15. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls the well-established practice at this Tribunal that allegations of partiality of trial judges are dealt with in the course of the normal appellate process, i.e., in the appeal judgement.[1] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that it has already made a determination, in the present case, that it will make its own assessment of the issues relating to the alleged partiality of Judge Harhoff in the course of the normal appellate process.[2]

16. With respect to the Applicants’ first argument, the Appeals Chamber recalls its previous finding that there has been no “general finding” or “final determination” regarding Judge Harhoff’s alleged partiality in this case and that thus there is no basis for a claim of “ongoing prejudice” during the appeal proceedings.[3] The fairness and validity of the Trial Judgement is yet to be determined by the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber therefore rejects the Applicants’ argument that the appeal proceedings are themselves improper and unfair because the Trial Judgement is invalid. In relation to the Applicants’ arguments that the Grounds of Appeal are “credible” based on the Appeals Chamber’s decision to admit the Letter as additional evidence on appeal, the Appeals Chamber notes that this decision was made in the context of, and is limited to Rule 115 of the Rules. The Appeals Chamber emphasises its previous conclusion that the Rule 115 Decision “pertain[s]] strictly to the admissibility [of the Letter ]] and not to the merits of the appeals filed by the parties”.^[4] The Appeals Chamber further emphasises that the credibility and merits of the appeals filed by the parties will be determined in due course by the Appeals Chamber. It is therefore not necessary to depart from the Tribunal’s well-established practice[5] on the basis that these proceedings “[flow] […] from an invalid Trial Judgement” as alleged by the Applicants.[6] The Applicants’ arguments in this regard are therefore without merit.

17. Regarding the Applicants’ second and third arguments, the Appeals Chamber notes that under Articles 20(1) and 21(4)(c) of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber has the primary obligation to ensure that a person convicted by a Trial Chamber has a fair and expeditious process on appeal. The Appeals Chamber is now seised of the fully briefed appeals. It is considering them and will deliver its judgement in due course.[7] The Appeals Chamber observes that the Applicants’ arguments of judicial economy and potential undue delay in the proceedings are based on a speculative premise as to the outcome of the appeals as a whole.[8] However, as previously emphasised, the outcome of the appeals lodged by the parties will be determined in the appeal judgement.[9] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that “possible remedies” which might be ordered by it merit a departure from the practice of this Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber further emphasises that proceeding through the normal appellate process in the present case does not prejudice the Applicants. For these reasons, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that judicial economy or the interests of justice require it to depart from the normal appellate process, i.e. considering the appeals as whole.

18. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds no justification to expedite adjudication of the Grounds of Appeal.