Haxhiu filed his notice of appeal against the trial judgement convicting him for contempt 26 days after the date of the trial judgement. The Prosecution asked to strike the notice of appeal as being time-barred. Haxhiu argued that appeals against judgements on appeal are filed not within the time limit prescribed by Rule 77(J) (15 days) but pursuant to the general time-limit for appeal against judgements pursuant to Rule 108 (30 days). The Appeals Chamber held as followed:

12. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber recalls that in Prosecutor v. Marijačić and Rebić it was confronted with a question similar to the one in this case. The Appeals Chamber in that case explicitly rejected the argument, made by one of the appellants in relation to the filing of the appeal brief, that Section III of the Practice Direction is only applicable to interlocutory decisions but not to judgements rendered pursuant to Rule 77. The Appeals Chamber consequently held that “Section III [of the Practice Direction] applies to final decisions of a Trial Chamber under Rule 77.”[1]

13. The same reasoning applies to Rule 77(J) of the Rules, which is mirrored in paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction. Indeed, in Prosecutor v. Šešelj, the Appeals Chamber stated that “Rule 77(J) of the Rules shall be interpreted as allowing for appeals against decisions disposing of contempt cases only.”[2]

14. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Haxhiu’s Notice of Appeal was filed outside the prescribed time-limits. […]

11.    To begin with, Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute draws no distinctions between the trial stage and the appeal stage of a case.  There is thus no textual basis for concluding that the guarantee to self-representation therein (as recognized in the Milošević Decision) evaporates with the issuance of the trial judgement.  Moreover, there is no obvious reason why self-representation at trial is so different in character from self-representation on appeal as to require an a priori distinction between the two.  Self-representation on appeal may be a complex and tricky business, but on its face it is no more difficult (and indeed perhaps less difficult) than self-representation at trial.  Both stages involve complicated factual and legal issues and require familiarity with a daunting set of procedural rules.  It may never be in an individual’s interests to represent himself, either at trial or at appeal, but he nonetheless has a “cornerstone” right to make his own case to the Tribunal.

12.    Finally, a review of the case law of domestic jurisdictions does not support a distinction between the trial and appeal stages for purposes of self-representation.  In the course of substantial research, as supplemented by the helpful submissions of the parties, the Appeals Chamber has come across only one jurisdiction – the United States – that finds a right to self-representation at trial but not on appeal.[2]  Moreover, in concluding that the United States federal Constitution grants defendants a right to self-representation at trial but not on appeal, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that the relevant constitutional provision “does not include any right to appeal” and thus that “[i]t necessarily follows that [this provision] does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal.”[3]  Such reasoning has no force in the situation at hand, since Article 25 of the Statute of the Tribunal plainly provides a right of appeal.  The Appeals Chamber thus declines to rely on the distinction drawn in United States jurisprudence.  The Appeals Chamber further considers it noteworthy that no other jurisdiction appears to draw such a distinction.[4]

Pages 2, 3

RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 144(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism […], the judgement on appeal shall be pronounced in public by the Appeals Chamber or a Judge thereof, on a date of which notice shall be given to the parties and counsel and at which they shall be entitled to be present;

[…]

OBSERVING that the Rules do not restrict the scheduling or conduct of appeal proceedings, including the pronouncement of judgement, on the basis of a stayed status conference;[14]

[…]

CONSIDERING that, during the Pronouncement of Judgement, a Judge of the Appeals Chamber will read a summary of the written judgement and publicly pronounce the verdict, with no action required from the parties or counsel;[18]

Pages 3, 4

RECALLING that assigned counsel are responsible for all aspects of defence in a given case before the Mechanism;[1]

RECALLING, however, that the Appeals Chamber may exercise its discretion to allow persons other than counsel and co-counsel to make representations before it;[2]

RECALLING that Ms. [Peta-Louise] Bagott was granted the right of audience for the Appeal Hearing and, appearing with the co‑counsel, made oral submissions on behalf of Mr. Mladić;[3]

CONSIDERING that […] Mr. Mladić consents to having Ms. Bagott represent him at the Pronouncement of Judgement, and that the Prosecution does not oppose this request;

RECALLING that, during the Pronouncement of Judgement, a Judge of the Appeals Chamber will read a summary of the written judgement and publicly pronounce the verdict, with no action required from the parties or counsel;[4]

[…]

FINDING that, in these circumstances, it is appropriate to exceptionally grant Ms. Bagott the right of audience before the Appeals Chamber at the Pronouncement of Judgement […];

[…]

HEREBY EXCEPTIONALLY EXTENDS Legal Consultant Ms. Bagott the right of audience to appear in court and act without either Lead Counsel Mr. [Branko] Lukić or Co-Counsel Mr. [Dragan] Ivetić being present in the courtroom for the Pronouncement of Judgement;