Common knowledge
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Appeal Judgement - 26.05.2003 |
RUTAGANDA George (ICTR-96-3-A) |
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225. […] [T]he underlying purpose of [judicial notice] is to dispense with future proof of officially recorded facts that are indisputable. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 20.05.2005 |
SEMANZA Laurent (ICTR-97-20-A) |
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194. At the time of the Decision on Judicial Notice, Rule 94 provided that “[a] Trial Chamber shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.”[1] The Rule was later amended[2] to provide, in addition, for the taking of judicial notice of adjudicated facts or documentary evidence.[3] The provision relating to facts of common knowledge, provided under paragraph (A) of Rule 94, remained the same.[4] As the ICTY Appeals Chamber explained in Prosecution v. Milošević, Rule 94(A) “commands the taking of judicial notice” of material that is “notorious.”[5] The term “common knowledge” encompasses facts that are not reasonably subject to dispute: in other words, commonly accepted or universally known facts, such as general facts of history or geography, or the laws of nature.[6] Such facts are not only widely known but also beyond reasonable dispute.[7] As stated above, the fact that the Appellant did dispute some of the facts judicially noticed before the Trial Chamber did not prevent the Trial Chamber from qualifying the facts as facts of common knowledge since, as explained by the Trial Chamber, “[h]aving entered a plea of not guilty to all the counts in the indictment, the Accused has placed even the most patent of facts in dispute. However, this alone cannot rob the Chamber of its discretion to take judicial notice of those facts not subject to dispute among reasonable persons.”[8] Having regard to the arguments submitted by the Appellant before the Trial Chamber to challenge the nature of the facts adduced by the Prosecution and to the facts themselves, the Appeals Chamber considers that the said facts were not the subject of a “reasonable” dispute. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in considering that the facts enumerated in the Decision on Judicial Notice were “facts of common knowledge” within the meaning of Rule 94 of the Rules. [1] Rule 94(A). [2] See amendments adopted at the ninth session, 3 November 2000. [3] Rule 94(B). [4] Rule 94(A). [5] [Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.5], “Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s 10 April 2003 Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts,” 28 October 2003, p. 3. [6] Decision on Judicial Notice, para. 23. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (United States of America, 1996), p. 952. [7] Decision on Judicial Notice, para. 24. [8] Decision on Judicial Notice, para. 31. |
ICTR Rule Rule 94 ICTY Rule Rule 94 | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 18.03.2010 |
BIKINDI Simon (ICTR-01-72-A) |
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99. […] The term “common knowledge” encompasses facts that are widely known and not reasonably subject to dispute: in other words, commonly accepted or universally known facts, such as general facts of history or geography, or the laws of nature.[1] [1] See Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 194; Karemera et al., Decision on Judicial Notice, paras. 22, 23. |
ICTR Rule Rule 94 ICTY Rule Rule 94 |