At para. 31, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the Referral Bench’s finding that regardless of the way an accused is transferred to the Tribunal, “transfer pursuant to Rule 11bis would not amount to an extradition stricto sensu”.[1] It held:

31. […] The Referral Bench’s reliance on the Kovačević Decision in support of the proposition that regardless of the manner in which the Appellants were originally transferred to the International Tribunal, referral pursuant to Rule 11bis of the Rules would not amount to an extradition stricto sensu, is correct.[2] Accordingly, the Referral Bench properly concluded that the treaty or national law governing extradition does not apply to prevent the referral of the Appellants’ case pursuant to Rule 11bis of the Rules because, as with the initial transfer of the Appellants to the International Tribunal, their transfer to the State authorities under Rule 11bis is not the result of an agreement between the State and the International Tribunal.[3] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the obligation upon States to cooperate with the International Tribunal and comply with its orders arises from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, a State cannot impose conditions on the transfer of an accused, or invoke the rule of specialty or non-transfer concerning its nationals.[4] The referral procedure envisaged in Rule 11bis is implemented pursuant to a Security Council resolution, which, under the United Nations Charter, overrides any State’s extradition requirements under treaty or national law.[5]