20. […] The Decision Accepting Withdrawals terminated the appeal proceedings in Strugar’s case.  It transformed him from an appellant into an individual with a final sentence. […]

25. The Appeals Chamber concludes that the Decision Accepting Withdrawals is fundamentally different from the kind of “final judgement” referred to in both the Čelebići Decision and the Žigić Decision.  While the Decision Accepting Withdrawals may be a “final judgement” in the sense that it concluded the case,[2] it neither constitutes the kind of judgement envisioned in Article 25(2) of the Statute nor provides all the due process protections that naturally accompany a full judgement on the merits.  It is essentially of a sui generis nature and is limited to procedure and process.  It was adopted without any consideration of the merits of the Trial Chamber judgement.  Were reconsideration prohibited in such circumstances, then substantive injustice might result. […]