54. The Appellant further submits that post-conflict conduct is a “separate and distinct mitigating circumstance” that should not be “commingled with remorse”.[1] In his view, the negotiated ceasefire and his political activities in the New Democratic Party should be characterised as steps taken by the Appellant “to improve the situation and alleviate suffering”, which is a mitigating circumstance “separate and distinct from remorse”.[2] He adds that to consider these factors “as remorse is an abuse of discretion which creates an injustice to the Appellant.”[3] The Appeals Chamber finds that this argument, advanced by the Appellant for the first time in his Brief in Reply, amounts to a new allegation. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber decides to exercise its discretionary power to briefly address the Appellant’s new argument. The Trial Chamber took the Appellant’s post-conflict conduct into account as a factor in mitigation[4] and considered it in its final determination, when it found that the Appellant’s remorse was a relevant mitigating circumstance “also shown by the conduct concomitant and posterior to the committed crimes.”[5] The Appeals Chamber finds that it was within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to consider the Appellant’s post-conflict conduct as an expression of his sincere remorse, instead of assessing his post-conflict conduct as a distinct mitigating circumstance. The Trial Chamber did not err in this respect.