General v. specific obligations
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Appeal Judgement - 16.10.2007 |
HALILOVIĆ Sefer (IT-01-48-A) |
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61. The Appeals Chamber will now consider the Prosecution’s submissions that the Trial Chamber erred in restating the law on the third element of superior responsibility.[1] According to the Prosecution, in paragraphs 81 to 90 of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber created an unnecessary and unwarranted distinction between a general obligation and a specific obligation to prevent crimes.[2] 63. […] The Appeals Chamber stresses that “necessary” measures are the measures appropriate for the superior to discharge his obligation (showing that he genuinely tried to prevent or punish) and “reasonable” measures are those reasonably falling within the material powers of the superior.[3] What constitutes “necessary and reasonable” measures to fulfil a commander’s duty is not a matter of substantive law but of evidence.[4] 64. The Appeals Chamber holds that the Trial Chamber erred when giving the impression that there is an additional requirement to the third element of superior responsibility and agrees with the Prosecution that the correct legal standard is solely whether the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.[5] Of course, this single standard will have to be applied differently in different circumstances; however, the artificial distinction between “general” and “specific” obligations creates a confusing and unhelpful dichotomy. [1] Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 4.2-4.17. See also Halilović Respondent’s Brief, paras 286-294; Prosecution Reply Brief, paras 5.1-5.4; AT. 53-55. [2] Prosecution Notice of Appeal, para. 7 (which concerns the Prosecution’s third ground of appeal). […]. [3] Article 86 of Additional Protocol I provides that superiors are responsible if, inter alia “[t]hey did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach”; in this respect, the ICRC Commentary explains that, for a superior to be found responsible, it must be demonstrated that the superior “did not take the measures within his power to prevent it” and elaborates that these measures must be “‘feasible’ measures, since it is not always possible to prevent a breach or punish the perpetrators” (ICRC Commentary, paras 3543 and 3548, emphasis added); Article 87 adds the duty to “initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations […] and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.” See also the US Supreme Court’s holding in In re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1945), at 16 (“such measures […] within his power and appropriate in the circumstances”) and US v. Karl Brandt et al., in TWC, Vol. II, p. 212 (“The law of war imposes on a military officer in a position of command an affirmative duty to take such steps as are within his power and appropriate to the circumstances to control those under his command…”). [4] Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 72. [5] See Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 4.9. |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2008 |
ORIĆ Naser (IT-03-68-A) |
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177. The Appeals Chamber considers that it need not discuss the merits of this sub-ground of appeal. It only recalls its finding in the Halilović Appeal Judgement that the general duty of commanders to take the necessary and reasonable measures is well rooted in customary international law and stems from their position of authority.[1] The Appeals Chamber stresses again that “‘necessary’ measures are the measures appropriate for the superior to discharge his obligation (showing that he genuinely tried to prevent or punish) and ‘reasonable’ measures are those reasonably falling within the material powers of the superior” and that what constitutes “necessary and reasonable” measures to fulfil a commander’s duty is not a matter of substantive law but of evidence.[2] The correct legal standard is solely whether the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.[3] While this single standard will have to be applied differently in different circumstances, “the artificial distinction between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ obligations creates a confusing and unhelpful dichotomy.”[4] [1] Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 63, referring to Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76, as an example. [2] ibid., para. 63, referring to Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 72. [3] Ibid., para. 64. [4] Ibid., para. 64. |