New conviction at appellate stage
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal Judgement - 23.01.2014 |
ŠAINOVIĆ et al. (IT-05-87-A) |
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1604. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to find Šainović and Lukić liable under Articles 5(h) and 7(1) of the Statute for committing, through their participation in a JCE, persecution, through sexual assaults, as a crime against humanity in Beleg, Ćirez/Qirez, and Priština/Prishtina and thereby disallowing convictions against them under Count 5 in relation to these sexual assaults. The Appeals Chamber further concludes that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to find Pavković liable under Articles 5(h) and 7(1) of the Statute for committing, through his participation in a JCE, persecution, through sexual assaults, as a crime against humanity in Priština/Prishtina and thereby disallowing convictions against him under Count 5 in relation to these sexual assaults. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber grants, in part, the Prosecution’s third ground of appeal and the Prosecution’s submissions in relation to Pavković’s responsibility pursuant to JCE III for persecution through sexual assaults committed in Priština/Prishtina.[1] However, in the circumstances of the present case, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Ramaroson dissenting, declines to enter new convictions on appeal in relation to the sexual assaults in question.[2] See also para. 1766. [1] See also Prosecution’s fourth ground of appeal. [2] Article 25 (2) of the Statute [ICTY Statute] provides that “[t]he Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers” (emphasis added). See also Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 73, holding: “the choice of remedy lies within [the] discretion [of the Appeals Chamber]. Article 25 of the Statute (relating to appellate proceedings) is wide enough to confer such a faculty […]. The discretion must of course be exercised on proper judicial grounds, balancing factors such as fairness to the accused, the interests of justice, the nature of the offences, the circumstances of the case in hand and considerations of public interest. These factors (and others) would be determined on a case by case basis.” Cf. Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 153-154, 192; Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 77; Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 220-227, 229, p. 87; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras 359-367, pp. 141-142; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, paras 588-591, p. 207. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 09.10.2012 |
GATETE Jean Baptiste (ICTR-00-61-A) |
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265. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls, Judge Pocar dissenting, that it is established jurisprudence that a new conviction may be entered at the appeal stage.[1] [1] Cf. Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 124; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, p. 168. |
ICTR Statute Article 24(2) ICTY Statute Article 25(2) | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 16.11.2012 |
GOTOVINA & MARKAČ (IT-06-90-A) |
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106. The Appeals Chamber observes, Judge Pocar dissenting, that it has, on multiple occasions, entered convictions on the basis of alternate modes of liability.[1] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that the plain text of Article 25(2) of the Statute, namely the power vested in the Appeals Chamber to “revise” a decision taken by a trial chamber, supports the Appeals Chamber’s authority to enter convictions on the basis of alternate modes of liability. One meaning of the term revise is “to alter (an opinion, judgement, etc.) after reconsideration, or in the light of further evidence.”[2] The practice of sustaining a conviction pursuant to an alternate mode of liability is effectively one such alteration to a trial chamber’s legal reasoning. The Appeals Chamber further observes that appellate bodies of various national jurisdictions are also empowered to enter convictions on an alternate basis of liability. For example, Section 3 of the England and Wales Criminal Appeal Act 1968 allows an appellate court to substitute a conviction for an alternative offence.[3] Other national jurisdictions have instituted similar practices.[4] 107. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Pocar dissenting, is not convinced that the Appellants have presented cogent reasons requiring departure from the practice of entering convictions on the basis of alternate forms of liability in appeals in certain circumstances. The Appeals Chamber further underscores that its power to enter convictions on the basis of alternate modes of liability is not dependent on whether the Prosecution appeals.[5] Finally the Appeals Chamber recalls that it has, on multiple occasions, rejected, Judge Pocar dissenting, the proposition that additional convictions on appeal violate an appellant’s right to a fair trial per se,[6] and notes that the Appellants do not raise new arguments that justify reconsideration of this position.[7] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber denies the Alternate Liability Challenge. 108. Having dismissed the Appellants’ challenge to its general power to enter convictions on the basis of alternate modes of liability, the Appeals Chamber recalls that its exercise of this power is subject to the Statute’s fundamental protections of the rights of the accused.[8] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that, as set out in the Statute, its jurisdiction is focused on reviewing the findings of trial chambers for errors of law which invalidate a decision and errors of fact which occasion a miscarriage of justice.[9] The Appeals Chamber will not enter convictions under alternate modes of liability where this would substantially compromise the fair trial rights of appellants or exceed its jurisdiction as delineated in the Statute.[10] 155. The Appeals Chamber notes that the foregoing analysis does not per se preclude replacing convictions based on JCE with convictions based on alternate modes of liability. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber has on certain occasions revised trial judgements in this way. However the Appeals Chamber notes that in each of these appeals, the trial chamber’s errors had a comparatively limited impact. Thus in the Simić Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber entered a conviction on the basis of aiding and abetting after finding that the indictment failed to plead participation in a JCE as a mode of liability. In both the Vasiljević Appeal Judgement and the Krstić Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber entered a conviction on the basis of aiding and abetting after finding that the trial chamber erred in concluding that the relevant appellant shared the common purpose of the JCE. In none of these judgements was the trial chamber’s analysis concerning the factual basis underpinning the existence of a JCE materially reversed. By contrast, in the present case, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Agius and Judge Pocar dissenting, has found that the Trial Chamber committed fundamental errors with respect to its findings concerning artillery attacks and by extension JCE, which stood at the core of findings concerning the Appellants’ criminal responsibility. [1] See, e.g., D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras 275-282, p. 128; Simić Appeal Judgement, paras 75-191, 301; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras 58-98, 104, p. 141; Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 135-144, p. 87; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, paras 115-135, 139-143, 147, 181, p. 60. See also Rukundo Appeal Judgement, paras 37, 39-115, 169-218, 269-270. [2]Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford English Dictionary Online, September 2012, OxfordUniversity Press). [3] Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (England and Wales), Section 3. [4] See Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (Western Australia), Section 30(5); Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 265, 322, 328 (Germany); Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, § 686(1)(b)(i)) (Canada); Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 597(2)(a) (Italy). [5] Cf. Article 25 of the Statute. See generally Simić Appeal Judgment; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement (in which the Appeals Chamber entered convictions on the basis of alternate modes of liability despite absence of any Prosecution appeal). [6] See [Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin [ljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Decision on Motion on Behalf of Veselin [ljivančanin Seeking Reconsideration of the Judgement Rendered by the Appeals Chamber on 5 May 2009 – or an Alternative Remedy, 8 December 2009 (“[ljivančanin Reconsideration Decision”)], pp. 2-3. See also Galić Appeal Judgement (compare majority opinion, pp. 1-185, with partially dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar, pp. 186-188); Semanza Appeal Judgement (compare majority opinion, pp. 1-127, with dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar, pp. 131-133); Rutaganda Appeal Judgement (compare majority opinion pp. 1-169, with dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar, pp. 1-4). [7] Compare [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appellant Ante Gotovina’s Motion Challenging the Appeals Chamber’s Jurisdiction to Consider Alternate Modes of Liability, or in the Alternative for Finding of Prosecution Waiver, 10 August 2012], paras 23-24, with [ljivančanin Reconsideration Decision, pp. 2-3; Galić Appeal Judgement (compare majority opinion, pp. 1-185, with partially dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar, pp. 186‑188); Semanza Appeal Judgement (compare majority opinion, pp. 1-127, with dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar, pp. 131-133); Rutaganda Appeal Judgement (compare majority opinion, pp. 1-169, with dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar, pp. 1-4). [8] See Article 21 of the Statute. See also Articles 20, 23, 25 of the Statute. [9] Article 25 of the Statute. Cf. Articles 20, 23 of the Statute; Orić Appeal Judgement, para. 11. [10] Cf. Articles 21, 25 of the Statute. [11] See Simić Appeal Judgement, paras 74-191, 301; Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 134-144, p. 87; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, paras 115-135, 139-143, 147, p. 60. [12] See Simić Appeal Judgement, paras 74-191, 301. [13] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 134-144, p. 87; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, paras 115-135, 139-143, 147, p. 60. [14] See Simić Appeal Judgement, paras 74-191, 301; Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 135-144, p. 87; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, paras 115-135, 139-143, 147, p. 60. [15] See [Gotovina and Markač Appeal Judgement], paras 84, 98. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 30.06.2016 |
STANIŠIĆ & ŽUPLJANIN (IT-08-91-A) |
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1096. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the choice of remedy lies within its discretion, in light of Article 25 of the Statute.[1] Accordingly, in the interests of fairness to Stanišić and Župljanin, balanced with considerations of public interest and the administration of justice, and taking into account the nature of the offences and the circumstances of the case at hand, the Appeals Chamber finds it appropriate to refrain from entering new convictions on appeal for these crimes.[2] [1] See Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 73. Article 25(2) of the Statute provides that “[t]]he Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers”. See also Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1604, fn. 5269 (with references). [2] See Jelisić Appeal Judgement, paras 73, 77; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 153-154, 192; Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 220-227, 229, p. 87; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras 359-367, pp 141-142; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, paras 588-591, p. 207. See also Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 1604, 1766. |
ICTR Statute Article 25 ICTY Statute Article 25 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Decision on Request to be Allowed to Exercise the Right to Appeal and to Have a Deadline Set for the Notice of Appeal - 27.11.2018 |
ŠEŠELJ Vojislav (IRMCT) |
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8. The Appeals Chamber notes that Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that “[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law”.[1] However, neither the Statute nor the Rules provide a legal framework for this avenue of relief where a conviction is entered at the appellate stage.[2] Instead, Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 146 of the Rules offer a convicted person the ability to seek a review of an appeal judgement on fulfilment of certain criteria, which have been interpreted broadly where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.[3] ₣…ğ [1] See United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976, United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 999, p. 177. The Human Rights Committee has clarified that Article 14(5) of the ICCPR also extends to convictions entered on appeal. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 23 August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 47. [2] Appeals Chamber jurisprudence at the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda similarly do not provide for the possibility to appeal an appeal judgement. This is demonstrated in decisions establishing that, since the Statute only provides for a right of appeal and a right of review, the Appeals Chamber has no power to reconsider its final judgement as an avenue to seek a further appeal. See, e.g., Ferdinand Nahimana v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52B-R, Decision on Ferdinand Nahimana’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Appeal Judgement, 30 June 2010, para. 6; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/l-A, Decision on Motion on Behalf of Veselin Šljivančanin Seeking Reconsideration of the Judgement Rendered by the Appeals Chamber on 5 May 2009 – or an Alternative Remedy, 8 December 2009 (“Šljivančanin Decision”), p. 2, n. 7, referring to, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Zoran Žigić, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision on Zoran Žigić’s "Motion for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber Judgement IT-98-30/1-A Delivered on 28 February 2005", 26 June 2006 (“Žigić Decision”), para. 9. [3] See Prosecutor v. Veselin Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/l-R.1, Review Judgement, 8 December 2010 (“Šljivančanin Review Judgement”), para. 7; Žigić Decision, para. 7, and references cited therein.
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IRMCT Statute Statute Article 24 IRMCT Rule Rule 146 | |
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9. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has previously stated that it was “satisfied that the existing appeal and review proceedings established under the Statute provide sufficient guarantees to persons convicted before this Tribunal that they have been tried fairly and in accordance with norms of due process”.[1] [...] Šešelj limits his arguments to the impropriety of being convicted on appeal and to asserting his consequent right to appeal[...] without articulating any deficiencies in the existing procedures for review of appeal judgements provided for in the Statute and the Rules or [...] attempt[ing] to demonstrate that the Appeal Judgement contains any errors.[2] [1] See Žigić Decision, para. 9. See also Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-R, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration, 23 November 2006 (public redacted version), para. 79.
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IRMCT Statute Statute Article 24 IRMCT Rule Rule 146 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Decision on Request to be Allowed to Exercise the Right to Appeal and to Have a Deadline Set for the Notice of Appeal - 27.11.2018 |
ŠEŠELJ Vojislav (IRMCT) |
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8. The Appeals Chamber notes that Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that “[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law”.[1] However, neither the Statute nor the Rules provide a legal framework for this avenue of relief where a conviction is entered at the appellate stage.[2] Instead, Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 146 of the Rules offer a convicted person the ability to seek a review of an appeal judgement on fulfilment of certain criteria, which have been interpreted broadly where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.[3] [...] 9. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has previously stated that it was “satisfied that the existing appeal and review proceedings established under the Statute provide sufficient guarantees to persons convicted before this Tribunal that they have been tried fairly and in accordance with norms of due process”.[4] [...] Šešelj limits his arguments to the impropriety of being convicted on appeal and to asserting his consequent right to appeal[...] without articulating any deficiencies in the existing procedures for review of appeal judgements provided for in the Statute and the Rules or [...] attempt[ing] to demonstrate that the Appeal Judgement contains any errors.[5] [1] See United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976, United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 999, p. 177. The Human Rights Committee has clarified that Article 14(5) of the ICCPR also extends to convictions entered on appeal. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 23 August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 47. [2] Appeals Chamber jurisprudence at the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda similarly do not provide for the possibility to appeal an appeal judgement. This is demonstrated in decisions establishing that, since the Statute only provides for a right of appeal and a right of review, the Appeals Chamber has no power to reconsider its final judgement as an avenue to seek a further appeal. See, e.g., Ferdinand Nahimana v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52B-R, Decision on Ferdinand Nahimana’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Appeal Judgement, 30 June 2010, para. 6; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/l-A, Decision on Motion on Behalf of Veselin Šljivančanin Seeking Reconsideration of the Judgement Rendered by the Appeals Chamber on 5 May 2009 – or an Alternative Remedy, 8 December 2009 (“Šljivančanin Decision”), p. 2, n. 7, referring to, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Zoran Žigić, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision on Zoran Žigić’s "Motion for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber Judgement IT-98-30/1-A Delivered on 28 February 2005", 26 June 2006 (“Žigić Decision”), para. 9. [3] See Prosecutor v. Veselin Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/l-R.1, Review Judgement, 8 December 2010 (“Šljivančanin Review Judgement”), para. 7; Žigić Decision, para. 7, and references cited therein. [4] See Žigić Decision, para. 9. See also Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-R, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration, 23 November 2006 (public redacted version), para. 79.
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IRMCT Statute Article 24 IRMCT Rule Rule 146 | |