According to the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber had found that to enter a conviction under the JCE doctrine, “in addition to the existence of a common purpose amounting to or involving the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute, an agreement between the accused and the principal perpetrator” has to be proven (para. 417). The Appeals Chamber rejected this additional requirement:

419. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber erred in stating that, in order to hold the Accused criminally responsible for the crimes charged in the Indictment pursuant to the first category of JCE, the Prosecution must, inter alia, establish that between the person physically committing a crime and the Accused, there was an understanding or an agreement to commit that particular crime. Moreover, the Trial Chamber erred when it required that, in order to hold the Accused responsible pursuant to the third category of JCE, the Prosecution must prove that the Accused entered into an agreement with a person to commit a specific crime (in this case, the crimes of deportation and/or forcible transfer) and that this same person personally committed another crime, which was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the crime agreed upon.