Other inhumane acts
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
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Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2011 |
BAGOSORA et al. (Military I) (ICTR-98-41-A) |
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729. […] The Appeals Chamber underscores that the desecration of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana’s corpse constituted a profound assault on human dignity meriting unreserved condemnation under international law.[1] Such crimes strike at the core of national and human identity. However, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Pocar dissenting, that Bagosora was not charged on this basis, and thus cannot be held legally responsible for this act. [1] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that, in 1994, many domestic criminal codes, including the Rwandan criminal code, explicitly criminalised acts degrading the dignity of the corpse or interfering with a corpse. Any review of customary international law regarding this issue would need to take into account the large number of jurisdictions that criminalise degrading the dignity of or interfering with corpses. See, e.g., Botswana, Penal Code (1964) Ch. 08:01, s. 138; Canada, Criminal Code, R.S., 1985, c.C-34, s. 182(b); Costa Rica, Codigo Penal (1971), art. 207; Ethiopia, Penal Code, (1957), art. 287(b); Germany, Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), 1998, s. 168 (this section was added in 1987); India, Penal Code (1860), s. 297; Kenya, Penal Code (1970) Ch. 63, s. 137; Japan, Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907), art. 190; Lithuania, Criminal Code as amended (1961), art. 335; New Zealand, Crimes Act 1961 No. 43, art. 150(b); Nigeria, Criminal Code Act (1990), (Ch. 77), s. 242; United States of America (Oregon State), (1971), ORS.166.087; Pakistan, Criminal Code (1860), s. 297; Rwanda, Décret-loi N°21/77 du 18 août 1977 instituant le Code pénal, art. 352; Switzerland, Code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937, art. 262; Uganda, Penal Code Act 1950 (Ch. 120), s. 120; Vietnam, Penal Code (1985), s. 246. Humanitarian law also prohibits the maltreatment of corpses. See, e.g., The Laws of War on Land, Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, art. 19; Manual of the Laws of Naval War, Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 August 1913, art. 85; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 6 July 1906, art. 3; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 27 July 1929, art. 3; Convention (X) of the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, The Hague, 18 October 1907, art. 16; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, art. 16; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 12 December 1977, art. 34(1); Yves Sandoz, Christoph Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), para. 1307. The prohibition and criminalisation of maltreating corpses also extends to domestic military law. See, e.g., regarding prohibition: Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., International Committee for the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. II (Practice) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) (“ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law”), pp. 2663-2667, referring to: Australia, Defence Force Manual (1994), s. 998; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Instructions to the Muslim Fighter (1993), sec. c; Netherlands, Military Manual (1993), p. VI-2, s. 1817(1); Philippines, Military Instructions (1989), ss. 2, 4; Spain, Royal Ordinance for the Armed Forces (1978), art. 140; Switzerland, Basic Military Manual (1987), arts. 194(2), 200(f); United Kingdom, Military Manual (1958), s. 380; United Kingdom, Law of Armed Conflict Manual (1981), Annex A, p. 47, s. 15. See, e.g., regarding criminalization: ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, pp. 2665-2667, referring to Australia, War Crimes Act (1945), s. 3 (xxxv); Ecuador, Naval Manual (1989), p. 6-5, s. 6.2.5; Italy, Wartime Military Penal Code (1941), art. 197; Netherlands, Military Criminal Code as amended (1964), art. 143; New Zealand, Military Manual (1992), s. 1704(5); Nigeria, Manual on the Laws of War (undated), s. 6; Switzerland, Basic Military Manual (1987), arts. 194(2), 200(f); Switzerland, Military Criminal Code as amended (1927), art. 140(2); United Kingdom, Military Manual (1958), s. 626(b); United States, Field Manual (1956), s. 504(c); United States, Instructor’s Guide (1985), pp. 13, 14; Bangladesh, International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973), s. 3(2)(e); Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act as amended (1962), s. 4(1) and (4). Furthermore, in several trials following the Second World War, accused were convicted on charges of mutilating dead bodies. See, e.g., Kihuchi and Mahuchi case, United States Military Commission at Yokohama, Japan, 20 April 1946; Trial of Max Schmid, United States General Military Government Court at Dachau, Germany, 19 May 1947, United Nations War Crimes Commission Law Reports, vol. XIII, pp. 151, 152; Takehiko case, Australian Military Court at Wewak, 30 November 1945. See also Yochio and Other case, United States Military Commission at the Mariana Islands, 2-15 August 1946; Tisato case, Australian Military Court at Rabaul, 2 April 1946; Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1949, Volume XV, p. 134. |
ICTR Statute Article 3(i) ICTY Statute Article 5(i) | |
Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 |
LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ (IT-98-32/1-A) |
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634. The Appeals Chamber considers that not all acts committed in detention can be presumed to meet the requisite seriousness. […] |
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Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
Appeal Judgement - 17.12.2004 |
KORDIĆ & ČERKEZ (IT-95-14/2-A) |
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1039. It has previously been held in Krnojelac, Vasiljević, and Krstić, that intra-Article 5 convictions under the Statute for persecutions as a crime against humanity with other crimes against humanity found in that Article, are impermissibly cumulative. In Vasiljević and Krstić, the Appeals Chamber stated that the appellant could not be convicted both for murder and persecutions under Article 5(a) and (h) of the Statute, on the basis of the same acts.[1] It was reasoned that where a charge of persecutions is premised on murder and is proven, the Prosecution need not prove an additional fact in order to secure the conviction for murder because the offence is subsumed by the offence of persecutions, which requires proof of a materially distinct element of discriminatory intent in the commission of the act.[2] Similarly, the Appeals Chamber in these cases, as well as in Krnojelac, held that convictions for persecutions under Article 5(h) and for other inhumane acts under Article 5(i) on the basis of the same conduct are impermissibly cumulative “since the crime of persecution in the form of inhumane acts subsumes the crime against humanity of inhumane acts.”[3] 1040. The Appeals Chamber considers that cogent reasons warrant a departure from this jurisprudence[4] as an incorrect application of the Čelebići test to intra-Article 5 convictions. These cases are in direct contradiction to the reasoning and proper application of the test by the Appeals Chambers in Jelisić, Kupreškić, Kunarać, and Musema. As stated above, the Appeals Chamber in Čelebići expressly rejected an approach that takes into account the actual conduct of the accused as determinative of whether multiple convictions for that conduct are permissible. Rather, what is required is an examination, as a matter of law, of the elements of each offence in the Statute that pertain to that conduct for which the accused has been convicted. It must be considered whether each offence charged has a materially distinct element not contained in the other; that is, whether each offence has an element that requires proof of a fact not required by the other offence. 1041. The first pair of intra-Article 5 cumulative convictions at issue in this case is persecutions as a crime against humanity under Article 5(h) of the Statute and murder as a crime against humanity under Article 5(a) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber finds that the definition of persecutions contains materially distinct elements not present in the definition of murder under Article 5 of the Statute: the requirement of proof that an act or omission discriminates in fact and proof that the act or omission was committed with specific intent to discriminate. Murder, by contrast, requires proof that the accused caused the death of one or more persons, regardless of whether the act or omission causing the death discriminates in fact or was specifically intended as discriminatory, which is not required by persecutions. Thus, cumulative convictions on the basis of the same acts under Article 5 of the Statute are permissible in relation to these crimes. 1042. The second pair of intra-Article 5 cumulative convictions at issue in this case is persecutions and other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity under Article 5(i) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber finds that the definition of persecutions contains materially distinct elements not present in the definition of other inhumane acts under Article 5 of the Statute: the requirement of proof that an act or omission discriminates in fact and proof that the act or omission was committed with specific intent to discriminate. Other inhumane acts, by contrast, require proof that the accused caused serious bodily or mental harm to the victim(s), regardless of whether the act or omission causing the harm discriminates in fact or was specifically intended as discriminatory, which is not required by persecutions. Thus, cumulative convictions on the basis of the same acts are permissible in relation to these crimes under Article 5 of the Statute. 1043. Finally, the third pair of intra-Article 5 cumulative convictions at issue in this case is persecutions and imprisonment as a crime against humanity under Article 5(e) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber finds that the definition of persecutions contains materially distinct elements not present in the definition of imprisonment under Article 5 of the Statute: the requirement of proof that an act or omission discriminates in fact and proof that the act or omission was committed with specific intent to discriminate. On the other hand, the offence of imprisonment requires proof of the deprivation of the liberty of an individual without due process of law, regardless of whether the deprivation of liberty discriminates in fact or was specifically intended as discriminatory, which is not required by persecutions. Thus, cumulative convictions on the basis of the same acts are permissible in relation to these crimes under Article 5 of the Statute. See also Joint Dissenting Opinion on Cumulative Convictions of Judges Schomburg and Güney. [1] Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 146; Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 231. [2] Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 231-232. [3] Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 188; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 146; Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 231. [4] Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 107, 109. |
ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5 |