93. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Rules are to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the Statute and the Rules.[1] Under Rule 104 of the Rules, upon completion of the presentation of the parties’ cases, a single judge must deliberate and decide separately on each charge contained in the indictment on whether he is satisfied that guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and shall impose a sentence in respect of each finding of guilt if he finds the accused guilty on one or more of the charges contained in the indictment.[2] The Appeals Chamber considers that the textual and contextual interpretation of the Rules supports the principle that once a charge is proven beyond reasonable doubt, a finding of guilt follows. Considering that the Rules apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings under Rule 90 of the Rules,[3] this principle similarly applies to contempt proceedings.

94. In addition, it is well established in the jurisprudence that “a trial chamber is bound to enter convictions for all distinct crimes which have been proven in order to fully reflect the criminality of the convicted person”.[4] While this principle emanates from jurisprudence concerning the crimes covered by Article 1(1) of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber sees nothing to suggest that the obligation of a single judge to enter a conviction does not equally apply to the crime of contempt, once all the elements of the crime have been proven. The Appeals Chamber further finds unpersuasive Munyeshuli’s argument that the language of Rule 90(A) of the Rules vests in a single judge the discretion not to enter a conviction for a proven crime. While a single judge has discretion to decide whether to initiate contempt proceedings,[5] neither the Rules nor prior jurisprudence support the conclusion that such discretion extends to the decision whether to enter a conviction for contempt, once all the elements of the offence have been proven.