Duty to ensure the welfare of the acquitted person
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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| Decision on Relocation - 18.11.2008 |
NTAGERURA André (ICTR-99-46-A28) |
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19 […] While the Tribunal does not have the ability to direct any State to accept the Appellant on its territory or to fully investigate whether the Appellant’s life or liberty would be at risk should he be returned to Rwanda or to another African country, it has nonetheless a duty to ensure the welfare of the acquitted person, and to that extent, to enquire whether the Appellant’s life or liberty would be at risk upon relocation to a given country. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that, notwithstanding the limitations on the capacity of the Tribunal to secure relocation for the Appellant, the Registrar is continuing his efforts to find a solution to the present situation.[1] As part of such efforts, the Appeals Chamber requests the Registrar to make enquiries with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and solicit its assistance in relocating the Appellant. [1] Response, para. 15. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Corrigendum to Decision on an Appeal of a Decision on Request for Temporary Humanitarian Aid Issued on 2 August 2023 - 04.08.2023 |
NAHIMANA, Ferdinand (MICT-23-127) |
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8. […] neither the Statute nor the Rules of the Mechanism […] expressly provides for an appeal as of right against a decision issued by a Single Judge on a matter concerning financial assistance to a convicted person released pending his relocation. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter before it relates to the Mechanism’s duty to ensure the welfare of released persons pending their relocation.[1] Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that it has considered appeals of decisions rendered by a Single Judge in matters that dispose of discrete litigation after the close of trial and appeal proceedings.[2] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the present matter raises issues over which the Appeals Chamber may exercise jurisdiction and will consider the Appeal. […] 15. […] there is nothing in the Mechanism’s legal framework. including in the Appeals Chamber’s binding jurisprudence on the matter, or in the provisions in the Mali Enforcement Agreement that requires the Mechanism to provide financial assistance to a convicted person who has completed serving his or her sentence and has been released on the territory of the enforcement State. [1] See In the Matter of François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye et al., Case No. MICT-22-124, Decision on Motions to Appeal Decision of 8 March 2022, For Reconsideration of Decision of 15 March 2022, and to Appear as Amicus Curiae, 27 May 2022, paras. 14, 24 and references cited therein. [2] See, e.g., Prosecutor v. François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, Case No. MICT-13-43, Decision on the Appeal of the Single Judge’s Decision of 22 October 2018, 17 April 2019; Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. MICT-13-33, Decision on Appeal of Decision Declining to Rescind Protective Measures for a Deceased Witness, 14 November 2016, para. 6. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Corrigendum to Decision on an Appeal of a Decision on Request for Temporary Humanitarian Aid Issued on 2 August 2023 - 04.08.2023 |
NAHIMANA, Ferdinand (MICT-23-127) |
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20. […] the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Mechanism has the duty to ensure the welfare of acquitted or released persons pending their relocation, and to that extent enquire whether their life or liberty would be at risk upon relocation.[1] The Appeals Chamber, however emphasizes that this duty neither continues indefinitely nor dictates what the obligation entails – the extent of the enquiry is limited to the circumstances at hand and the applicable legal framework. […][2] [1] Nzuwonemeye et al. Decision of 27 May 2022 [In the Matter of François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye et al., Case No. MICT-22-124, Decision on Motions to Appeal Decision of 8 March 2022, For Reconsideration of Decision of 15 March 2022, and to Appear as Amicus Curiae, 27 May 2022], para. 24. [2] Nzuwonemeye et al. Decision of 27 May 2022, para. 24. Cf. Nzuwonemeye Decision of 17 April 2019 [Prosecutor v. François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, Case No. MICT-13-43, Decision on the Appeal of the Single Judge’s Decision of 22 October 2018, 17 April 2019], para. 29 (“Domestic jurisdictions or other international institutions tasked with adjudicating claims of violations of human rights must evaluate such claims in their full context and are better suited to address the issues raised by Nzuwonemeye, including alleged violations to his human right to family life.”). |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Decision on Prosecution Appeal or Motion for Reconsideration Concerning Félicien Kabuga’s Release - 28.04.2026 |
KABUGA Félicien (MICT-13-38-AR80.4) |
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24. The Appeals Chamber turns next to the Prosecution’s argument that the Trial Chamber erroneously interpreted the Mechanism’s duty of care towards Kabuga as significantly higher than that required by relevant human rights standards. The authorities cited by the Prosecution in support of its submission concern cases that are distinguishable from the present one, in that they prescribe that States may not remove an individual from their territory if: (i) there is a real risk of irreparable harm to that individual as a result of human rights violations in the “country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed”, or (ii) the individual is suffering from serious illness and is either at imminent risk of dying or would face a real risk on account of the absence of, or access to, appropriate treatment in the “receiving country” or “country of origin”. [2] In relation to Kabuga, however, the Trial Chamber did not base its conclusion on Rwanda’s capacity to provide safety or adequate care to Kabuga. Instead, its consideration was exclusively focused on whether Kabuga may be transported to Rwanda by air, without the flight itself posing a clear and substantial risk to his life.[4] 25. Nevertheless, the authorities cited by the Prosecution centre on the protection of the fundamental rights to life and to not being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Articles 6(1) and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and in Articles 2(1) and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).[5] The Appeals Chamber observes that, in deciding whether Kabuga can be released to Rwanda, the Trial Chamber recalled that the Mechanism’s “duty of care” requires it to ensure the welfare of released persons, including enquiring whether their life would be at risk upon relocation.[6] The Trial Chamber opined that, in the context of this case, it must satisfy itself that travel to Rwanda “would not place [Kabuga’s] life at significant risk”.[7] Having found that flying Kabuga to Rwanda “would pose a clear and substantial risk to [his] life”, the Trial Chamber concluded that ordering Kabuga’s release in Rwanda is “incompatible with the Mechanism’s duty of care to him”.[8] The Prosecution fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erroneously interpreted the Mechanism’s duty of care towards Kabuga as significantly higher than that required by relevant human rights standards. [1] [Prosecutor v. Félicien Kabuga, Case No. MICT-13-38-AR80.4, Prosecution Appeal or Motion for Reconsideration Concerning Kabuga’s Release, 28 November 2025 (public with confidential annex) (“Prosecution Submission”)], para. 10. [2] Prosecution Submission, para. 10, nn. 31-33, referring, inter alia, to J, K, L, and M v. Sweden, CCPR/C/140/D/2936/2017, Decision Adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2936/2017, 1 May 2024 (“Sweden Case”), paras. 6.1, 7.5, 7.7, General Comment No. 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004 (“General Comment No. 31”), para. 12, A.R.J v. Australia, CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996, Views, Communication No. 692/1996, 11 August 1997 (“Australia Case”), para. 6.8, Case of Savran v. Denmark, Application No. 57467/15, Judgment, 7 December 2021 (“Savran v. Denmark”), para. 134, Case of Paposhvili v. Belgium, Application No. 41738/10, Judgment, 13 December 2016 (“Paposhvili v. Belgium”), para. 183, Case of A.S. v. Switzerland, Application No. 39350/13, Judgment, 30 September 2015 (“A.S. v. Switzerland”), para. 31. [3] See [Prosecutor v. Félicien Kabuga, Case No. MICT-13-38-T, Decision of Félicien Kabuga’s Fitness to Travel to Rwanda, 14 November 2025 (“Impugned Decision”)], para. 31. [4] See Impugned Decision, paras. 30, 31. [5] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953). See Prosecution Submission, para. 10, referring, inter alia, to General Comment No. 31, para. 12 (requiring States Parties to respect the obligation “not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the [ICCPR], either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.”), Sweden Case, para. 7.5 (“The [Human Rights] Committee recalls its [G]eneral [C]omment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the [ICCPR], in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the [ICCPR] (para. 12). According to the jurisprudence of the Committee, the risk must be personal, and there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish the existence of a real risk of irreparable harm. […].”), Australia Case, para. 6.8 (“What is at issue in this case is whether by deporting Mr. J. to Iran, Australia exposes him to a real risk (that is, a necessary and foreseeable consequence) of a violation of his rights under the [ICCPR]. […]. The right to life is the most fundamental of these rights.”), Paposhvili v. Belgium, para. 183 (“The [European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)] considers that the ‘other very exceptional cases’ […] which may raise an issue under Article 3 should be understood to refer to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person in which substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The [ECtHR] points out that these situations correspond to a high threshold for the application of Article 3 of the [ECHR] in cases concerning the removal of aliens suffering from serious illness.”), A.S. v. Switzerland, para. 31 (“With regard to the expulsion of seriously ill persons, […] [t]he fact that the applicant’s circumstances, including his life expectancy, would be significantly reduced if he were to be removed from the Contracting State is not sufficient in itself to give rise to a breach of Article 3. The decision to remove an alien who is suffering from a serious mental or physical illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness are inferior to those available in the Contracting State may rise an issue under Article 3, but only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are compelling.”), Savran v. Denmark, para. 134 (“[T]he [ECtHR] reiterates that the evidence adduced must be ‘capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds’ for believing that as a ‘seriously ill person’, the applicant ‘would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy’ […].”). [6] Impugned Decision, para. 23, referring to In the Matter of Emmanuel Rukundo, Case No. MICT-23-128, Decision on Appeal of a Decision on Request for Temporary Humanitarian Aid, 15 August 2023, para. 22, In the Matter of Ferdinand Nahimana, Case No. MICT-23-127, Corrigendum to “Decision on an Appeal of a Decision on Request for Temporary Humanitarian Aid” Issued on 2 August 2023, 4 August 2023, para. 20, In the Matter of François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye et al., Case No. MICT-22-124, Decision on Motions to Appeal Decision of 8 March 2022, for Reconsideration of Decision of 15 March 2022, and to Appear as Amicus Curiae, 27 May 2022, para. 24, See also In Re. André Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A28, Decision on Motion to Appeal the President’s Decision of 31 March 2008 and the Decision of Trial Chamber III of 15 May 2008, 18 November 2008, para. 19. [7] Impugned Decision, para. 23. [8] Impugned Decision, para. 30. |
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