Concurrent or consecutive sentences
|Appeal Judgement - 20.02.2001||
DELALIĆ et al. (Čelebići)
771. Rule 101(C) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provided at the time relevant to the Trial proceedings in this case that:
The Trial Chamber shall indicate whether multiple sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently.
The choice as to concurrent or consecutive sentencing is therefore a matter within the Trial Chamber’s discretion. Rule 101(C) has now been removed from the Rules but the discretion of the Trial Chamber in relation to concurrent or consecutive sentencing is preserved in the amended Rule 87(C), which provides that the Trial Chamber will indicate whether separate sentences imposed in respect of multiple convictions shall be served consecutively or concurrently. However, it is clear that this discretion must be exercised by reference to the fundamental consideration, referred to above, that the sentence to be served by an accused must reflect the totality of the accused’s criminal conduct. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution submission that a person who is convicted of many crimes should generally receive a higher sentence than a person convicted of only one of those crimes.
 These amendments to the Rules derive from Revision 19, effective 19 January 2001.
|ICTR Rule Rule 87(C) ICTY Rule Rule 87(C)|
|Appeal Judgement - 19.10.2000||
102. The Appeals Chamber notes that nothing in the Statute or Rules expressly states that a Chamber must impose a separate sentence for each count on which an accused is convicted. However, in view of the references in Rule 101(C) to “multiple sentences”, and to “consecutively or concurrently”, it may be argued that the Rules seem to assume that a separate sentence will be imposed for each count.
103. The Appeals Chamber finds in this regard that the Statute is sufficiently liberally worded to allow for a single sentence to be imposed. Whether or not this practice is adopted is within the discretion of the Chamber. The Appeals Chamber upholds the argument of the Prosecution that a Chamber is not prevented from imposing a global sentence in respect of all counts for which an accused has been found guilty.
109. It is thus apparent that it is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to impose either a single sentence or multiple sentences for convictions on multiple counts. However, the question arises, in what circumstances is it appropriate for a Chamber to exercise its discretion to impose a single sentence.
110. On this point, the Appeals Chamber notes that with respect to the particular circumstances of the Blaškić case, ICTY Trial Chamber I stated that
the crimes ascribed to the accused have been characterised in several distinct ways but form part of a single set of crimes committed in a given geographic region during a relatively extended time-span … In light of this overall consistency, the Trial Chamber finds that there is reason to impose a single sentence for all the crimes of which the accused has been found guilty.
This followed similar reasoning in the Jelisić case.
111. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the approach adopted in the Blaškić case: where the crimes ascribed to an accused, regardless of their characterisation, form part of a single set of crimes committed in a given geographic region during a specific time period, it is appropriate for a single sentence to be imposed for all convictions, if the Trial Chamber so decides. The issue is whether this case falls within such parameters.
See also paras. 104–108.
 Prosecutor’s Response [Prosecution’s Response to Jean Kambanda’s Provisional Appellant’s Brief of 30 March 2000”, 2 May 2002], at para. 4.164.
 “Judgement”, The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, T. Ch. I, 14 December 1999, para. 137.
|ICTR Rule Rule 101(C) ICTY Rule Rule 101(C)|