The Prosecution was arguing that the Impugned Decision was not based on the established criterion of “compelling humanitarian reasons” but was simply a decision to grant provisional release during the judicial recess. The Appeals Chamber held:

10. The Appeals Chamber recalls its observation that “there is no reason to establish a precedent pursuant to which accused are granted provisional release for the period between the Prosecution and Defence case, absent sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons”.[1] The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber correctly stated the applicable law, including the criterion of sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons, and proceeded to apply it to the circumstances of the case before it.[2] The Trial Chamber noted the fact that it would adjourn for judicial recess during the period for which Praljak requested to be released only after it identified the criteria that it was required to establish in order to grant the Request.[3] While the Appeals Chamber agrees that there is no “recess leave”, it considers that the judicial activity calendar may be a relevant factor when assessing a request for provisional release, notably to avoid unwarranted disruptions or undue delays in the proceedings.[4] Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to show an error of law in the Impugned Decision in this regard.