Adequate penalty structure
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Decision on Referral - 09.10.2008 |
MUNYAKAZI Yussuf (ICTR-97-36-R11bis) |
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The Appeals Chamber considered whether the Trial Chamber erred in law by holding that Rwanda’s penalty structure, and, in particular, the possibility of life imprisonment in solitary confinement, did not accord with internationally recognized standards and with the requirements of international law. The Appeals Chamber considered, in particular, whether the Trial Chamber erred in relying on the Abolition of Death Penalty Law, rather than the Transfer Law. The Appeals Chamber held: 19. The Appeals Chamber considers that it is not up to the Trial Chamber to determine how these laws could be interpreted or which law could be applied by Rwandan courts in transfer cases. For the reasons provided above, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that it would be possible for courts in Rwanda to interpret the relevant laws either to hold that life imprisonment with special provisions is applicable to transfer cases, or to hold that life imprisonment without special provisions is the maximum punishment. 20. Since there is genuine ambiguity about which punishment provision would apply to transfer cases, and since, therefore, the possibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a penalty of life imprisonment in isolation would apply to such cases, pursuant to the Abolition of Death Penalty Law, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the current penalty structure in Rwanda is not adequate for the purposes of transfer under Rule 11bisof the Rules. |
ICTR Rule Rule 11 bis ICTY Rule Rule 11 bis | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Referral - 04.12.2008 |
HATEGEKIMANA Idelphonse (ICTR-00-55B-R11bis) |
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The Appeals Chamber considered whether the Trial Chamber erred in law when it concluded that, pursuant to Rwandan law, Hategekimana may face life imprisonment in isolation without adequate safeguards, in violation of his right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. The Appeals Chamber noted Rwanda’s submission that its Parliament had recently passed a new law which modifies the Abolition of Death Penalty Law,[1] and that in accordance with Article 1 of this law, life imprisonment with special provisions, which includes solitary confinement, shall not apply to cases transferred from the Tribunal to Rwanda under the Transfer Law.[2] The Appeals Chamber further noted[3] that Article 1 of the said law provides: [L]ife imprisonment with special provision as provided for by paragraph one of this article shall not apply to cases transferred to Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from other States in accordance with the provisions of the [Transfer Law]… The Appeals Chamber found that: 38. The Appeals Chamber considers that, should this new law enter into force in its current form, the ambiguity as to the applicable punishment for transfer cases which it noted in the Munyakazi and Kanyarukiga decisions[4] would be resolved. However, there is no information before the Appeals Chamber to indicate that this law has entered into force. The Appeals Chamber is therefore unable to conclude that the ambiguity as to the applicable punishment under Rwandan law for transfer cases has been resolved. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that under Rwanda’s current legal framework, Hategekimana may face life imprisonment in isolation without adequate safeguards, in violation of his right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.[5] The Appeals Chamber therefore dismisses this ground of appeal. The Appeals Chamber concluded by finding that: 40. The Appeals Chamber acknowledges the steps which Rwanda has recently taken to clarify the issue of the applicable penalty for transfer cases. However, the Appeals Chamber notes its finding under Ground 2 that the Trial Chamber did not err in concluding that Hategekimana’s right to obtain the attendance of, and to examine, Defence witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses called by the Prosecution cannot be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has not shown that the Trial Chamber abused its discretion in denying the request to transfer Hategekimana’s case to Rwanda on the basis that, under the present circumstances, it was not satisfied that he would receive a fair trial in that country. [1] See Rwanda Amicus Brief, para. 2 fn. 3. The Appeals Chamber notes Rwanda’s statement therein that this law has not yet officially entered into force. See also Annex 1. [2] Rwanda Amicus Brief, para. 2. [3] See Appeal Decision, para. 37. [4] See Munyakazi Appeal Decision, paras. 16-20; Kanyarukiga Appeal Decision, paras. 12-16. See also The Prosecutor v. Jean-Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 17 November 2008, para. 87. [5] See Tubarimo Aloys v. The Government, Case. No. RS/INCONST/Pén. 0002/08/CS, 29 August 2008, para. 36 of the English translation of the Decision. The Supreme Court held that the imposition of periods of solitary confinement is not per se unlawful, but must be implemented in accordance with international standards and proper safeguards. Legislation governing the implementation of solitary confinement has not yet entered into force. The Supreme Court therefore held that it could not repeal Article 4 paragraph 2 “before the law governing the execution of this sentence [of solitary confinement] comes into force, which will make it clear, whether solitary confinement contravenes the Constitution”. See also Kanyarukiga Appeal Decision, para. 15. |
ICTR Rule Rule 11 bis ICTY Rule Rule 11 bis | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Decision on Referral - 30.10.2008 |
KANYARUKIGA Gaspard (ICTR-2002-78-R11bis) |
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The Appeals Chamber considered whether the Trial Chamber erred in holding that the current penalty structure in Rwanda was not adequate for the purposes of transfer under Rule 11bis of the Rules. The Appeals Chamber considered, in particular, the Trial Chamber’s finding that the relationship between the Abolition of Death Penalty Law and the Transfer Law was unclear, such that there was a risk that Kanyarukiga, if transferred and convicted, might be subject to imprisonment in isolation.[1] The Appeals Chamber recalled its findings in the Munyakazi case on this issue, and found that: 12. In Munyakazi, the Appeals Chamber already ruled that it is unclear how these two laws will be interpreted by the Rwandan courts,[2] which could construe them as either holding that imprisonment with special provisions is applicable to transfer cases, or that life imprisonment without special provisions is the maximum punishment.[3] There are no reasons to depart from these findings. [...] 15. The Appeals Chamber further recognizes that the punishment of solitary confinement may constitute a violation of international standards if not applied as an exceptional measure which is necessary, proportionate, restricted in time and includes minimum safeguards.[4] However, it observes that there was no information before the Trial Chamber that Rwandan law provides for such safeguards.[5] 16. Since there is genuine ambiguity about which punishment provision would apply to transfer cases,[6] and since, therefore, the possibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a penalty of life imprisonment in isolation would apply to such cases, pursuant to the Abolition of Death Penalty Law,[7] the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the current penalty structure in Rwanda is not adequate for the purposes of transfer under Rule 11bis of the Rules. [1] Rule 11bis Decision [Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 6 June 2008], para. 96. [2] Munyakazi Appeal Decision [The Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis, 9 October 2008], para. 16. [3] Munyakazi Appeal Decision, para. 19. [4] See Ramirez Sanchez v. France, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber (GC), App. No. 59450/00, Judgement, 4 July 2006, paras. 121, 136, 145; Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgement (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 30 May 1999, Series C, No. 52, paras. 194-199; Case of Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgement, 25 November 2006, Series C, No. 160, para. 315; Case of García Asto and Ramirez Rojas, Judgement, November 25 2005, Series C, No. 137, para. 221; Case of Raxacó Reyes, Judgement, 15 September 2005, Series C, No. 133, para. 95; Case of Fermín Ramírez, Judgement of 20 June 2005, Series C, No. 126, para. 118. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Denmark, 31 October 2000, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/70/DNK; UN Committee against Torture (CAT), Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Japan, 3 August 2007, UN Doc. CAT/C/JPN/CO/1, para. 18. The Trial Chamber noted in the Rule 11bis Decision that “it is common ground that prolonged solitary confinement may constitute a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR and other instruments prohibiting torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment”. The Trial Chamber further found that the parties did not address this issue. See Rule 11bis Decision, para. 95 and fn. 130. [5] See Tubarimo Aloys Decision, supra fn. 37. [6] Munyakazi Appeal Decision, para. 20. [7] Munyakazi Appeal Decision, para. 20. |
ICTR Rule Rule 11 bis ICTY Rule Rule 11 bis |