Collusion
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 |
SETAKO Ephrem (ICTR-04-81-A) |
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137. The Appeals Chamber recalls that collusion is “an agreement, usually secret, between two or more persons for a fraudulent, unlawful, or deceitful purpose.”[1] If an agreement between witnesses for the purpose of untruthfully incriminating an accused is established, their evidence should be excluded pursuant to Rule 95 of the Rules.[2] [1] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 234. [2] Rule 95 of the Rules states: “No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.” See also Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 234. |
ICTR Rule Rule 95 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 08.05.2012 |
KANYARUKIGA Gaspard (ICTR-02-78-A) |
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238. The Appeals Chamber recalls that collusion has been defined as an agreement, usually secret, between two or more persons for a fraudulent, unlawful, or deceitful purpose.[1] If an agreement between witnesses for the purpose of untruthfully incriminating an accused were indeed established, their evidence would have to be excluded pursuant to Rule 95 of the Rules.[2] However, a mere risk of collusion is insufficient to exclude evidence under Rule 95 of the Rules. [1] Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 137; Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 275, referring to Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 234. [2] Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 137; Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 275, referring to Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 234. Rule 95 of the Rules states: “No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings”. |
ICTR Rule Rule 95 ICTY Rule Rule 95 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 02.02.2009 |
KARERA François (ICTR-01-74-A) |
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234. The Appeals Chamber notes that collusion can be defined as an agreement, usually secret, between two or more persons for a fraudulent, unlawful, or deceitful purpose.[1] If an agreement between witnesses for the purpose of untruthfully incriminating an accused were indeed established, their evidence would have to be excluded pursuant to Rule 95 of the Rules.[2] In the present instance, the Trial Chamber rejected the possibility of collusion between the four Prosecution witnesses testifying about the events in Ntarama.[3] The Trial Chamber held that it could not “exclude that the witnesses may have discussed the events of 1994, in spite of [their] general denials of having done so”.[4] It took into account that two of the witnesses gave their respective statements to investigators on the same day at the same place and that the other two gave their statements on another day at the same location.[5] It also considered that all four witnesses lived in the same area, travelled together to Arusha in connection with the trial, and had their meals together in the safe house.[6] However, the Trial Chamber reasoned that the differences in the testimonies of the four witnesses did not support the allegation of collusion[7] and concluded that there was no basis to find that they colluded to untruthfully implicate the Appellant.[8] The Appellant has failed to show that the Trial Chamber erred in reaching this conclusion. 235. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced by the Appellant’s claim that the Trial Chamber contradicted itself at paragraphs 250 and 307 of the Trial Judgement. The Trial Chamber consistently stated in both paragraphs that it did not exclude the possibility that the witnesses may have jointly discussed the events of 1994 but that there was insufficient basis to conclude that they colluded amongst themselves in order to untruthfully implicate the Appellant. Consequently, the Appellant’s argument is rejected. [1] The Appeals Chamber notes that Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition defines collusion as “[a]n agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. It implies the existence of fraud of some kind, the employment of fraudulent means, or of unlawful means for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose”. [2] Rule 95 of the Rules states: “No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.” See, also, mutatis mutandis, Nahimana et al. where the Appeals Chamber dismissed the testimony of a witness insofar as it was not corroborated by other credible evidence, having found that even if the evidence was “insufficient to establish with certainty that [this witness] was paid for his testimony against [the accused], it [was] nonetheless difficult to ignore this possibility, which undeniably casts doubt on the credibility of this witness.” It also ruled that “if the Trial Chamber had been aware of the fact that the Prosecutor’s investigator questioned the witness’ moral character, suspecting him of having been involved in the subornation of other witnesses and of being prepared to testify in return for money – the Trial Chamber would have been bound to find that these matters cast serious doubt on [this witness’s] credibility. Hence, like any reasonable trier of fact, it would have disregarded his testimony, or at least would have required that it be corroborated by other credible evidence.” Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 545. [3] Trial Judgement, paras. 250, 308, 313. [4] Trial Judgement, para. 250. See also Trial Judgement, para. 308 (“[a]s observed previously, it cannot be excluded that the witnesses may have discussed the events of 1994, either previously or in connection with travelling to Arusha or taking their meals together.”). [5] Trial Judgement, para. 250. [6] Trial Judgement, para. 250. [7] Trial Judgement, para. 250. [8] Trial Judgement, para. 308. |
ICTR Rule Rule 95 | |