[1] Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Motion Re Fitness to Stand Trial, 10 March 2008 (confidential and ex parte); Prosecutor v. Milorad Trbić, Case No. IT-05-88/1-PT, Order in Regard to the Preparation for Trial, 21 March 2007 (confidential), p. 3; Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Stanišić Defence’s Motion on the Fitness of the Accused to Stand Trial with Confidential Annexes, 27 April 2006, pp. 3-5; Prosecutor v. Vladimir Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Public Version of the Decision on Accused’s Fitness to Enter a Plea and Stand Trial, 12 April 2006, paras 21-29; Prosecutor v. Momir Talić, Case No. IT-99-36/1-T, Decision regarding Fitness of the Accused to Stand Trial, 29 April 2003 (confidential); Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Order on the Prosecution’s Request for a Formal Finding of the Trial Chamber that the Accused Landžo Is Fit to Stand Trial, 23 June 1997; Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 52, referring to Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, [Decision on] Motion by the Defence in Accordance with Rule 74 bis, 20 February 2001 (confidential).

[2] The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al., Order of the Tribunal Granting Postponement of Proceedings Against Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen, 15 November 1945, 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 143; Order of the Tribunal Regarding a Psychiatric Examination of Defendant Streicher, 17 November 1945, 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 153 and Proceedings, Third Day, 22 November 1945, 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 156; Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Hess and Designating a Commission to Examine Defendant Hess with Reference to his Mental Competence and Capacity to Stand Trial, 24 November 1945, 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 166-167 and Proceedings, Ninth Day, 30 November 1945, 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 478-496, Proceedings, Tenth Day, 1 December 1945, 3 Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 1; The United States of America, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zeland, India, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines against Sadao Araki et al., 42 Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 19637-19638 (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998).

[3] S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958/00, para. 29, ECHR 2004-IV; T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, para. 83, 16 December 1999; V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, para. 90, ECHR 1999-IX; Stanford v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 282-A, para. 26.

[4] Rules 133 and 135 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC-ASP/1/3).

[5] Rule 32 of the Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, adopted on 12 June 2007.

[6] Rule 74 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, adopted on 16 January 2002 (last amended on 19 November 2007).

[7] The Prosecutor against Foday Saybana Sankoh a.k.a Popay a.k.a. Papa a.k.a. Pa, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-I, Order for Further Physiological and Psychiatric Examination, 21 March 2003, p. 1; The Prosecutor against Foday Saybana Sankoh a.k.a Popay a.k.a. Papa a.k.a. Pa, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-I, Ruling on the Motion for a Stay of Proceedings Filed by the Applicant, 22 July 2003 (“Sankoh Decision of 22 July 2003”), p. 5.

[8] Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes v. Joseph Nahak, Case No. 01A/2004, Findings and Order on Defendant Nahak’s Competence to Stand Trial, 1 March 2005 (“Nahak Decision”), paras 54-56, 135.

[9] See supra, para. 41 [to plead, to understand the nature of the charges, to understand the course of the proceedings, to understand the details of the evidence, to instruct counsel, to understand the consequences of the proceedings, and to testify].

[10] Decision of 26 May 2004 [Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision re Strugar Motion to Terminate Proceedings, 24 May 2004], para. 37.

[11] See Stanišić Decision of 10 March 2008, para. 60. Cf. also, see also Hansard 2 March 2000 col 665-667; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte The Kingdom of Belgium; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amnesty International Limited and others, Queen’s Bench Division, CO/236/2000, CO/238/2000, 15 February 2000, 2000 WL 461 (QBD) (“Pinochet Decision of 15 February 2000”), para. 20: “In referring to Senator Pinochet's fitness to stand trial, the Secretary of State is referring to his capacity to participate meaningfully in a trial. The Home Secretary has proceeded on the footing that the decisive criteria are the quality of his memory, his ability to process verbal information and to follow the proceedings, his ability to understand the content and implications of questions put to him, his ability to express himself coherently and comprehensibly, and his ability to instruct his legal representatives” (emphasis added); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960),pp. 402-403: “the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’”; R. v. Presser [1958] VR 45, p. 48: “[…] [the accused] need not, of course, understand the purpose of all the various court formalities”; “[h]e need not, of course, be conversant with court procedure and he need not have the mental capacity to make an able defence […] The question is whether "the accused, because of mental defect, fails to come up to certain minimum standards which he needs to equal before he can be tried without unfairness or injustice to him". See also supra, paras 47, 52 (fn. 140) and infra, para. 60.

[12] See supra, paras 41-42.

[13] Decision of 26 May 2004, para 48, citing Lečić-Toševski Report, p. 14, as well as the relevant passage of the New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry referred to therein, which in reality reads as follows: “In its traditional formulation the test of unfitness to plead is whether the defendant is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings in the trial, so as to make a proper defence, to know that he might challenge jurors, and to comprehend detail of the evidence”.

[14] Cf. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Concerning Further Medical Report, 11 November 2005 (confidential), p. 2: “[A]ny further report should […] distinguish between the degree of fitness necessary to attend courts as an Accused person, and that required to additionally conduct one’s own case.” See also, Milošević Decision of 1 November 2004, para 14: “How should the Tribunal treat a defendant whose health, while good enough to engage in the ordinary and non-strenuous activities of everyday life, is not sufficiently robust to withstand all the rigors of trial work – the late nights, the stressful cross-examinations, the courtroom confrontations – unless the hearing schedule is reduced to one day a week, or even one day a month? Must the Trial Chamber be forced to choose between setting that defendant free and allowing the case to grind to an effective halt? In the Appeals Chamber’s view, to ask that question is to answer it.” (footnotes omitted).

[15] See supra, para. 52 (fn. 140).

[16] See supra, para. 55. Cf. S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958/00, para. 29, ECHR 2004-IV: “Given the sophistication of modern legal systems, many adults of normal intelligence are unable fully to comprehend all the intricacies and exchanges which take place in the courtroom.” The representation by skilled and experience lawyers can however be found insufficient to guarantee effective participation of an accused in the proceedings against him where he or she is incapable to cooperate with his or her lawyers for the purposes of his or her defence due to, for example, his or her immaturity and/or disturbed emotional state (T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, para. 83, 16 December 1999; V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, para. 90, ECHR 1999-IX); German Federal Constitutional Court holding that the impact of psychological or physical shortcomings on the actual exercise of the accused’s procedural rights can be sufficiently compensated by counsel support (NJW 1995, p. 1952); Japanese Supreme Court holding that even if the relevant abilities of the accused are considerably limited he may not be considered to lack them if he enjoys the appropriate assistance of his counsel and/or interpreters who play the role of his guardians (Japanese Supreme Court Judgement 1996(A)No.204, pp. 23-24).

[17] See supra, paras 52, 55; cf. R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914; Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (1968); see also Missouri Institute of Mental Health Policy Brief, June 2003, p. 1: “no psychological symptoms (e.g., sensory hallucinations, dementia, or amnesia) can be considered an automatic bar to competency”; Steele c. R. Cour d’appel du Québec, No. 500-10-0004418-853, 12 February 1991, p. 59.

[18] Decision of 26 May 2004, para. 46; See also Pinochet Decision of 15 February 2000, paras 20-21 stating with approval that the criteria set by the Home Secretary for determination of Augusto Pinochet’s fitness to stand trial were not used in the sense of “general physical debility”.