Death of a party
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Decision on Termination of Appellate Proceedings for Gvero - 07.03.2013 |
POPOVIĆ et al. (IT-05-88-A) |
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6.[…] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber considers that, having found that the death of an appellant results in the termination of proceedings and given that no appeal judgement can be rendered with respect to Gvero, nothing can undermine the finality of the Trial Judgement as it concerns Gvero.[1] As a consequence, the Trial Judgement shall be considered final in relation to Gvero. [1] See Delić Decision, para. 15. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Termination of Appellate Proceedings for Gvero - 07.03.2013 |
POPOVIĆ et al. (IT-05-88-A) |
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5.[…] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that appellate proceedings before this Tribunal should be terminated following the death of the appellant for lack of jurisdiction.[1] On the death of Gvero, the Appeals Chamber no longer has jurisdiction over his proceedings. The appellate proceedings in relation to Gvero must therefore be terminated, without prejudice to the appellate proceedings concerning the other appellants in the Popović et al. case. [1] Delić Decision, [Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, Decision on the Outcome of the Proceedings, 29 June 2010] para. 8. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Review - 17.12.2013 |
DELIĆ Rasim (IT-04-83-R.1) |
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CONSIDERING further that Counsel have no standing in their own right in circumstances where the appellant has died and the appellate proceedings before the Tribunal have been terminated; |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings - 29.06.2010 |
DELIĆ Rasim (IT-04-83-A) |
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5. This is the first time in the history of both this Tribunal and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) where an appellant has died before the rendering of the appeal judgement. The orders previously issued to terminate the proceedings following the death of an accused have so far only been rendered prior to the delivery of the trial judgement.[1] That said, the Appeals Chamber notes that while neither the Statute nor the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) explicitly provide for the course of action to be taken following the death of an appellant, a number of their provisions clearly exclude the possibility of the continuation of the appellate proceedings in such circumstances. 8. […] the Appeals Chamber finds that, as a matter of principle, the appellate proceedings before this Tribunal should be terminated following the death of the appellant for lack of jurisdiction. […] For an overview of considerations raised in other international criminal jurisdictions where proceedings have been terminated following the death of an accused prior to the rendering of the trial judgement, see para. 7. [1] E.g., Prosecutor v. Djordje Djukić, Case No. IT-96-20-A, Order Terminating the Appeal Proceedings, 29 May 1996 (in which the Appeals Chamber terminated all proceedings, given that at the time of death, it was seised of the Prosecution’s appeal against the Trial Chamber’s decision rejecting the parties’ requests to withdraw the Indictment on humanitarian grounds); Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić et al., Case No. IT-95-13a-T, Order Terminating Proceedings Against Slavko Dokmanović, 15 July 1998; Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Order Terminating Proceedings Against Mehmed Alagić, 21 March 2003; Prosecutor v. Momir Talić, Case No. IT-99-36/1-T, Order Terminating Proceedings Against Momir Talić, 12 June 2003; Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Terminating the Proceedings, 14 March 2006; see also The Prosecutor v. Samuel Musabyimana, Case No. ICTR-2001-62-I, Order Terminating the Proceedings Against Samuel Musabyimana, 20 February 2003. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings - 29.06.2010 |
DELIĆ Rasim (IT-04-83-A) |
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For a brief overview of the relevant provisions and legal precedents in national jurisdictions, see paras 11-12. 9. The Appeals Chamber notes that neither the Statute nor the Rules indicate whether the termination of the appellate proceedings has any impact on the finality of the trial judgement following the death of an appellant and prior to the issuance of an appeal judgement. The Appeals Chamber is further mindful of the fact that pursuant to Rule 102(A) of the Rules, the enforcement of the trial judgement shall be stayed as soon as notice of appeal is given and “until the decision on the appeal has been delivered”.[1] However, the Appeals Chamber has found that the death of the appellant results in the termination of the appeal proceedings; consequently, this provision is not applicable to the situation at hand. 13. […] [T]here is no general principle that is consistently followed in the majority of jurisdictions as to the finality of the trial judgement in the event that the proceedings are terminated following the death of an appellant. For this reason, as well as bearing in mind the specific realities of, and the particular procedures before, this Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber cannot discern any prevalent approach, let alone identify any rules of customary international law, that would be directly applicable to the situation at hand. 14. The Appeals Chamber considers that the approach followed in certain national jurisdictions, where convictions entered by a court of first instance are vacated following the death of an appellant, is not compatible with the essence of the appellate proceedings before this Tribunal. […] 15. Having found that the death of an appellant results in the termination of proceedings and given that no appeal judgement can be rendered in this case, nothing can undermine the finality of the Trial Judgement. As a consequence, the Trial Judgement shall be considered final. [1] See also Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqija and Bajrush Morina, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4-A, Decision on Motion of Astrit Haraqija for Provisional Release, 8 April 2009, para. 4. |
ICTR Rule Rule 102(A) ICTY Rule Rule 102(A) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Death of Co-Accused - 24.09.2010 |
KAREMERA et al. (ICTR-98-44-AR50) |
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15. The Appeals Chamber finds that Karemera and Ngirumpatse have failed to demonstrate a discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s order in relation to the amendment of the Indictment. It is clear from the Indictment of 23 August 2010, which implements the Impugned Decision, that Nzirorera is no longer an accused in the case. While his name continues to appear in the Indictment of 23 August 2010, his name has been removed from the title and the counts, and his status is now no different from other alleged members of the joint criminal enterprise who are not charged in this case. […] 16. The Appeals Chamber recalls that where joint criminal enterprise is pleaded as a mode of liability, the Prosecution must plead the identity of the alleged members of the joint criminal enterprise.[1] While Nzirorera is no longer an accused in the case, it is still open for the Prosecution to allege that he was a member of the joint criminal enterprise. This being the case, it is proper for the Prosecution to name him in the Indictment while making clear that he is not one of the accused. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that, contrary to Ngirumpatse’s submission, in other cases where proceedings have been terminated in relation to one accused due to that accused’s death but where joint criminal enterprise was pleaded, the deceased accused’s name has continued be referred to in the Indictment.[2] [1] Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Judgement, 28 November 2006, para. 22; The Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgement, 7 July 2006, para. 24. [2] See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brðanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, in which Momir Talić was separated from the case and later died, but his name continued to appear in the Indictment (see Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brðanin and Momir Talić, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Oral Request for the Separation of Trials, 20 September 2002 (“Brðanin and Talić Decision of 20 September 2002”); Brðanin Sixth Amended Indictment [Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brðanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Sixth Amended Indictment, 9 December 2003]); Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, in which Vlajko Stojiljković died but his name continued to appear in the Indictment (see Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Third Amended Indictment, 19 July 2002, p. 1; Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Third Amended Joinder Indictment, 21 June 2006, paras. 14, 20, 48, 61). See also Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, in which charges against Momir Nikolić and Dragan Obrenović were dismissed following their guilty pleas and both their names continued to appear in the amended indictment (see Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Indictment, 17 June 2003; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Amended Joinder Indictment, 26 May 2003). |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Death of Co-Accused - 24.09.2010 |
KAREMERA et al. (ICTR-98-44-AR50) |
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17. Turning to the issue of retaining the body of evidence adduced to date on the record, the Appeals Chamber also finds that Karemera and Ngirumpatse have failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed a discernible error in this regard.[1] Although the Trial Chamber retained all the evidence on the record, it specifically clarified that in its deliberations it would “separate the evidence that relates only to Nzirorera and that which relates to a joint criminal enterprise or conspiracy or aiding and abetting amongst Nzirorera and others”.[2] In adopting this approach, it correctly recalled that “[t]here is clear statutory language and jurisprudence which emphasize the individual nature of criminal responsibility in this Tribunal [and that] [e]ven if Accused persons are joined together into one trial, this in no way diminishes the Prosecution’s burden to prove each element of each crime individually against each of the co-Accused.”[3] The Appeals Chamber does not find this “streamlined approach”[4] unreasonable. 18. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a similar approach was adopted in the Brðanin case before the ICTY, in which Momir Talić was severed from the case eight months after the trial started.[5] Not only did Talić’s name continue to appear in the indictment,[6] but the evidence already on the record was retained.[7] In the Brðanin Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber noted that “[it] ha[d] taken into consideration the evidence given against the former co-accused Momir Talić, whose case was severed from that of the Accused and who subsequently passed away, as far as it [was] relevant to the case against the Accused.”[8] Accordingly, the Trial Chamber in that case followed the same approach proposed by the Trial Chamber in the present case. [1] See Impugned Decision; Reasons for Impugned Decision [The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Reasons for Oral Decision of 23 August 2010 and on Oral Applications for Certification to Appeal, 26 August 2010 (“Reasons for Impugned Decision”)], p. 7. [2] Reasons for Impugned Decision, para. 9. [3] Reasons for Impugned Decision, para. 14. [4] Reasons for Impugned Decision, para. 10. [5] The trial started on 23 January 2002 and Talić was severed from the case on 20 September 2002. See Brðanin and Talić Decision of 20 September 2002, para. 2, p. 9. [6] See Brðanin Sixth Amended Indictment, paras. 10, 12, 13, 19, 20, 20.1, 21, 23.1, 24-26, 27.2. [7] Indeed the Brðanin and Talić Decision of 20 September 2002 provided that the severance would come into force following the completion of the cross-examination of a witness whose testimony had been suspended when Talić fell ill. Brðanin and Talić Decision of 20 September 2002, para. 29, p. 9. [8] Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brðanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 36. |