with caution. For example, the Indian judiciary has recognized that corroboration is not lawfully required but that it is wise to assess accomplice evidence with caution.[7] Moreover, corroboration requirements for accomplices have been abolished in Canada,[8] the United Kingdom,[9] and Australia.[10] The Appeals Chamber further recalls the discussion in Tadić of corroboration requirements in civil law countries, which concluded that “there is no ground for concluding that this requirement of corroboration is any part of customary international law and should be required by [the ICTY]].”[11] 44. The Nahimana et al. and Muvunyi Appeal Judgements upon which the Appellant relies do not represent a different proposition. When the Appeals Chamber stated in Muvunyi that it was necessary for the Trial Chamber to consider whether the testimony of a particular accomplice witness was corroborated, it did so because the Trial Chamber had already found that the witness had a general motive to enhance Muvunyi’s role in the crimes and to diminish his own.[12] Contrary to the Appellant’s argument, this does not evidence a categorical rule requiring Trial Chambers to search for corroboration when evaluating the testimony of an accomplice witness. Rather, the Appeals Chamber simply found that corroboration was necessary in those circumstances because the accomplice witness had a motive to enhance the accused’s role in the crimes. 45. In the passage from the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement upon which the Appellant relies, the Appeals Chamber considered whether the Trial Chamber erred when it relied on the testimony of an accomplice witness only to the extent that it was corroborated.[13] The Nahimana Trial Chamber had concluded that it could only rely on the witness’s evidence to the extent that it was corroborated because, in addition to being an accomplice, the witness gave testimony that was confusing and inconsistent.[14] The Nahimana Appeal Judgement found that there was no error in this approach.[15] This reflects the fact that Trial Chambers are endowed with the discretion to require corroboration, but does not mean that corroboration is required when evaluating the testimony of all accomplice witnesses. 46. In support of his proposition, the Appellant also points to a passage from the Krajišnik Appeal Judgement.[16] There, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that a Trial Chamber should briefly explain why it accepted the evidence of witnesses who may have had motives or incentives to implicate the accused to show its cautious assessment of such evidence.[17] This passage does not mean that corroboration is required. It simply stresses that Trial Chambers cannot merely state that they exercised caution when assessing the evidence of an accomplice witness, but must establish that they in fact did so. 48. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber considers that the proposition that a Trial Chamber retains the discretion to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony applies equally to the evidence of accomplice witnesses provided that the trier of fact applies the appropriate caution in assessing such evidence. [1] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. [2] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 439, citing Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 203-206. See also Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98 (“However, considering that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal, a Chamber, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered.”). The Appeals Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone similarly stated in Brima et al. that “in assessing the reliability of an accomplice, the main consideration for the Trial Chamber should be whether or not the accomplice has an ulterior motive to testify as he did.” Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 3 March 2008 (“Brima et al. Appeal Judgement”), para. 128. In some instances a situation may arise where Rule 95 of the Rules is applicable. See Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 234 and fn. 498, referring to Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 545. [3] Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, para. 128. See Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 46 (“a Trial Chamber has the discretion to decide, in the circumstances of each case, whether corroboration of evidence is necessary and to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony.”). [4] See Rutaganda Appeal Judgment, para. 29 (“It is possible for one Trial Chamber to prefer that a witness statement be corroborated, but neither the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal nor of the ICTY makes this an obligation.”); Musema Appeal Judgment, paras. 36-38; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, paras. 154, 187, 320, 322; Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 506; Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, paras. 62, 63; Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 65; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 33. [5] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 92. [6] Brima et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 129. [7] See Dagdu & Others Etc. v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 S.C.R. 636, 643 (India) (explaining that section 133 of the Evidence Act permits a conviction to be based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony but given that such evidence may be “hazardous,” a judge should dispense with corroboration “only if the peculiar circumstances of a case make it safe to” do so); Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan (1952) S.C.R. 377, 385 (India) (clarifying that in cases tried by a judge, the judge should indicate that he considered the rule of caution and “explain why he considered it safe to convict without corroboration in the particular case”). [8] R. v. Vetrovec, [1982]] 1 S.C.R. 811, 830 (Canada) (holding “that there is no special category for accomplices” but cautioning that a jury warning may sometimes be appropriate). [9] See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 32 (UntitedKingdom) (abolishing any requirement for a corroboration warning). [10] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s. 164(1). See, e.g., Conway v. The Queen (2002) 209 C.L.R. 203, 223-224 (Australia) (applying section 164(1) of the Evidence Act 1995, in the context of a case involving testimony from accomplice witnesses, and affirming that the corroboration requirement has been abolished in such circumstances). [11] Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 539. [12] Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, paras. 129-131. [13] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 439. [14] Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 824. [15] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 439. [16] Brief in Reply [Siméon Nchamihigo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A, Appellant’s Brief in Reply, filed confidentially in French on 15 July 2009 (Mémoire en réplique de l’appelant), re-filed publically on 31 July 2009], paras. 3, 6. [17] Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 146. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 09.07.2004 |
NIYITEGEKA Eliézer (ICTR-96-14-A) |
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98. The ordinary meaning of the term “accomplice” is “an associate in guilt, a partner in crime.”[1] Nothing in the Statute or the Rules of the Tribunal prohibits a Trial Chamber from relying upon testimony of those who were partners in crime of persons being tried before it. As stated above, a Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.[2] Accomplice testimony is not per se unreliable, especially where an accomplice may be thoroughly cross-examined.[3] However, considering that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal, a Chamber, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered.[4] In the view of the Appeals Chamber, reliance upon evidence of accomplice witnesses per se does not constitute a legal error. [1] Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.). [2] See Rule 89(C) of the Rules. [3] See Media Case[Nahimana et al.]., Case No. ICTR-99-52-I, Decision on the Defence Motion Opposing the Hearing of the Ruggiu Testimony against Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, 31 January 2002, pp. 2-3. [4] See Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 629. See also Media Case [Nahimana et al.]. Trial Judgement, para. 824. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 30.06.2014 |
BIZIMUNGU Augustin (ICTR-00-56B-A) |
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63. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is within a trial chamber’s discretion to rely on the evidence of accomplice witnesses.[1] However, the trial chamber must exercise appropriate caution in assessing such evidence and carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered.[2] Of the several factors relevant to a cautious assessment, consideration should be given to circumstances showing that the witness may have motives or incentives to incriminate the accused or to lie.[3] 64. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “[u]nder some circumstances, a reasoned explanation of the Trial Chamber’s assessment of a particular witness’s credibility is a crucial component of a ‘reasoned opinion’ – for instance, where there is a genuine and significant dispute surrounding a witness’s credibility and the witness’s testimony is truly central to the question whether a particular element is proven”.[4] The Appeals Chamber considers the Trial Chamber’s analysis to be inadequate given the existence of a genuine and significant dispute surrounding Witness GAP’s credibility in light of his status as an accomplice witness and evidence suggesting that he may have had a motive to lie. In particular, the Trial Chamber failed to expressly consider evidence that Witness GAP had been pressured by Rwandan authorities to implicate Bizimungu in order to receive a more lenient sentence.[5] It failed to expressly address other evidence which alleged that Witness GAP facilitated the fabrication of evidence against accused before the Tribunal generally and Bizimungu specifically.[6] These omissions must be viewed in light of the Trial Chamber’s further failure to expressly consider that Witness GAP never mentioned this meeting or Bizimungu’s involvement in it in his statements to the Tribunal prior to 2003,[7] and that he failed to report this when confessing to his crimes before Rwandan authorities in 2002.[8] Mindful that trial chambers enjoy broad discretion in assessing evidence[9] and that they need not articulate every step of their reasoning for each finding they make,[10] the Appeals Chamber finds that the absence of any express consideration of these circumstances reflects a failure to apply necessary caution in light of the particular circumstances surrounding Witness GAP’s evidence. [1] Gatete Appeal Judgement, para. 154; Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 93; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 143. See also Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 128; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 146. [2] Gatete Appeal Judgement, para. 154; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 305. See also Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 128. [3] See Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 37. See also Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 128. [4] Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 61 (emphasis in original). [5] The Appeals Chamber observes that Witness GAP retracted that he had been pressured by Rwandan authorities to implicate Bizimungu when he appeared before the Karemera et al. trial chamber in January 2010. See, e.g., Defence Exhibit 699a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness GAP, T. 26 January 2010 pp. 32, 33, 36, 37, 43, 44). Other evidence reflects that pressure was applied on other inmates in Ruhengeri prison to fabricate evidence against several accused before the Tribunal and that fabricated evidence was given in this regard. See, e.g., Defence Exhibit 689a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 10 April 2008 pp. 50-60); Defence Exhibit 690a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., ICTR-Case No. 98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 14 April 2008 pp. 2-53, 57-60, 62, 63); Defence Exhibit 691a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 15 April 2008 pp. 16-19, 21-35); Defence Exhibit 692a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 16 April 2008 pp. 13, 14, 26-36, 41-46, 48-51, 55-57, 61, 62, 64-71); Defence Exhibit 693a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 17 April 2008 pp. 21, 22, 25-28, 30). See also Witness DB11-2, T. 12 June 2007 pp. 42, 43 (closed session); T. 13 June 2007 pp. 16, 22, 23 (closed session); Witness CBP99, T. 3 March 2008 pp. 45, 46, 57, 58, 61, 62, 65-69. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber only generally discussed that Witness GFA was confronted with statements taken from other witnesses who he testified had provided false testimony before the Tribunal, indicating that they had not lied. See Trial Judgement, paras. 178, 179. The Trial Chamber provided no indication that it found Witness GFA’s testimony to lack credibility on this issue. [6] Defence Exhibit 689a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 10 April 2008 pp. 58, 59) (referring to individual number 3); Defence Exhibit 690a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 14 April 2008 pp. 5, 8, 19, 20) (referring to individual number 2); Defence Exhibit 691a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 15 April 2008 pp. 22, 23, 30-34) (referring to individual number 2); Defence Exhibit 692a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 16 April 2008 pp. 61, 62) (referring to individual number 2); Defence Exhibit 693a (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Witness BTH, T. 17 April 2008 p. 31) (referring to individual number 2). To identify that the individual referred to in Witness BTH’s testimony in the Karemera et al. proceeding as Witness GAP, Defence Exhibits 689a, and 690a must read in conjunction with Defence Exhibits 666 and 668, respectively, while Defence Exhibits 691a, 692a, and 693a must be read in conjunction with Defence Exhibit 678. All of these exhibits were admitted pursuant to Rules 89(C) and 92bis(D) of the Rules through The Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision on Bizimungu’s Motion for the Admission into Evidence of the Transcripts and Exhibits of Witness BTH’s Testimony in the Karemera et al. Case Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 4 December 2008, paragraph 1 of which identifies Witness BTH in the Karemera et al. case as being Witness GFA in the present case. [7] See Witness GAP, T. 16 February 2005 pp. 22-27, 33, 37, 62, 63; T. 17 February 2005 pp. 6, 49; T. 22 February 2005 p. 47. [8] See Witness GAP, T. 15 February 2005 pp. 4-6, 11, 12 (closed session), 36, 42-44; T. 16 February 2005 pp. 11, 12, 19-21, 27, 30, 33, 63. [9] See, e.g., Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 121; Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgement, para. 21; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 47. [10] See, e.g., Ntabakuze Appeal Judgement, para. 161; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 269; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 165. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 09.05.2007 |
BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ (IT-02-60-A) |
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82. Accomplice testimony is not per se unreliable, and its use by a Trial Chamber, in and of itself, does not constitute error. Such evidence, however, must be carefully considered in light of the circumstances under which it was given. […] In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber treated this evidence with appropriate caution. […] [1] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 203, 204. [2] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 204. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 17.03.2009 |
KRAJIŠNIK Momčilo (IT-00-39-A) |
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146. The Appeals Chamber recalls at the outset that it is well established in the jurisprudence of both ad hoc Tribunals that nothing prohibits a Trial Chamber from relying on evidence given by a convicted person, including evidence of a partner in crime of the person being tried before the Trial Chamber.[1] Indeed, accomplice evidence, and, more broadly, evidence of witnesses who might have motives or incentives to implicate the accused is not per se unreliable, especially where such a witness may be thoroughly cross-examined; therefore, reliance upon this evidence does not, as such, constitute a legal error.[2] However, “considering that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal, a Chamber, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered”.[3] As a corollary, a Trial Chamber should at least briefly explain why it accepted the evidence of witnesses who may have had motives or incentives to implicate the accused; in this way, a Trial Chamber shows its cautious assessment of this evidence. [1] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 439. See also Blagojević and Jokiæ Appeal Judgement, para. 82; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 203-206; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. [2] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 204, and Blagojević and Jokiæ Appeal Judgement, para. 82. [3] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 439; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 204 and 206, and Blagojević and Jokiæ Appeal Judgement, para. 82. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 20.10.2010 |
KALIMANZIRA Callixte (ICTR-05-88-A) |
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173. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal” and that “a Chamber, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered.”[1] The Trial Chamber noted the requirement to approach accomplice witnesses with caution.[2] It also examined the circumstances surrounding Witness BCZ’s testimony and his possible motives to falsely incriminate Kalimanzira.[3] [1] See Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, para. 128. [2] Trial Judgement, para. 72. [3] Trial Judgement, paras. 608, 612. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 |
LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ (IT-98-32/1-A) |
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128. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has the discretion to rely upon evidence of accomplice witnesses.[1] However, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, the trial chamber is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered. In particular, consideration should be given to circumstances showing that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal or to lie.[2] This does not mean that corroboration is required.[3] However, a trial chamber must explain the reasons for accepting the evidence of an accomplice.[4] [1] Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras 47, 305. [2] Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras 42, 305. See also Blagojević and Jokiæ Appeal Judgement, para. 82. [3] Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, paras 46-48. [4] Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 146. See also Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 145. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 09.10.2012 |
GATETE Jean Baptiste (ICTR-00-61-A) |
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154. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, while a witness’s status as an accomplice does not render his or her evidence unreliable per se,[1] a trial chamber must exercise appropriate caution in assessing his or her evidence.[2] [1] Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 98. [2] See, e.g., Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 42. |
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