18.     Furthermore, the statutory limitation on the cumulative period of service of ad litem judges under Article 13bis(2) [sic: 13ter(2)] should be interpreted in light of its object, purpose, context and practical policy considerations, or raison d’être of the provision in question.[1] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that “the choice of a three-year cumulative service limit appears to have been primarily motivated by budgetary considerations, and not by any issues concerning the fair trial of an accused”.[2] Further, even at the time of establishment of the mechanism providing for the institution of ad litem judges, it was considered logically conceivable that extensions of service might be necessary where a trial would last longer than three years.[3] It is obvious that, in these circumstances, preventing Judge Canivell from sitting in the Krajišnik case until the end of the trial would in fact be detrimental to the right of the Accused[4] to be tried without undue delay under Article 21 of the Statute, this being the expression of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966.[5]

25.     […] Allowing Judge Canivell to sit until the end of the present case has been done out of a legitimate concern in this trial to ensure that the proceedings do not suffer undue delays and that the trial is completed within a reasonable time, which is recognized as a fundamental right of due process.[6]