27. […] Relying on Wigmore’s Evidence in Trials at Common Law,[1] the Appellant concludes that because Milan Babić’s death, which resulted in the prevention or curtailment of the cross-examination of his evidence, was caused by “the voluntary act of the witness himself,” namely his suicide, the examination-in-chief must be struck out.[2]

29. […] In his appeal, armed with the Report’s finding that Milan Babić did in fact commit suicide, the Appellant attempts to rely on Wigmore for the general principle that evidence given by a witness in direct examination who commits suicide prior to, or during his cross-examination, should be excluded.

30. The Appeals Chamber concludes that the International Tribunal need not adopt this approach and finds that, despite Milan Babić’s death having been ruled a suicide, it remained within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to retain the evidence of Milan Babić on the basis that the interruption of his cross-examination, the majority of which had been completed, was unforeseeable and unavoidable.