Personal jurisdiction
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
|---|---|---|
| Decision on Holbrooke Agreement - 12.10.2009 |
KARADŽIĆ Radovan (IT-95-5/18-AR73.4) |
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34. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, has adopted the Statute by means of resolution and established the Tribunal as a measure contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia.[1] The Statute, as the constitutive instrument of the Tribunal, defines the scope and limits of the Tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction.[2] In particular, Articles 1 to 9 of the Statute define the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, personae, loci and temporis. Article 1 of the Statute confers a general power for the Tribunal to prosecute “persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991”. There is no provision of the Statute which excludes any specific individual from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. [1] UNSC Resolution 808, S/RES/808(1992), 22 February 1993. See also, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 (“Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction”), paras 37-38; Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-AR73.2, Decision on Krajišnik’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision Dismissing the Defense Motion for a Ruling that Judge Canivell is Unable to Continue Sitting in This Case, 15 September 2006, (“Krajišnik Decision”), para. 15. [2] For the distinction between the notions of “substantive” and “inherent” jurisdiction, see Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 14. |
ICTY Statute Article 1 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Appeal Judgement - 19.05.2010 |
BOŠKOSKI & TARČULOVSKI (IT-04-82-A) |
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52. The Appeals Chamber recalls that pursuant to Article 1 of the Statute, the Tribunal is not limited in its jurisdiction to prosecute persons of a specific level of authority.[1] Indeed, a number of accused who had low-ranking positions in the military or the police or did not have any official position at all have been prosecuted and convicted by the Tribunal.[2] Hence, the subordinate role of an accused is legally irrelevant in determining his individual criminal responsibility. […] [1] Article 1 of the Statute provides: […].” [2] Cf. Erdemović Sentencing Judgement, paras 92-95; Tadić Sentencing Judgement, para. 60; Banović Sentencing Judgement, paras 45 and 91; Češić Sentencing Judgement, para. 37; Mrđa Sentencing Judgement, para. 53. See also Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) and Annex thereto, U.N. Doc. S/25704, para. 54: “all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia contribute to the commission of the violation and are, therefore, individually responsible” (emphasis added). |
ICTY Statute Article 1 | |
| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| JCE Decision - 21.05.2003 |
MILUTINOVIĆ et al. (IT-99-37-AR72) |
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21. […] In order to come within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae, any form of liability must satisfy three pre-conditions: (i) it must be provided for in the Statute, explicitly or implicitly; (ii) it must have existing under customary international law at the relevant time; (iii) the law providing for that form of liability must have been sufficiently accessible at the relevant time to anyone who acted in such a way; and (iv) such person must have been able to foresee that he could be held criminally liable for his actions if apprehended. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Decision on the Outcome of Proceedings - 29.06.2010 |
DELIĆ Rasim (IT-04-83-A) |
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6. First, the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to “natural persons”,[1] which, read in the context and in light of the Statute’s object and purpose, should be understood in its ordinary meaning, i.e., the living. Second, Article 25 of the Statute clearly states that “[t]he Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor”, thus leaving no room for other persons interested in the outcome of the appeal.[2] Third, neither the Statute nor the Rules allow for Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to any procedures initiated by the convicted person’s heirs or victims. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that this clearly demonstrates that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae is limited to living accused or convicted persons.[3] In Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, Decision on Motion for Continuation of the Appellate Proceedings, 29 June 2010, the Appeals Chamber denied the motion seeking the continuation of the proceedings on behalf of Rasim Delić’s son and considered that […] the plain reading of the Motion indicates that the entirety of the submissions therein are made on behalf of Delić’s son,[4] who is not and cannot qualify as a party to any existing proceedings before the Tribunal; […] Delić’s son has no standing to submit a motion before the Tribunal and cannot be represented by Counsel assigned to Delić; […] consequently, […] the Motion is not validly filed before the Appeals Chamber and […] the Appeals Chamber has no jurisdiction to consider its merits; [1] Article 6 of the Statute. [2] See also, Decision of 29 June 2010 [Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, Decision on Motion for Continuation of the Appellate Proceedings, 29 June 2010], p. 2. [3] In addition, trials and appeals before this Tribunal, as such, are not conducted in absentia, unless a living accused or the appellant waives his right to be present in the courtroom (see Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, 28 November 2007, paras 97-99 and references therein). The Appeals Chamber further notes that Rule 118(B) of the Rules provides for the possibility of the appeal judgement being rendered in the absence of the accused. However and in light of the above, the Appeals Chamber considers that this provision only deals with the issue of a living accused who is not physically present in the courtroom and therefore does not apply to the present situation. [4] E.g., Motion, paras 3, 7; Response, para. 2. |
ICTR Statute
Article 5; Article 24(1) ICTY Statute Article 6; Article 25(1) |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Decision on Croatia's Amicus Curiae Application - 18.07.2016 |
PRLIĆ et al. (IT-04-74-A ) |
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9. […] The Appeals Chamber further observes that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is restricted to “natural persons” and the Tribunal does not have the competency to make findings on state responsibility.[1] […] [1] Statute of the Tribunal, Arts 1, 6-7. See also Gotovina and Markač Decision of 8 February 2012 [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Decision on Motion to Intervene and Statement of Interest by the Republic of Croatia, 8 February 2012], para. 12. |
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| Notion(s) | Filing | Case |
| Decision Dismissing a Request - 13.04.2018 |
NIYITEGEKA Eliézer (MICT-12-16-R) |
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Pages 1-2: NOTING that Niyitegeka passed away on 28 March 2018, while serving his sentence in the Republic of Mali;[1] RECALLING that the Mechanism continues the personal jurisdiction of the ICTR as set out in Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTR ("ICTR Statute");[2] OBSERVING that Article 5 of the ICTR Statute stipulates that the ICTR "shall have jurisdiction over natural persons"; CONSIDERING that, when read in the context of the object and purpose of the ICTR Statute, "natural persons" is understood as limited to those who are alive;[3] RECALLING that appeal proceedings before the ICTY and trial proceedings before the ICTY and the ICTR have been terminated following the death of the appellant or the accused for lack of personal jurisdiction;[4] CONSIDERING that, to uphold principles of due process and fundamental fairness, the Mechanism's jurisdiction ratione personae, consistent with that of the ICTR and the ICTY, is limited to living persons;[5] FINDING that, in light of. Niyitegeka's death, the Appeals Chamber no longer has jurisdiction to consider the Request; [1] See Registrar’s Submission Pursuant to Rule 31(B), 6 April 2018 (confidential), para. 2, Annex A. See also The Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Decision on the Enforcement of Sentence, 4 December 2008, p. 3. See also Request for Review, 27 June 2017 (confidential; French original filed on 7 June 2017), para. 1. [2] Article 1 of the Statute of the Mechanism. [3] See, mutatis mutandis, Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, Decision on the Outcome of the Proceedings, 29 June 2010 (“Delić Decision of 29 June 2010"), para. 6 (interpreting "natural persons" in Article 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")). [4] See Delić Decision of 29 June 2010, paras. 5, 6, 8, 16, n. 16 and references cited therein. See also Prosecutor v. Goran Hadžić, Case No. IT-04-75-T, Order Terminating Proceedings, 22 July 2016, p. 1; The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision Relating to Registrar’s Submission Notifying the Demise of Accused Joseph Nzirorera, 12 August 2010, para. 2. Cf. Édouard Karemera et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR‑98‑44‑AR91.3, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal of Decision Not to Investigate Witnesses GAP and BDW for False Testimony, 26 August 2010, p. 1 (dismissing Joseph Nzirorera’s pending interlocutory appeal after his death for lack of jurisdiction). [5] See supra n. 8. See also Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-09-A.R14, Decision on Appeal Against the Referral of Phénéas Munyarugarama's Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to Strike, 5 October 2012, paras. 5, 6. |
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