The Appeals Chamber clarified that it would only proceed with a request for an order for the purposes of an investigation if a party has shown a legitimate forensic purpose for it. It is a discretionary decision of the Chamber. While, in some cases, it may be that the Prosecution will use its own resources and extended powers to facilitate the obtainment of the information sought by the Defence, the obligation of the Defence to report to the Chamber its inability to obtain the cooperation of a State’s authorities is intended as a first step in exercising due diligence. The applicant is thus expected to show that she/he was unable to obtain such cooperation despite her/his own independent attempts to do so. A mere assertion that such an attempt would face obstruction from the national authorities is not sufficient to justify an order for cooperation.

13. […] Il fonde en réalité sa Requête sur les articles 54 et 107 du Règlement qui donnent à la Chambre d’appel le pouvoir de délivrer des ordonnances « nécessaires aux fins de l’enquête, de la préparation ou de la conduite du procès ». A cet égard, il convient de rappeler que la Chambre d’appel ne saurait accéder à une requête en délivrance d’une telle ordonnance que si la partie requérante a démontré un motif judiciaire légitime à cet effet[1]. La Chambre d’appel jouit en l’occurrence d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire pour déterminer si le requérant « a bien rapporté les preuves requises, ce pouvoir étant essentiel pour veiller à ce que la mesure coercitive […] ne soit pas appliquée de façon inconsidérée »[2]

14. Dans certains cas, une fois que les difficultés rencontrées par la Défense ont été portées à l’attention de la Chambre compétente, il se peut que le Procureur, conformément à son devoir d’assister le Tribunal aux fins d’établir la vérité et de rendre justice aux accusés[3], utilise ses propres ressources et pouvoirs afin de faciliter l’obtention de l’information nécessaire[4]. Cependant, l’obligation faite à la Défense d’informer la Chambre qu’elle ne peut obtenir la coopération escomptée des autorités étatiques constitue la première étape dans l’exercice de la diligence voulue[5]. La Chambre d’appel constate que l’Appelant n’a pas fait montre d’une telle diligence en l’espèce au stade actuel du procès.

15. Il appartient dès lors à l’Appelant d’entreprendre des démarches indépendantes pour se procurer des éléments de preuve à décharge qui ne sont pas en possession du Procureur, et de démontrer qu’en dépit de l’exercice de la diligence requise, il n’a pas réussi à obtenir l’enregistrement en question[6]. Or, dans sa Requête, l’Appelant se contente de dire que ses investigations « se seraient heurtées à l’obstruction des autorités rwandaises »[7] et ne donne aucun élément d’information sur les actions concrètes qu’il aurait engagées en ce sens depuis le début de son procès en appel. Il n’apporte pas non plus de preuve d’un manque de coopération de la part des autorités rwandaises en ce qui concerne l’accès aux archives dans lesquelles serait contenu l’enregistrement recherché. En conséquence, la demande de l’Appelant tendant à ce que la Chambre d’appel ordonne aux autorités rwandaises de transmettre au Greffe du Tribunal l’intégralité de l’interview doit être rejetée.

15. […] Also, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Appellant’s Counsel does not need the Appeals Chamber’s authorization or an order from the Appeals Chamber to obtain a statement from Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes the Appellant’s submission that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza is prepared to provide a written statement to him,[1] as well as the fact that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza is a detainee in the United Nations Detention Facility in Arusha, not subject to any restrictive or protective measures that would preclude the Appellant’s Counsel from taking a statement from him. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant submits that taking the statement from Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza would not result in any expenses for the Registry of the Tribunal.

27. The Appeals Chamber first notes […] that generally, no authorization is needed for the Appellant’s Counsel to contact potential witnesses with the view of obtaining written statements from them, unless any such witnesses are subject to specific protective measures. Since the Appellant neither requests any funding from the Registry of the International Tribunal for such “further investigation” nor justifies why his Counsel would be unable to collect such information on his behalf without intervention of the Appeals Chamber, there was no reason for the Appellant to seize the Appeals Chamber with such request at this stage.

28. […] considering that the Appellant seeks in the Second Motion to obtain the potential witness’ statement with a view to seeking leave to present additional evidence on appeal under Rule 115 of the Rules,the Appeals Chamber finds it appropriate […] to associate the request for further investigation with the requirements for timely filing of a motion under Rule 115.

16. In any event, noting that the Appellant seeks to obtain Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s statement with a view to seeking leave to present additional evidence, the Appeals Chamber recalls that under Rule 115(A) of the Rules, a motion for admission of additional evidence on appeal must be filed within seventy-five days from the date of the trial judgement, unless good cause is shown for the delay. The Appeals Chamber understands the Appellant to submit that good cause for the delay of such a filing more than two years after the Trial Judgement[3] is that, in light of Jean-Bosco Baraygwiza’s refusal to participate in the trial, there was no accessibility to him until recently, even through his own counsel.[4] However, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant has not indicated how and when he was first able to gain access to Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza for evidence or information. Even if Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s absence during the trial were to be considered by the Appeals Chamber as justifying the fact that such evidence was neither available at trial nor could have been obtained through the exercise of due diligence, the Appellant has failed to show why such a request could not have been submitted in time during the appeals proceedings. […]

17. […] The Appeals Chamber considers that the Appellant has failed to establish that Barayagwiza’s Rule 115 Motion contains new information pertinent for the Appellant’s case that was unknown to the Appellant before the date on which it was filed, thereby preventing him from filing his First Motion until 6 January 2006. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the filing of Barayagwiza’s Rule 115 Motion at the end of December 2005 also does not constitute good cause for the late submission of the First Motion.

18. In light of the findings above, the Appeals Chamber does not consider it necessary to address the other arguments made by the Appellant.

29. The Appeals Chamber notes that submission of the additional evidence that the Appellant seeks to obtain in the Second Motion would take place more than two years after the Trial Judgement was rendered, which makes the filing of the Second Motion untimely. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, in order to demonstrate that it was not able to comply with the time limit set in Rule 115 of the Rules for filing a motion for additional evidence within 75 days from the date of the rendering of the trial judgement, the moving party is required to demonstrate good cause for the delay and submit the motion in question “as soon as possible after it became aware of the existence of the evidence sought to be admitted”.[5] The Appellant has failed to show that he has complied with these requirements.

30. […] Moreover, the Appeals Chamber reiterates that the relevant time is when the witness became available to give evidence to the moving party, and not when a witness statement was in fact taken.[6]