69. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber did not make a finding as to whether the armed conflict in the municipality of Vukovar at the material time was of an international or non-international nature.[1] However, even in the context of an internal armed conflict, Geneva Convention III applies where the parties to the conflict have agreed that the Convention shall apply.[2] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls the ECMM instructions to its monitors on the implementation of the Zagreb Agreement which indicated that the Geneva Conventions were to be applied to the prisoners of war.[3] In an order issued on 18 November 1991, Lt. General Života Panić directed that JNA units in the Vukovar area, including OG South, were to observe all aspects of Geneva Convention III.[4] Furthermore, Colonel Nebojša Pavković advised the ECMM monitors of instructions from General Rašeta that Croat forces would not be evacuated with the rest of the humanitarian convoy but remain as prisoners of war and the Geneva Conventions would apply.[5] The Appeals Chamber considers that, while the Zagreb Agreement makes no mention of the application of Geneva Convention III to the Croat forces at the Vukovar hospital,[6] these documents provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the JNA had agreed that the Croat forces were to be considered prisoners of war and that Geneva Convention III was to apply.[7]

113. In light of the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions, which is to guarantee the protection of certain fundamental values common to mankind in times of armed conflict, and of the customary nature of their provisions,[1] the Appeals Chamber is in no doubt that State succession has no impact on obligations arising out from these fundamental humanitarian conventions.  In this regard, reference should be made to the Secretary-General’s Report submitted at the time of the establishment of the Tribunal, which specifically lists the Geneva Conventions among the international humanitarian instruments which are “beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise”.[2]  The Appeals Chamber finds further support for this position in the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision.[3]