31. A person’s state of mind is no different to any other fact concerning that person which is not usually visible or audible to others. It may be established by way of inference from other facts in evidence. Where, as here, the state of mind to be established is an essential ingredient of the basis of criminal responsibility charged, the inference must be established beyond reasonable doubt. If there is any other inference reasonably open from the evidence which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the required inference will not have been established to the necessary standard of proof. Any words of or conduct by the accused which point to or identify a particular state of mind on his part is relevant to the existence of that state of mind. It does not matter whether such words or conduct precede the time of the crime charged, or succeed it. Provided that such evidence has some probative value, the remoteness of those words or conduct to the time of the crime charged goes to the weight to be afforded to the evidence, not its admissibility. [...]

630.   The Appeals Chamber recalls that an individual’s high-ranking position, coupled with the open and notorious manner in which criminal acts unfold, can provide a sufficient basis for inferring knowledge of the crimes.[1] […]