14.     In accordance with the criteria set out in Rule 65(I) of the Rules for granting provisional release, the Appeals Chamber will first determine whether it is satisfied that, if released, the Appellant will surrender into detention at the conclusion of the fixed period. With regard to the applicable standard of proof, the Appeals Chamber recalls that Rule 65 of the Rules provides for provisional release for an accused as well as for a convicted person. The specificity of the appeal stage is reflected by Rule 65(I)(iii) of the Rules, which provides for an additional criterion, i.e. that “special circumstances exist warranting such release.” As to the burden of proof that an applicant must meet in order to satisfy the Appeals Chamber, there is no explicit or implicit provision in the Rules suggesting that a higher standard of proof should be applied on appeal. The Appeals Chamber deems that the inclusion of a provision on provisional release in the Rules was driven by humane and compassionate considerations together with concerns related to the principle of proportionality in international law. These concerns remain even if the applicant has been convicted at trial. The Appeals Chamber considers that the fact that the person has already been sentenced is a matter to take into account when balancing the probabilities. 

15.     The Appeals Chamber considers that the seriousness of the offences of which an appellant has been found guilty is one of the factors it has to take into account when assessing whether an appellant, if released, would return to detention. It is evident that the more severe the sentence is, the greater is the incentive to flee. The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that this cannot be the sole factor that determines the outcome of an application for provisional release.

3. Pursuant to Rule 65(I) of the Rules, a convicted person may bring an application seeking provisional release for a fixed period. By virtue of Rule 107 of the Rules, the whole of Rule 65 of the Rules applies mutatis mutandis to applications brought before the Appeals Chamber under this provision.[1] Rule 65(I) of the Rules thus provides that the Appeals Chamber may grant provisional release if it is satisfied that (i) the convicted person, if released, will either appear at the hearing of the appeal or will surrender into detention at the conclusion of the fixed period, as the case may be; (ii) the convicted person, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person, and; (iii) special circumstances exist warranting such release. These requirements must be considered cumulatively.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that “whether an applicant satisfies these requirements is to be determined on a balance of probabilities, and the fact that an individual has already been sentenced is a matter to be taken into account by the Appeals Chamber when balancing the probabilities.”[3]

3. Pursuant to Rule 65(I) of the Rules, a convicted person may bring an application seeking provisional release for a fixed period. By virtue of Rule 107 of the Rules, the whole of Rule 65 applies mutatis mutandis to applications brought before the Appeals Chamber under this provision.[1] Rule 65(I) of the Rules thus provides that the Appeals Chamber may grant provisional release if it is satisfied that: (i) the convicted person, if released, will either appear at the hearing of the appeal or will surrender into detention at the conclusion of the fixed period, as the case may be; (ii) the convicted person, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person, and; (iii) special circumstances exist warranting such release. These requirements must be considered cumulatively.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that “whether an applicant satisfies these requirements is to be determined on a balance of probabilities, and the fact that an individual has already been sentenced is a matter to be taken into account by the Appeals Chamber when balancing the probabilities”.[3] Finally, the discretionary assessments of the requirements under Rule 65 of the Rules are made on a case-by-case basis.[4]

4. Pursuant to Rule 65(I) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal (“Rules”), a convicted person may bring an application seeking provisional release for a fixed period. By virtue of Rule 107 of the Rules, the whole of Rule 65 applies mutatis mutandis to applications brought before the Appeals Chamber under this provision.[1] Rule 65(I) of the Rules thus provides that the Appeals Chamber may grant provisional release if it is satisfied that (i) the convicted person, if released, will either appear at the hearing of the appeal or will surrender into detention at the conclusion of the fixed period, as the case may be; (ii) the convicted person, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person, and; (iii) special circumstances exist warranting such release. These requirements must be considered cumulatively.[2] The Appeals Chamber recalls that “whether an applicant satisfies these requirements is to be determined on a balance of probabilities, and the fact that an individual has already been sentenced is a matter to be taken into account by the Appeals Chamber when balancing the probabilities.”[3] Finally, the discretionary assessments of the requirements under Rule 65 are made on a case-by-case basis.[4]

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[…] [C]ounsel participating in appeals proceedings are expected to familiarize themselves with the relevant procedural requirements;

Pages 2-3

CONSIDERING that Šešelj has elected to represent himself and that he has the right to self‑representation at the appeal stage;

[…]

CONSIDERING that, in view of Šešelj’s current position not to appear at the appeal hearing, the Appeals Chamber must take appropriate measures to ensure that his interests are represented at the upcoming appeal hearing in order to ensure the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings;

CONSIDERING that, prior to restricting Šešelj’s right to self-representation, the Appeals Chamber must issue a warning that is specific in nature;

CONSIDERING that, if [ešelj maintains his intention not to attend the appeal hearing, it will be in the interests of justice to instruct the Registrar pursuant to Rules 46 and 131 of the Rules to assign a standby counsel to represent Šešelj’s interests in the event that Šešelj is not present at the appeal hearing;

CONSIDERING that any restrictions on Šešelj’s right to represent himself must be limited to the minimum extent necessary to protect the Mechanism’s interest in a reasonably expeditious resolution of the appeal before it;

CONSIDERING, therefore, that, in order to preserve Šešelj’s right to self-representation, the mandate of the standby counsel shall be strictly limited to ensuring that Šešelj’s procedural rights at the hearing are protected if he does not attend, and shall not extend to making a response on [ešelj’s behalf on the substance of the Prosecution’s appeal;

[…]

CONSIDERING that Šešelj should be given an opportunity to reconsider his position not to attend the appeal hearing prior to instructing the Registrar to assign standby counsel;[5]

Page 2

CONSIDERING that standby counsel shall have access to the inter partes record of the appeal proceedings in order to prepare for the hearing;

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RECALLING that the filing of a notice of appeal marks the commencement of the appeal proceedings in a case, and, since the time limits for the filing of subsequent briefs are calculated from the date on which the notice of appeal is filed, any delay at such an early stage will affect subsequent filings;[1]

RECALLING FURTHER that parties may have the opportunity, after the filing of the notice of appeal, to request variation of their grounds of appeal provided that they show good cause under Rule 133 of the Rules;[2]

Pages 2, 3

RECALLING that, pursuant to Rule 144(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism […], the judgement on appeal shall be pronounced in public by the Appeals Chamber or a Judge thereof, on a date of which notice shall be given to the parties and counsel and at which they shall be entitled to be present;

[…]

OBSERVING that the Rules do not restrict the scheduling or conduct of appeal proceedings, including the pronouncement of judgement, on the basis of a stayed status conference;[14]

[…]

CONSIDERING that, during the Pronouncement of Judgement, a Judge of the Appeals Chamber will read a summary of the written judgement and publicly pronounce the verdict, with no action required from the parties or counsel;[18]

Pages 3, 4

RECALLING that assigned counsel are responsible for all aspects of defence in a given case before the Mechanism;[1]

RECALLING, however, that the Appeals Chamber may exercise its discretion to allow persons other than counsel and co-counsel to make representations before it;[2]

RECALLING that Ms. [Peta-Louise] Bagott was granted the right of audience for the Appeal Hearing and, appearing with the co‑counsel, made oral submissions on behalf of Mr. Mladić;[3]

CONSIDERING that […] Mr. Mladić consents to having Ms. Bagott represent him at the Pronouncement of Judgement, and that the Prosecution does not oppose this request;

RECALLING that, during the Pronouncement of Judgement, a Judge of the Appeals Chamber will read a summary of the written judgement and publicly pronounce the verdict, with no action required from the parties or counsel;[4]

[…]

FINDING that, in these circumstances, it is appropriate to exceptionally grant Ms. Bagott the right of audience before the Appeals Chamber at the Pronouncement of Judgement […];

[…]

HEREBY EXCEPTIONALLY EXTENDS Legal Consultant Ms. Bagott the right of audience to appear in court and act without either Lead Counsel Mr. [Branko] Lukić or Co-Counsel Mr. [Dragan] Ivetić being present in the courtroom for the Pronouncement of Judgement;